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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Some well-known and respected commentators recently have criticized 
Congress for enacting statutes that, in their opinion, exceed Congress’ 
delegated powers and invade traditional spheres of state regulation.  In the 
wake of such criticism, some commentators have heralded the recent United 
States Supreme Court decisions in New York v. United States, United States v. 
Lopez, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, City of Boerne v. Flores, and Printz v. 
United States, each of which strikes down an Act of Congress on some 
constitutional basis, as fundamentally shifting the federal balance of power in 
favor of the states.  Others are of the opinion that the narrow holdings of these 
cases have little to say about the general relationship between the federal 
government and the states and, therefore, will have little effect on that 
relationship.  Not coincidentally, the remarkable split in the commentary 
almost invariably divides along the lines of those who agree that the cases 
reflect sound constitutional principles and those who believe the cases declare 
flawed public policy. 
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This Article evaluates the impact of the above Supreme Court cases by 
collecting the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit that apply the cases.  Based upon the Eighth Circuit’s receptiveness to 
litigants’ arguments predicated on the Supreme Court cases, this Article draws 
conclusions regarding the degree to which the cases have realized the 
expectations of their proponents or the stark predictions of their critics.  The 
goal is to determine authoritatively whether, putting to one side their highly 
disputed merits, the cases truly represent a revolution in federalism 
jurisprudence or merely are aberrations destined to be ignored in most cases. 
A. Criticism of Congressional Acts 
Respected scholars, popular commentators, and even the Chief Justice of 
the United States, recently have expressed concerns about congressional Acts 
“federalizing” entire areas of law traditionally thought to be reserved for state 
regulation, “commandeering” state resources and officers for the advancement 
of federal policies, or subjecting states to private causes of action in federal 
court.1  The fundamental criticism is that Congress, by enacting these statutes, 
has exceeded its delegated powers and has encroached upon the residual 
sovereignty of the states, thus damaging the system of dual sovereignty 
established in the United States Constitution. 
A prominent expositor of this view, former United States Attorney General 
Edwin Meese III, repeatedly has criticized Congress for the rapid increase in 
the number of criminal offenses in the United States Code that duplicate 
existing state crimes.  In his capacity as chairman of an American Bar 
Association task force studying the federalization of criminal law, Meese 
lamented that federal crimes, many of which prohibit and punish conduct local 
in nature, now number in the thousands.2  The growing number of federal 
 
 1. But see Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 247 (1997); Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1029, 1038-47 (1995). 
 2. See Edwin Meese, III, The Dangerous Federalization of Crime, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 
1999, at A19 (“Today there are more than 3,000 federal crimes on the books.  Hardly any crime, 
no matter how local in nature, is beyond the jurisdiction of federal law enforcement authorities.”); 
see also Edwin Meese III, Big Brother on the Beat: The Expanding Federalization of Crime, 1 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 3 (1997) (“[T]here are well over 3,000 federal crimes today.  And this 
number does not include the 10,000 regulatory requirements that carry criminal penalties.  Few 
crimes, no matter how local in nature, are beyond the reach of the federal criminal jurisdiction.”). 
Some of the examples Meese cited are: the Anti-Car Theft Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (West Supp. 
1999) (prohibiting carjacking); the Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 228 (West Supp. 
1999) (prohibiting failure to pay child support); the Church Arson Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
247 (West Supp. 1999) (prohibiting burning or damaging church property); the Freedom of 
Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994) (prohibiting blocking an abortion clinic); 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (West Supp. 1999) (prohibiting possession of 
a handgun near a school).  See Meese, TEX. REV. L. & POL., supra, at 3-5. 
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offenses is particularly alarming, according to Meese, when one considers the 
“startling fact that more than 40% of the federal criminal provisions enacted 
since the Civil War became law in just the last three decades.”3  Meese’s basic 
concern, as expressed at a symposium on the role of the federal judiciary, is 
that “the federalization of crimes that traditionally have concerned state and 
local governments upsets the balance between the national government and the 
states.”4 
In many ways, the opinions of the former attorney general parallel the 
concerns expressed for years by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist.5  Since as 
early as 1991, Chief Justice Rehnquist consistently has stressed, in his annual 
Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, the importance of a proper balance 
between federal and state court jurisdiction and has requested that Congress 
restrain itself when considering the addition of new crimes to the United States 
Code.6  Regarding the substantial increase in federal criminal cases in 1997,7 
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that “[m]any factors have produced this 
 
 3. Meese, WALL ST. J., supra note 3, at A19; see also Meese Task Force Reports on Laws, 
LAS VEGAS REV. J., Feb. 16, 1999, at 5A (“A task force chaired by former Attorney General 
Edwin Meese III . . . notes with alarm that more than 40 percent of all federal criminal laws 
enacted since the Civil War were passed since 1970.”). 
 4. Edwin Meese, III, Putting the Federal Judiciary Back on the Constitutional Track, 14 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 793 (1998). 
 5. See Meese, WALL ST. J., supra note 3, at A19 (“The ABA report, backed up by 
extensive statistical data, supports the position of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who deplored 
the expanded federalization of crime in his annual report on the federal judiciary last 
December . . . .”); LAS VEGAS REV. J., supra note 3, at 5A (“The ‘Federalization of Criminal 
Law’ report mirrors criticism raised by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in his year-end report 
on the federal judiciary in December.”). 
 6. See William H. Rehnquist, The 1991 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, THE 
THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington D.C.), Jan. 1992, at 2-3: 
In attaining [jurisdictional] balance, we cannot overlook . . . the federal courts’ limited 
role reserved for issues where important national interests predominate . . . .  Modest 
curtailment of federal jurisdiction is important; equally important is self-restraint in 
adding new federal causes of action.  New additions should not be made unless critical to 
meeting important national interests . . . . 
Id.; see also William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conference on State-Federal 
Judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1660 (1992) (“Those of you who have read my 
Annual Report on the Judiciary know what I have been saying about the recent tendency to 
federalize crimes for essentially political reasons without recognizing the impact federalization 
would have on the federal courts.”). 
 7. The increase in criminal cases “produc[ed] the largest federal criminal caseload in 60 
years.”  William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary [hereinafter 
1997 Judiciary Report], THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, 
D.C.), Jan. 1998, at 2; see also 1997 Jud. Bus. U.S. Cts. 19-20, 178 (Table D) (“In 1997, filings 
of both criminal cases and defendants rose to their highest levels since 1933, the year the 
Prohibition Amendment was repealed.  Case filings grew 5 percent to 50,363, which caused 
filings per authorized judgeship to increase from 74 to 78 cases.”). 
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upward spiral, including laws enacted by Congress that expand federal 
jurisdiction over crimes involving drugs and firearms.”8  Chief Justice  
Rehnquist admonished Congress to consider carefully the impact of the 
increased caseload on the federal courts before further expanding federal 
jurisdiction.  He then reiterated the federal judiciary’s “long-standing position 
that federal prosecutions should be limited to those offenses that cannot or 
should not be prosecuted in state courts.”9 
In his 1998 year-end report, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the most 
severe, and prominently reported,10 rebuke to date of Congress’ continuing 
penchant for federalizing crimes traditionally prosecuted in state courts.11  He 
warned that the current trend “threatens to change entirely the nature of our 
federal system.”12  Federal courts, he stated, were not meant to deal with local 
crimes, and because state courts are capable of handling such crimes, the 
federal courts should not be expected to do so.13 
 
 8. Rehnquist, 1997 Judiciary Report, supra note 7, at 2. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Numerous widely-circulated newspapers publicized Chief Justice Rehnquist’s remarks 
and excerpted them at length.  See, e.g., Making a Federal Case Out of It, N.Y. POST, Jan. 5, 
1999, at 24; Aaron Epstein, Rehnquist Rips Congress for Neglecting U.S. Courts, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Jan. 2, 1999, at A2; Rehnquist Report Assails Glut of Federal Offenses, CHI. TRIB., 
Jan. 1, 1999, at 3. 
 11. See William H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary [1998 
Judiciary Report], THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.), 
Jan. 1999, at 2. 
  As examples of the recent trend “to federalize crimes already covered by state laws,” 
Chief Justice Rehnquist listed: the Anti-Car Theft Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (West Supp. 1999) 
(prohibiting carjacking); the Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 228 (West Supp. 1999) 
(prohibiting failure to pay child support); the Animal Enterprise Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43 
(West Supp. 1999) (prohibiting stealing, damaging, or causing the loss of any property of an 
animal research facility, zoo, circus or other “animal enterprise”); the Church Arson Prevention 
Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 247 (West Supp. 1999) (prohibiting burning or damaging church property).  
Rehnquist, 1998 Judiciary Report, supra, at 2.  See also Rehnquist, VA. L. REV., supra note 6, at 
1660 (describing the Violence Against Women Act as “creat[ing] new federal crimes[,] . . . an ill-
defined new civil cause of action . . . [and] needless friction and duplication among the state and 
federal systems”). 
 12. Rehnquist, 1998 Judiciary Report, supra note 11, at 2. 
 13. See id. (“Federal courts were not created to adjudicate local crimes, no matter how 
sensational or heinous the crimes may be.  State courts do, can, and should handle such 
problems.”); see also William H. Rehnquist, Seen In a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal 
Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993) (“Federal courts were intended to complement state court 
systems, not supplant them.  And federal courts were to be a distinctive judicial forum of limited 
jurisdiction, performing the tasks that state courts, for political or structural reasons, could not.”). 
  For additional criticism of the federalization of crime by other prominent leaders, see, 
e.g., 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1944-45 (Nov. 29, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6696-1 (President Bush); Lorie Hearn, Trying Times Are Ahead: Justice O’Connor Says 
Federalization of Crime Could Overwhelm the Courts, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Aug. 17, 1994, 
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Less prominent in the popular media, but equally prevalent in legal 
journals and law reviews, has been commentary regarding Congress’ 
propensity for “commandeering” the administrative and regulatory 
bureaucracies of the states.  For example, Professor Caminker, in a 1995 
article, reported that Congress has enacted numerous statutes in the past decade 
that treat the states as departments of the federal government.14  He stated that, 
“[r]ather than regulate private behavior directly, the statutes order state 
governments to issue or enforce regulations on private behavior according to 
Congress’s direction.”15  As Professor Caminker explained, the statutes create 
resentment among state officials because they require that scarce state 
resources be diverted to advance federal purposes, instead of being allocated to 
meet local demands.16 
Professor Hills argued, in a more recent article, that commandeering 
amounts to “pointless centralization” of governmental power because it 
sacrifices federalism’s advantages to achieve ends that are just as easily 
reached by paying the states for the use of their regulatory bureaucracies.17  
Commandeering also diminishes state revenue and the policymaking discretion 
of state officers.18  “[S]uch erosion of the power, money, and prestige of 
nonfederal offices can only reduce the incentive of voters and politicians to 
 
at A1 (Justice O’Connor); FBI Chief Says New Laws Strain Bureau, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 9, 1993, 
at A16 (FBI Director Louis J. Freeh). 
 14. See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer 
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1995).  As 
examples of such commandeering, Professor Caminker cited to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act and to the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act.  Id. at 1002, 1009-
10.  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-(j) (1988) (making each state responsible for the disposal 
of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders); 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924, 925A (1994) 
(requiring that state law enforcement officers make a “reasonable effort” to determine if proposed 
gun sales comply with local, state, and federal law). 
 15. Caminker, supra note 14, at 1002. 
 16. See id. at 1003; see also Edward A. Zelinsky, The Unsolved Problem of the Unfunded 
Mandate, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 741, 766 (1997): 
[I]f the federal government requires employees of the DMV to register voters, those 
employees are thereby diverted from some other task, e.g., programs to deter drunk 
driving; if local police are required to implement the Brady Bill, they too are deflected 
from some other activity, e.g., street patrols.  To preserve those other activities, state and 
local officials must divert resources from other programs or must raise taxes, in effect 
levying state and local taxpayers to pay for federally-mandated programs. 
Id. 
 17. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State 
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 857 (1998).  
See also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 181, 185 (1998) (“[N]on-federal governments have the capacity to bargain hard for more 
implementing discretion or more federal money, or both, when they enlist to implement federal 
programs.”). 
 18. See Hills, MICH. L. REV., supra note 17, at 894-95. 
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expend time, energy, and money in voting, running for office, monitoring 
representatives, and otherwise engaging in political activities. . . .”19  
Furthermore, commandeering unfairly allocates the costs of federal programs 
to the states, forcing states to cut nonmandated services that are not favored by 
Congress, even though they may be of interest to local constituents.20  Finally, 
Professor Hills argued that commandeering often forces state politicians to 
advance federal policies with which they disagree, and that such “forced 
association” undermines political accountability,21 decreases political 
pluralism,22 and degrades the integrity of state officers.23 
Professor Light, limiting his discussion of commandeering to the arena of 
environmental regulation, commented on the emergence in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s of environmental statutes “designed to utilize state administration 
and enforcement mechanisms in the implementation of federal regulatory 
regimes.”24  To ensure efficient implementation by the states, most of the 
environmental statutes provide economic incentives, threaten partial 
preemption of state law, or impose regulatory requirements that are also 
generally applicable to private entities.25  Some of the statutes, however, 
comprise “direct orders” compelling state legislatures to enact, and state 
executive agencies to enforce, federal programs at the threat of civil and 
criminal penalties for noncompliance.26  Professor Light criticized such 
 
 19. Id. at 895. 
 20. Id. at 901-04; see also Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural 
Approach, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (1998) (“Whatever time and money states must 
expend to enact or administer federal regulatory programs necessarily diminishes their ability to 
adopt and implement state regulatory programs.”). 
 21. Hills, MICH. L. REV., supra note 17, at 906-07; see also Hills, HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y., supra note 17, at 192 (“If Congress could force state and local governments to carry out 
federal programs, then Congress could also bar governors and mayors from interfering with state 
and local agencies’ efforts to enforce federal law.”). 
 22. See Hills, MICH. L. REV., supra note 17, at 911. 
 23. Id. at 911-12. 
 24. Alfred R. Light, He Who Pays the Piper Should Call the Tune: Dual Sovereignty in U.S. 
Environmental Law, 4 ENVTL. L. 779, 782 (1998).  Regarding the recent vintage of federal 
environmental regulation, Professor Light stated, “[t]he high degree of federal participation 
exercised in environmental law today is only a recent phenomenon.  Until the late 1960s, 
environmental regulation was considered primarily the domain of states and municipalities.  In 
response to public outcry, however, Congress waxed prolific in the area of environmental 
protection.”  Id. 
 25. See Light, supra note 24, at 798-99, 804, 813. 
 26. Id. at 800-04.  See generally the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1994) 
(establishing criminal penalties for negligent and knowing violations of certain substantive 
sections of the Act); the Lead Contamination Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-24 (1994) (requiring 
that states disseminate information compiled by the EPA and establish lead contamination 
remedial programs); the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know-Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
11001(a) and 11046(a)(1)(C)-(D) (1994) (requiring that the governor of each state establish an 
“emergency response commission” and creating civil liability for noncompliance with other 
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mandates on the familiar grounds that they “commandeer[] the states’ police 
power . . . [and] erode political accountability.”27 
Finally, Professor Light also was skeptical of federal statutes that provide 
for citizen enforcement actions against violators of environmental 
regulations.28  Such enforcement provisions, though they appear innocuous 
enough at first blush, may raise federalism concerns when the alleged violator 
happens to be a state official or agency.  Professor Light doubted that, in the 
event such a case should arise, Congress would have the power to abrogate the 
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court to enforce 
federal environmental regulations promulgated under the Commerce Clause.29  
“[T]he Eleventh Amendment could conceivably bar citizen claims against 
states . . . , even when the state is part of the regulated community along with 
private parties.”30 
B. Commentary on the Significance of the Supreme Court’s Recent 
Federalism Cases 
In the context of the wide-ranging criticism that Congress, by enacting 
statutes like the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act, and the Clean Air Act, has overreached its 
boundaries and encroached upon spheres of state regulation, some 
commentators, and judges alike, have acclaimed the recent decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court in New York v. United States,31 United States v. 
Lopez,32 Seminole Tribe v. Florida,33 City of Boerne v. Flores,34 and Printz v. 
 
provision of the Act); the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991a(b)-(c) and 6972(a)(1)(A) 
(1994) (requiring that the governor of each state designate a state agency to inventory 
underground storage tanks for submission to the EPA, and creating civil liability for failure to do 
so). 
 27. Light, supra note 24, at 800. 
 28. See id. at 806.  Professor Light cited the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) 
(creating a civil cause of action against any person, including “the United States, and . . . any 
other government instrumentality or agency,” for violation of the Act) and the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994) (creating a civil cause of action against any person, 
including “the United States, and. . .any other government instrumentality or agency,” for 
violation of the Act). 
 29. See Light, supra note 24, at 809; see also William E. Thro, The Eleventh Amendment 
Revolution in the Lower Federal Courts, 25 J.C. & U.L. 501, 502, 518 (1999) (criticizing 
Congress’ regular abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment allowing private parties to “enforce 
virtually all federal statutory rights against the States in federal courts.”). 
 30. Light, supra note 24, at 810. 
 31. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the “take-title” provision of the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act is beyond the Article I powers of Congress and, 
therefore, is a violation of the Tenth Amendment). 
 32. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeds the power of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause). 
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United States35 as the first steps toward a federal system of government in 
which the reserved sovereignty of the states is respected and the limits of 
congressional power are enforced.36 
 
 33. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress does not have the power under the Indian 
Commerce Clause to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, 
as it purported to do in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act). 
 34. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeds 
Congress’ enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 35. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the background-check provision of the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act exceeds Congress’ Article I power and is inconsistent with the 
constitutional systems of federalism and separation of powers). 
 36. Other cases often included in this category of recent federalism cases are the following: 
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (holding the Ex parte Young exception to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity did not apply to a suit amounting to a quiet title action brought 
by an Indian tribe against state officers); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (holding that a 
federal district court’s desegregation orders requiring Missouri to fund salary increases and 
remedial education are beyond its remedial capacity); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 
U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing, for a four-justice minority, that the Tenth 
Amendment reserves to the people of Arkansas the power to amend their state constitution to 
impose term limits on U.S. senators and congressmen from Arkansas); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452 (1991) (holding the Missouri Constitution’s mandatory retirement age for state judges 
does not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act or the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Introduction: Constitutional Federalism 
Reborn, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 93 (1998) (discussing Coeur d’Alene); Harry Litman & Mark 
D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of Commerce-Clause Based Regulation 
of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921 (1997) (discussing Jenkins and U.S. 
Term Limits); Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution’s Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New 
Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 621, 623-25 (1995) 
(discussing U.S. Term Limits and Gregory); Richard C. Reuben, Court Bolsters 10th Amendment, 
ABA J., April 1995, at 78-79 (discussing Gregory).  These cases, however, are not circumstances 
in which the Supreme Court struck down congressional legislation as exceeding congressional 
power and encroaching on state sovereignty; therefore, they are outside the scope of this Article. 
  Three cases that cannot be excluded from the category of recent Supreme Court 
federalism cases are the following: Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (holding that 
Congress does not have the power under Article I to abrogate an unconsenting state’s sovereign 
immunity to private suit for damages in state court); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense Board. v. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (holding that the Patent and 
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act does not abrogate state sovereign immunity to 
suit in federal court because it is not appropriate remedial or preventive legislation under § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment); and College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) (holding that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act 
does not abrogate state sovereign immunity to suit in federal court because it was not enacted 
pursuant to Congress’ enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; and 
overruling the constructive waiver doctrine of Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)).  
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education, the Court also overruled 
the constructive waiver doctrine allowing states to waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity 
without having expressed intent to do so.  Id. 
  Likewise, the Eighth Circuit, relying on Alden and the Florida Prepaid cases, decided in 
Bradley v. Arkansas Department of Education that Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to 
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For example, in a paper submitted to a 1995 academic symposium on 
Lopez, Professor Calabresi characterized the Lopez Court’s decision to strike 
down the Gun-Free Schools Zones Act37 as an “extraordinary event” and 
endorsed Lopez as a “revolutionary . . . revival” of the fundamental 
constitutional principle that the powers of the federal government are 
enumerated and limited.38  “Even if Lopez produces no progeny and is soon 
overruled, the opinion has shattered forever the notion that, after fifty years of 
Commerce Clause precedent, we can never go back to the days of limited 
national power.”39  Indeed, according to Professor Calabresi, Lopez may prove 
to be a seminal Commerce Clause case of the same magnitude as NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.40 and United States v. Darby.41  In conclusion, 
Professor Calabresi dismissed the “gnashing of teeth among law professors”42 
in response to Lopez and derided the conventional wisdom that Lopez is a 
fleeting departure from the standard Commerce Clause jurisprudence.43  He 
encouraged the Court to pursue the path it undertook in Lopez and exhorted 
other commentators to do the same.44 
 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but 
that the abrogation exceeded Congress’ § 5 enforcement power.  See 189 F.3d 745, 750-51, 752 
(8th Cir. 1999).  The Eighth Circuit has since granted rehearing en banc on the portion of the 
decision dealing with § 504.  See Jim C. v. Arkansas Dep’t of Educ., 197 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(order granting rehearing en banc). 
 37. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994) (prohibiting possession of a handgun near a school). 
 38. Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of 
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995) [hereinafter Calabresi, A Government of 
Limited and Enumerated Powers or Calabresi, MICH. L. REV.]; see also Steven G. Calabresi, 
Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1379-80 
(1998) [hereinafter Calabresi, Textualism]: 
[With] decisions such as City of Boerne v. Flores, Printz v. United States, Seminole Tribe 
v. Florida, United States v. Lopez, [and] New York v. United States, . . .  it can fairly be 
said that the U.S. Supreme Court is again policing textually-provided-for structural 
jurisdictional lines in a way that has not occurred in this country since before 1937.  This 
constitutional development is nothing less than a quiet revolution. 
Id. 
 39. Calabresi, A Government of Limited and Enumerated Power, supra note 38, at 752. 
 40. 301 U.S. 1, 29-32 (1937) (holding the National Labor Relations Act may be construed as 
within Congress’ Commerce Clause power to regulate acts directly burdening or obstructing 
interstate or foreign commerce). 
 41. See Calabresi, A Government of Limited & Enumerated Power, supra note 38, at 752.  
See also Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114, 123-24 (1941) (holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act is a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’ commerce power and does not violate the Tenth 
Amendment). 
 42. Calabresi, A Government of Limited & Enumerated Power, supra note 38, at 827. 
 43. See id. at 831. 
 44. See id. (“Those of us who comment on the Court’s work, whether in law reviews or in 
the newspapers, should encourage the Court to follow the path on which it has now embarked.”); 
see also Calabresi, Textualism, supra note 38, at 1385 (“[T]he increasing use of judicial review in 
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More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
in the course of striking down a portion of the Violence Against Women Act,45 
heralded New York, Lopez, Seminole Tribe, City of Boerne, and Printz as “the 
considered judgments of a Supreme Court that has incrementally, but 
jealously, enforced the structural limits on congressional power that inhere in 
Our Federalism.”46  In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge James Harvie 
Wilkinson hailed the Supreme Court’s decision in New York as the beginning 
of an era of measured judicial activism seeking to revive the structural 
guarantees of federalism.47  Chief Judge Wilkinson noted the post-New York 
“spate” of federalism cases handed down by the Supreme Court48 and assessed 
their collective impact as “preserv[ing] Congress as an institution of broad but 
enumerated powers, and the states as entities having residual sovereign 
rights.”49 
Contrary to the opinions of Professor Calabresi and Chief Judge 
Wilkinson, some commentators persist in the sentiment that New York, Lopez, 
Seminole Tribe, City of Boerne, and Printz are aberrations and should be 
discounted accordingly.  Harry Litman and Mark D. Greenberg, for example, 
did not see Lopez and Seminole Tribe as initiating a dramatic new approach to 
federalism issues.50  They framed Lopez, not as a discourse on the proper 
federal balance of power, but as a narrowly drafted determination that the Gun-
 
structural constitutional cases . . . is a happy development which needs to be better understood 
and which we should all applaud.”). 
 45. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(en banc) (holding that the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), was an 
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and the Enforcement 
Clause of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 46. The Fourth Circuit rejected the “wistful assertions [of the defenders of the Act] that 
United States v. Lopez is an aberration of no significance and that the established precedents upon 
which City of Boerne v. Flores rested . . . should be disregarded as insufficiently ‘modern’ to 
define any longer the reach of Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 826.  
Regarding the appellants’ efforts to distinguish or discount Lopez, the Fourth Circuit stated, 
“[W]e are unwilling to consign the Supreme Court’s most significant recent pronouncement on 
the Commerce Clause to the status of inconvenient but ultimately insignificant aberration.”  Id. at 
854.  Likewise, the Fourth Circuit defended the efficacy of City of Boerne, despite the appellants’ 
arguments to the contrary: 
Ultimately, City of Boerne forcefully affirms that Congress’ power under Section 5 [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment] is not without limits, and that those limits are not simply 
theoretical or speculative, but are real and concrete, and are to be enforced by the courts, 
even at the expense of invalidating laudable and otherwise socially beneficial legislation. 
Id. at 882. 
 47. See id. at 892-93 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). 
 48. Id. at 892 (citing Printz, City of Boerne, Lopez, and Seminole Tribe). 
 49. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 893 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). 
 50. See Litman & Greenberg, supra note 36, at 921-25. 
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Free School Zones Act exceeds Congress’ commerce power.51  Litman and 
Greenberg concluded that, because Lopez admits of little occasion for 
application beyond its facts, it “will prove to have no more than a modest 
impact on the interpretation of the Commerce Clause and a negligible one on 
federalism jurisprudence.”52 
Similarly, Professor Moulton opined in an April 1999 article that “the 
Court’s current search for doctrine that would meaningfully promote 
federalism . . . has been a failure.”53  Professor Moulton characterized New 
York, Printz, and Lopez as a resurgence of judicially enforced federalism, 
which finds the Court “casting about” for ways to limit congressional power 
without regard to constitutional text, the historical record, Supreme Court 
precedent, or any practical benefit owing to federalism.54  Professor Moulton 
argued that New York and Printz will prove ineffective in restraining Congress 
because, in those cases, the Court failed to “limit the reach of the Commerce 
Clause generally”55 and left “the national government free to secure state 
implementation of national policy through . . . conditional spending and 
preemption.”56  Similarly, Lopez, in which the Court reaffirmed much of its 
post-New Deal precedent, “is unlikely to grow into more than a minor obstacle 
to a nearly omnipotent Congress”57 and is best described as “one in a series of 
periodic reminders to Congress that its powers are not plenary.”58  Therefore, 
“while cases like New York, Lopez, and Printz may on occasion stimulate 
important debate, . . . they will never have more than the most marginal 
relevance to the allocation of decisions that matter most.”59 
Other commentators, like Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, remain unsure of the impact of the recent 
 
 51. See id. at 925, 957-60. 
 52. Litman & Greenberg, supra note 36, at 977; see also Jay S. Bybee, Insuring Domestic 
Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization of Crime, and the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence 
Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2, 10-12 (1997) (concluding that, in Lopez and New York, 
“[t]he Court has offered us an empty concern, a specter that the Court itself has no tools for 
capturing,” because the Commerce Clause, the only Article I power with which Lopez dealt, is 
not the exclusive means by which Congress can federalize crime, and because the Tenth 
Amendment defines the powers reserved to the states only by reference to the powers not 
delegated to the federal government). 
 53. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 
83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 851 (1999). 
 54. Id. at 852-56, 872-78, 889, 895. 
 55. Id. at 884.  Professor Moulton likewise dismissed City of Boerne and Seminole Tribe as 
“federalism reminders in contexts other than the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment.”  
Moulton, supra note 53, at 884 n.234. 
 56. Id. at 895. 
 57. Id. at 896. 
 58. Moulton, supra note 53, at 890. 
 59. Id. at 924-25. 
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Supreme Court cases.  At a March 1998 symposium on federalism, Judge 
Kozinski expressed his view that, with its recent decisions, the Supreme Court 
“has revitalized federalism.”60  In New York and Printz, stated Judge Kozinski, 
the Court restored the Tenth Amendment as an enforceable limit on the power 
of Congress.  In Lopez, the Court began to once again define the limits of 
Congress’ Commerce Clause power.  In Seminole Tribe, the Court “gave new 
life to the Eleventh Amendment.”61  And in City of Boerne, the Court enforced 
the limits of Congress’ remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Although Judge Kozinski was encouraged by each case as an expression of the 
Court’s view of federalism, he bemoaned the fact that the Court had been 
unable to articulate precise limits on the powers of Congress: “This inability 
leaves judges like me struggling with very little guidance to figure out what the 
limits of Congress power are.”62  Therefore, according to Judge Kozinski, it 
remains to be seen whether “the rebirth of federalism is a blip on the historical 
screen or if it is the beginning of something truly wonderful.”63 
C. Prospectus 
Considering the widely divergent opinions on the significance of the 
Supreme Court’s recent federalism decisions, an empirical study of the actual 
impact of these decisions–whether they are in fact the remedy for Congress’ 
perceived overreaching or are mere aberrations–appears to be in order.  
Perhaps the best method for judging the impact of the decisions, the method 
chosen for the purposes of this Article, is to examine the case law of the United 
States circuit courts of appeals as they wrestle with the issues relegated to them 
for decision after the Supreme Court’s recent cases.  It largely will be up to the 
circuit courts, as the final arbiters of federal law in the vast majority of cases,64 
 
 60. Kozinski, supra note 36, at 93. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 94; see also Richard C. Reuben, Finding the Right Target: Federalism is the 
Underlying Issue in Challenges to the Brady Act, 83-Jan. ABA J. 44 (1997) (reporting that New 
York “has been cited frequently in subsequent challenges to a wide range of federal laws, but the 
lower courts have bogged down on the central question of [the meaning of that case]”). 
 63. Kozinski, supra note 36, at 94; see also Thro, supra note 29, at 501, 505, 525 (describing 
Seminole Tribe and Flores as “a revolution in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence,” but 
lamenting that, unless the lower federal courts embrace these cases, “the Eleventh Amendment 
revolution will be nothing more than a footnote in history”). 
 64. Of course, the Supreme Court, in any case it chooses, is the ultimate expositor of 
constitutional law.  The key here, however, is the infrequency with which the Court has permitted 
itself to interject.  But see Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2240; Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2199; College 
Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2219.  For example, in the one-year period ending September 30, 1997, 
52,319 appeals were filed in the United States circuit courts (not including the Federal Circuit), 
while the Supreme Court granted only 135 petitions for writ of certiorari.  See 1997 Jud. Bus. 
U.S. Cts. 76, 85 (Tables B, B-2).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
accounted for 3,335 of those circuit court filings, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 15 
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to elaborate upon the issues raised in New York, Lopez, Seminole Tribe, City of 
Boerne, and Printz.  Thus, despite the vast scholarly commentary on the 
subject, the opinion of the circuit courts very well may be the opinion that 
matters most.65 
This study will limit itself to a single circuit court, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, based in St. Louis, to better manage the large 
and ever-growing body of case law applying the Supreme Court’s recent 
federalism cases.  No representations are made regarding the typicality of the 
Eighth Circuit’s disposition of these issues, nor is it suggested that the Eighth 
Circuit, more or less than any other circuit court, is representative of the 
federal circuits.  Quite simply, the preferred scope of this study requires that it 
be confined to a single circuit, and the geographic proximity of the Eighth 
Circuit made it the obvious choice. 
The subject matter’s geographic boundaries having been reduced to a lone 
circuit, its temporal limits also should be established.  The first of the Supreme 
Court’s federalism cases treated herein, New York, is a June 1992 case.  Printz, 
the latest case in this line, was handed down on the last day of the Court’s 
October 1996 term.  Though the relatively new vintage of these cases lends 
timeliness, accompanying that obvious advantage is the concomitant risk of 
myopia.  Nonetheless, a study of the effects of these cases at this early stage is 
 
petitions originating in the Eighth Circuit.  See 1997 Jud. Bus. U.S. Cts. 76, 86 (Tables B, B-2).  
In 1998, 53,805 appeals were filed in the circuit courts, and the Supreme Court granted only 109 
certiorari petitions.  See 1998 Jud. Bus. U.S. Cts. 90, 99 (Tables B, B-2).  The Eighth Circuit 
accounted for 3,330 of those appeals, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 22 petitions 
from the Eighth Circuit.  See 1998 Jud. Bus. U.S. Cts. 90, 100 (Tables B, B-2). 
 65. See generally Lynn A. Baker, The Revival of States’ Rights: A Progress Report and a 
Proposal, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 93, 96-100 (1998) (dismissing scholarly predictions and 
briefly reviewing federal court decisions to determine the impact of Lopez and Printz). 
  Although Congress’ opinion of these cases obviously cannot be ignored, there is little 
indication that Congress will choose to stop enacting the kinds of statutes at issue due to the 
pressure of public opinion to address the pressing problems of the day.  See William Marshall, 
American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 140, 140-41, 144 (1998) (“[G]iven the conservative tenor of the present Congress, one 
might expect to see some manner of change in congressional behavior in light of the Supreme 
Court decisions. . . .  [But] the protection of states through the political processes in Washington 
is dead, or if not dead, is seriously ill.”); Victoria Davis, Note, A Landmark Lost: The Anemic 
Impact of United States v. Lopez on the Federalization of Criminal Law, 75 NEB. L. REV. 117, 
148-49 (1996): 
Whether Lopez will have any impact on Congress is yet to be seen.  If it has, federal 
regulation of local criminal activity should decrease. . . .  Yet, the potential future impact 
of Lopez on Congress must be evaluated while keeping in mind the constant pressure from 
the American public for Congress to be tough on crime. 
  Naturally, under public pressure for legislation, it is easy to lose sight of the critical 
distinction between federal and state jurisdiction – a distinction without a difference for much of 
the general public concerned about issues such as child support, children with guns, carjacking, 
church burnings, domestic violence, radioactive waste disposal, and clean water. 
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not without value.  The conclusions drawn here from the sampling of a few 
years certainly will reveal something about the cases’ short-term impact, and, 
given the constraints of stare decisis, likely will be some indication of how 
they will fair in the future. 
As for the organization of this Article, the Supreme Court’s recent 
federalism cases are listed chronologically, and each case is explained to the 
extent necessary for imparting the essential holding and establishing the basic 
issues as they existed before the Eighth Circuit added its gloss.  Each Eighth 
Circuit decision, in turn, is approached as an application of the pertinent 
Supreme Court case or cases.  Conclusions regarding the impact of the 
Supreme Court’s federalism cases are drawn from the degree to which the 
Eighth Circuit has been receptive to constitutional challenges based on those 
cases. 
II. NEW YORK, LOPEZ, SEMINOLE TRIBE, CITY OF BOERNE, PRINTZ, AND THE 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT RECEPTION 
A. New York v. United States 
In New York v. United States,66 the Supreme Court dealt with the 
constitutionality of three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act (LLRW Amendments).67  Congress, in an effort to 
promote the safe and efficient disposal of low-level radioactive waste, enacted 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LLRW Act) in 1980,68 and then 
amended the LLRW Act in 1986 with the LLRW Amendments.69  The LLRW 
Amendments make each state responsible for the disposal of low-level 
radioactive waste generated within its borders.70  To encourage the states to 
comply with their statutory duty under  2021c(a)(1), the LLRW Amendments 
include three types of “incentives,” the most severe of which is the so-called 
“take-title” provision.71  The take-title provision mandates that any state unable 
 
 66. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 67. See Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j 
(1988)). 
 68. See Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j 
(amended 1986)). 
 69. See Pub. L. No. 99-250, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986). 
 70. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1) (1988). 
 71. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)(1988) (take-title provision).  The two less severe 
incentive provisions are found at 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(a)(2) and (d)(1) (1988).  Section 2021e(a)(2), 
the “access” incentive provision, provides: 
Availability of disposal capacity 
. . . 
During the seven year period beginning January 1, 1986 and ending December 31, 1992, 
subject to the provisions of subsections (b) through (g) of this section, each State in which 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
544 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:529 
to provide for the disposal of the waste generated within its borders “shall take 
title to the waste, shall be obliged to take possession of the waste, and shall be 
liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred by [the] generator or 
owner as a consequence of the failure of the State to take possession of the 
waste.”72 
The State of New York and two of its counties (collectively, New York), 
seeking to avoid the requirements of the LLRW Amendments, filed suit 
against the United States requesting a declaratory judgment that the three 
incentive provisions of the statute are inconsistent with the Tenth 
Amendment73 and the Guarantee Clause74 of the Constitution.75 
The Supreme Court76 first took up the Tenth Amendment claim and began 
by reviewing the different analyses it previously had used to distinguish federal 
from state power.77  In some cases, the Court had inquired whether the Act of 
Congress at issue was authorized by one of Congress’ Article I powers,78 while 
in other cases, the Court had asked whether the statute encroached upon the 
sovereignty of the states retained under the Tenth Amendment.79  The Court 
reconciled these two approaches as “mirror images of each other”80 for the 
 
there is located a regional disposal facility referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3) of 
subsection (b) of this section shall make disposal capacity available for low-level 
radioactive waste generated by any source not referred to in paragraph (1). 
  Section 2021e(d)(1), the “monetary” incentive provision, provides in pertinent part: 
Surcharges 
The disposal of any low-level radioactive waste under this section (other than the low-
level radioactive waste generated in a sited compact region) may be charged a surcharge 
by the State in which the applicable regional disposal facility is located, in addition to the 
fees and surcharges generally applicable for disposal of low-level radioactive waste in the 
regional disposal facility involved. . . . 
 72. § 2021e(d)(2)(C). 
 73. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
United States Constitution, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states, or to the 
people.”). 
 74. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on 
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) 
against domestic Violence.”). 
 75. See New York, 505 U.S. at 154. 
 76. Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined.  Justice White wrote an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined.  Justice Stevens 
also wrote his own opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 77. New York, 505 U.S. at 155. 
 78. See id. (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)). 
 79. See New York, 505 U.S. at 155-56 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Met. Trans. Auth., 469 
U.S. 528 (1985); Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 (1869)). 
 80. New York, 505 U.S. at 156. 
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simple reason “that the Tenth Amendment ‘states but a truism that all is 
retained that has not been surrendered.’”81 That is, the Tenth Amendment 
merely makes explicit what is necessarily implied from the limited and 
exclusive constitutional grant of powers to Congress: “‘The States 
unquestionably do retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority . . . to 
the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers 
and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.’”82  For this reason, 
the issue is the same whether it involves the powers affirmatively granted to 
Congress or the sovereignty reserved to the states.83 
Having laid the foundation for deciding the case before it, the Court turned 
to the specific arguments made by New York in its Tenth Amendment 
challenge to the LLRW Amendments.84  As the Court construed its argument, 
New York was not challenging Congress’ authority to regulate the interstate 
market in waste disposal or pre-empt state regulation of radioactive waste.85  
Nor was it questioning the authority of Congress to subject state governments 
to generally applicable laws.86  Rather, New York’s contention was that 
Congress, instead of directly regulating private generators and disposers of 
radioactive waste, chose in the LLRW Amendments to compel the states to 
regulate that field.87  Thus, this was a case about “the circumstances under 
which Congress may use the States as implements of regulation; that is, 
 
 81. Id. (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 124). 
 82. Id. at 156 (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549). 
 83. See id. at 159. 
 84. See id. at 160. 
 85. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160. 
 86. See id.  The Court distinguished the case at bar from the line of cases in which several 
states challenged, as violating the Tenth Amendment, the extension of the generally applicable 
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to state 
employers.  See id. (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia, 469 U.S. 528).  The Court apparently did so to avoid the 
“unsteady path” of this volatile line of cases.  Id.  In Wirtz, the Court determined that Congress’ 
application of the FLSA to state hospitals and schools did not exceed its power granted under the 
Commerce Clause.  See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196-97 (“[V]alid general regulations of commerce do 
not cease to be regulations of commerce because a State is involved.”).  Only eight years later, in 
Usery, the Court overruled Wirtz and held that Congress’ extension of the FLSA to almost all 
employees of states and their political subdivisions exceeded the authority granted to Congress.  
See Usery, 426 U.S. at 852, 854-55 (“[T]he States as States stand on a quite different footing 
from an individual or corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress’ power to regulate 
commerce.”).  In Garcia, the Court did another about-face when it overruled Usery and held that 
affording the protections of the FLSA to state employees did not contravene any affirmative limit 
on Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.  See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-57 (“The political 
process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.”). 
 87. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160. 
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whether Congress may direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate in a 
particular field or a particular way.”88 
The Court reaffirmed that, pursuant to the spending power,89 Congress 
generally may withhold federal funds from states failing to meet certain 
conditions.90  Similarly, Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to 
present the states a choice between regulating commercial activity according to 
federal standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation.91  “By 
either of these methods, as by any other permissible method of encouraging a 
State to conform to federal policy choices, the residents of the State retain the 
ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply.”92  For these 
reasons, the “monetary” incentive provision of the LLRW Amendments, 
authorizing states to surcharge radioactive waste from other states and 
requiring that states satisfy certain conditions to receive a portion of the 
proceeds, is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Spending 
and Commerce Clauses of Article I and, therefore, does not violate the Tenth 
Amendment.93  Likewise, the “access” incentive provision, authorizing states 
to deny access to radioactive waste disposal sites to states failing to meet 
federal standards, does not exceed Congress’ commerce power or intrude on 
state sovereignty.94 
A different case altogether is presented, however, when Congress seeks to 
“commandeer” state resources by forcing the states to enact and enforce 
federal standards.95  As the Court stated, “[T]he Framers explicitly chose a 
Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not 
States . . . . The allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause, for 
example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does 
 
 88. Id. at 161. 
 89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States . . . .”). 
 90. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) 
(“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds . . . .”)). 
 91. See id. at 167-68 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).  In Hodel, the Court held that the Surface Mining Act did not exceed the 
commerce power and did not violate the Tenth Amendment because the statute does not 
“commandeer[] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and 
enforce a federal regulatory program,” but merely offers states the choice of either regulating 
pursuant to federal standards or allowing the federal government to bear the burden of regulation 
through preemption of state law.  Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288. 
 92. New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
 93. See id. at 171-73. 
 94. See id. at 173-74. 
 95. Id. at 161 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 and quoting Federal Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1982) [hereinafter FERC] (“[T]his Court never 
has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and 
regulations . . . .”)). 
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not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate 
commerce.”96  The Court was concerned that if the case was otherwise and 
Congress could mandate state regulation, then governmental accountability 
would be reduced.97  State officials, not federal officials, would be made to 
answer to unhappy constituents, but would be powerless to effect any change 
in federally mandated policy.98 
The take-title provision of the LLRW Amendments, as the Court construed 
it, offers the states a choice between accepting ownership of radioactive waste 
or regulating the waste pursuant to Congress’ instructions.99  Because either 
option standing alone would be beyond the authority of Congress, Congress 
could not force upon the states a choice between the two impermissible 
options.100  “Either way, ‘the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the 
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program’ . . . .”101 
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court rejected the argument that, because 
Congress may enact laws enforceable in state courts,102 Congress must have 
the power to compel state regulation.  The Court explained that the 
enforcement of congressional statutes in state courts is a consequence of the 
Supremacy Clause103 and could not be extrapolated to condone congressional 
compulsion of state legislatures.104  The Court also distinguished federal 
regulations enforceable in state courts against private individuals from the 
LLRW Amendments’ requirement that state legislatures regulate in a particular 
manner.105 
Similarly, the Court dismissed the government’s proposed analogy of a 
congressional power to commandeer state governments to the well-established 
power of the federal courts to order state officials to comply with federal 
law.106  The Court explained that the federal courts’ power to mandate state 
 
 96. Id. at 162, 166. 
 97. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
 98. See id. at 169. 
 99. See id. at 174-75. 
 100. See id. at 175-76. 
 101. Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288). 
 102. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding, under the Supremacy Clause, that 
a state court may not “deny enforcement to claims growing out of a valid federal law”). 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  The clause states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
Id. 
 104. See New York, 505 U.S. at 178-79. 
 105. See id. at 178. 
 106. See id. at 179. 
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compliance with federal law, like the congressional power to enact laws 
enforceable in state courts, is conferred by the Supremacy Clause, as well as by 
Article III.107  According to the Court, the Constitution does not grant an 
analogous power to Congress.108 
Thus, the Court concluded that the take-title provision, as either an 
accretion of Congress’ Article I powers or an infringement of the Tenth 
Amendment, is inconsistent with the federal structure of government 
established by the Constitution.109  Having thus disposed of the take-title 
provision, the Court declined to reach the constitutionality of that provision 
under the Guarantee Clause of Article IV.110  Finally, the Court determined 
that the take-title provision was severable from the other portions of the LLRW 
Amendments because the remainder of the statute would continue to serve 
Congress’ objective of encouraging the states to properly dispose of 
radioactive waste.111 
1. Concerned Citizens of Nebraska v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission 
The first mention of New York v. United States in Eighth Circuit case law 
appears in Concerned Citizens of Nebraska v. United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission.112  In that case, Nebraska and four other states entered 
a compact for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste pursuant to the 
LLRW Act of 1980 and, ultimately, the LLRW Amendments of 1985.113  The 
compact’s governing body designated Boyd County, Nebraska, as the site for a 
regional disposal facility.  Concerned Citizens of Nebraska, a non-profit 
organization, sought to enjoin the development of the facility.114  It claimed 
that standards promulgated by the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and the Nebraska Department of Environmental Control, which 
do not require complete containment of radiation at low-level waste disposal 
 
 107. See id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, 
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States . . . ; [and] 
to Controversies between two or more States; [and] between a State and Citizens of another 
State . . . .”)). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See New York, 505 U.S. at 177. 
 110. See id. at 183-84.  The Court did determine, however, that the access incentive provision 
and the monetary incentive provision are consistent with the Guarantee Clause.  See id. at 185.  
To arrive at this conclusion, the Court assumed, despite serious doubts to the contrary, that such a 
challenge under the Guarantee Clause is justiciable.  See id. at 184-86. 
 111. See id. at 186-87. 
 112. 970 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 113. See id. at 422. 
 114. See id. at 423. 
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facilities, are inconsistent with the LLRW Amendments115 and, therefore, 
violate the separation of powers doctrine and the Supremacy Clause.116 
At the outset, the Eighth Circuit117 acknowledged the Supreme Court’s 
decision in New York.  The Eighth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court 
had held the take-title provision of the LLRW Amendments unconstitutional 
under the Tenth Amendment and had severed that provision from the 
remainder of the LLRW Amendments.  The Eighth Circuit concluded that, 
because Concerned Citizens did not implicate the take-title provision, the 
issues in that case were unaffected by the Supreme Court’s decision in New 
York.118 
2. May v. Arkansas Forestry Commission 
In May v. Arkansas Forestry Commission,119 numerous forestry rangers 
filed a class action suit in federal court against their employer, the Arkansas 
Forestry Commission.120  The suit alleged that the commission’s policy of not 
compensating the rangers for time spent “subject-to-call” violated the overtime 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).121  The commission 
responded by claiming that the Tenth Amendment prohibits the application of 
the FLSA to state employees.122  For this argument, the Commission relied 
upon National League of Cities v. Usery,123 which, unfortunately for the 
commission, had been explicitly overruled some eight years earlier in Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.124  The commission, 
undaunted, argued that the Supreme Court had expressed dissatisfaction with 
 
 115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021b(7) (1988) (requiring “permanent isolation” of low-level 
radioactive waste). 
 116. See Concerned Citizens, 970 F.2d at 423-26. 
 117. Judge C. Arlen Beam, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel. 
 118. See Concerned Citizens, 970 F.2d at 422 n.1. 
 119. 993 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 120. See id. at 635.  A more thorough recitation of the facts of this case is reported at Cross v. 
Arkansas Forestry Comm’n, 938 F.2d 912, 914-16 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 121. May, 993 F.2d at 635; see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1988), which provides in part: 
[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty 
hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the 
hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at 
which he is employed. 
Id. 
 122. See May, 993 F.2d at 635. 
 123. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to 
impose the requirements of the FLSA on state and local governments), overruled by Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985). 
 124. 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (overruling Usery and holding that applying wage and hour 
provisions of FLSA to city transit authority employees do not contravene any limit on Congress’ 
commerce power). 
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Garcia’s abrupt overruling of Usery in two cases decided in the years 
following the Garcia decision, New York and Gregory v. Ashcroft.125 
The Eighth Circuit,126 however, harmonized New York and Gregory with 
Garcia, stating that, in both New York and Gregory, the Supreme Court 
expressly declined to reach the Tenth Amendment issue settled in Garcia.127  
Garcia had not been reversed in New York or Gregory, and therefore remained 
the controlling case.128  Accordingly, the Eight Circuit could not hold that the 
Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from applying the FLSA to state 
forestry rangers.129 
3. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota 
The Eighth Circuit next took up New York in Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 
v. South Dakota.130  The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe sought declaratory and 
preliminary injunctive relief against South Dakota and several of its officials 
(collectively, the state) pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA)131 to compel the state to negotiate in good faith regarding gambling 
activities conducted by the tribe.132  The state, relying on New York, claimed 
that the IGRA violates the Tenth Amendment because it compels states to 
negotiate gambling compacts with Indian tribes.133   
The Eighth Circuit,134 however, concluded that the IGRA “‘gives states the 
right to get involved in negotiating a gaming compact because of the obvious 
state interest in gaming casino operations within the state boundaries, but does 
 
 125. See May, 993 F.2d at 635-36; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) 
(holding that neither the Age Discrimination in Employment Act nor the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits Missouri from mandating that state judges retire at age 
seventy). 
 126. Again, Judge Beam wrote for a unanimous panel. 
 127. See id. at 636 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 160 (“This litigation presents no occasion to 
apply or revisit the holding[] of [Garcia] . . . .”), and Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464 (noting that 
Garcia constrains the Supreme Court in its “ability to consider the limits that the state-federal 
balance places on Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause”)). 
 128. See May, 993 F.2d at 636. 
 129. See id. 
 130. 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 131. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988): 
Any Indian tribe . . . shall request the State in which [the tribe’s] lands are located to enter 
into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the 
conduct of gaming activities.  Upon receiving such a request, the State shall negotiate 
with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact. 
 Id. 
 132. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 830 F. Supp. 523 (D. S.D. 1993), 
aff’d, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 133. See Cheyenne River, 3 F.3d at 281. 
 134. Judge Theodore McMillian wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel. 
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not compel it.’”135 As construed by the Eighth Circuit, the IGRA gives states 
the option of: (1) negotiating until a compact is reached; (2) negotiating, but 
failing to reach a compact, in which case a court would determine whether the 
state negotiated in good faith; or (3) refusing to negotiate at all, in which case a 
court could require, under the terms of the IGRA,136 that a compact be 
concluded within sixty days.137  If the state persisted in its refusal to negotiate 
or otherwise participate in the IGRA statutory scheme, then a mediator simply 
would select a proposed compact submitted by the tribe.138  Given these 
options, the state could not claim that the IGRA forces it to compact with 
Indian tribes regarding Indian gaming.  Therefore, the IGRA does not violate 
the Tenth Amendment.139 
4. Fond du Lac Band of Chippewa Indians v. Carlson 
The Eighth Circuit next addressed New York in Fond du Lac Band of 
Chippewa Indians v. Carlson,140 wherein Minnesota Chippewa Indians sought, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,141 to enjoin state officials from enforcing 
Minnesota’s fishing and gaming laws contrary to federal treaty rights.  The 
state officials argued that they were immune from suit in federal court under 
the Eleventh Amendment142 and that the doctrine of Ex parte Young,143 which 
 
 135. Cheyenne River, 3 F.3d at 281 (quoting Cheyenne River, 830 F. Supp. at 526). 
 136. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (1988) (“If . . . the court finds that the State has failed 
to negotiate in good faith with the Indian tribe to conclude a Tribal-State compact . . ., the court 
shall order the State and the Indian Tribe to conclude such a compact within a 60-day period.”). 
 137. See Cheyenne River, 3 F.3d at 281. 
 138. See id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) (1988): 
If a State and an Indian tribe fail to conclude a Tribal-State compact . . . within the 60-day 
period . . ., the Indian tribe and the State shall each submit to a mediator appointed by the 
court a proposed compact that represents their last best offer for a compact.  The mediator 
shall select from the two proposed compacts . . . . 
Id. 
 139. See Cheyenne River, 3 F.3d at 281 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 158-59 and Dole, 483 
U.S. at 210-211 (stating that a federal statute conditioning the receipt of federal benefits on the 
state’s compliance with federal plans is not a violation of the state’s sovereignty where the state 
may simply opt not to comply)). 
 140. 68 F.3d 253 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 141. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  The statute states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress. . . . 
Id. 
 142. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). 
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otherwise would allow the Indians to proceed in federal court, should be 
curtailed as a result of more contemporary cases “that recognize the vitality of 
state sovereignty.”144  The state officials, relying on New York, argued that, 
because Congress could not directly compel Minnesota to regulate fishing and 
gaming in a particular way, the federal courts could not do so either.145  The 
Eighth Circuit146 summarily rejected this argument, noting that the Supreme 
Court determined in New York that “courts under Article III and the 
Supremacy Clause have the power to order states to perform acts that Congress 
lacks.”147 
 
 143. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that suits may be brought in federal court against state 
officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief to prevent future violations of 
federal law). 
 144. Fond du Lac, 68 F.3d at 256 n.3. 
 145. See id. 
 146. Judge Donald P. Lay wrote the opinion for a unanimous three-judge panel. 
 147. Fond du Lac, 68 F.3d at 256 n.3 (citing New York, 505 U.S at 178-80 (“[T]hat federal 
courts may in proper circumstances order state officials to comply with federal law . . . [does not] 
imply an authority on the part of Congress to mandate state regulation.”)). 
  In the years following Fond du Lac, the Eighth Circuit decided a string of cases only 
briefly citing New York in support of some simple proposition.  First, in Minnesota Citizens 
Concerned for Life v. Federal Election Comm’n, 113 F.3d 129, 131 (8th Cir. 1997), the Eighth 
Circuit cited generally to New York, 505 U.S. at 186, as authority for the district court’s 
uncontroverted determination that portions of a Federal Election Commission regulation violating 
the First Amendment could not be severed from the remainder of the regulation. 
  Second, the Eighth Circuit held, in United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397, 1401 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 341 (1997), that the Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228 
(1994), was a proper exercise of Congress’ commerce power and, therefore, does not violate the 
Tenth Amendment.  In support, the Eighth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court’s statement in New 
York that, “‘[i]f a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment 
expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States.’” Crawford, 115 F.3d at 1401 
(quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 156).  Crawford is more aptly characterized as a Lopez challenge 
and, therefore, is discussed more thoroughly, infra Part II.B.14. 
  Third, in Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904, 917 (8th 
Cir. 1997), the Eighth Circuit, after finding a portion of an 1850 executive order unconstitutional, 
again cited New York, 505 U.S. at 186, as recent authority for the Supreme Court’s long-
established severability test.  The Mille Lacs case, as it deals with a Printz issue raised therein, is 
more thoroughly considered, infra Part II.E.1. 
  Finally, the Eighth Circuit decided, in United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th 
Cir. 1997), that the Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1) (1994), was validly 
enacted under Congress’ commerce power and, therefore, does not violate the Tenth Amendment.  
The Eighth Circuit relied in part on the same language in New York that was quoted in Crawford, 
115 F.3d at 1401 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 156).  See Wright, 128 F.3d at 1276.  Wright, 
like Crawford, is further discussed in its capacity as an application of Lopez at Part II.B.15 infra. 
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5. United States ex rel. Zissler v. Regents of the University of Minnesota 
After Fond du Lac, well over two years passed before New York again was 
given substantial attention148 by the Eighth Circuit in United States ex rel. 
Zissler v. Regents of the University of Minnesota.149  James Zissler brought suit 
as a qui tam relator,150 claiming that the University of Minnesota had 
misallocated federal grant money in violation of the False Claims Act.151  The 
United States intervened,152 alleging that the university had, in its dealings with 
the federal government, presented false claims,153 submitted a false record or 
statement for payment,154 and concealed or avoided an obligation to the 
government.155  The university, relying on New York, argued that the penalties 
for violation of the False Claim Act “impermissibly ‘commandeer the 
legislative processes of the States’”156 and, by coercing the states to comply 
 
 148. Prior to Zissler, the Eighth Circuit decided Christians v. Chrystal Evangelical Free 
Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998), in which the panel was split.  Although the 
opinion for the court did not mention New York, the dissenting opinion referred to New York as a 
case in which the Supreme Court had reasserted the role of the federal courts in maintaining the 
separation of powers, see id. at 865 (Bogue, J., dissenting), and repeated the Supreme Court’s 
statement that “‘the Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power 
among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the 
temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day.’” 
id. at 866-67 (Bogue, J., dissenting) (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 187).  In re Young is more 
thoroughly discussed, infra Part II.D.3 as an application of City of Boerne. 
 149. 154 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 150. Qui tam refers to “an action brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a 
penalty for the commission or omission of a certain act, and provides that the same shall be 
recoverable in a civil action, part of the penalty to go to any person who will bring such action 
and the remainder to the state or some other institution.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (6th 
ed. 1990); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1994) (providing that “[a] person may bring a civil 
action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government”). 
 151. See Zissler, 154 F.3d at 871; see also 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33, 37 (1994) (False Claims 
Act). 
 152. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), (c)(1) (1994) (providing that the government may intervene 
and proceed with the action and that, if the government elects to proceed with the action, “it shall 
have the primary authority for prosecuting the action”). 
 153. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting “knowingly present[ing], or caus[ing] to 
be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government or a member of the 
Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”). 
 154. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (1994) (prohibiting “knowingly mak[ing], us[ing], or 
caus[ing] to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or 
approved by the Government”). 
 155. See Zissler, 154 F.3d at 871; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (1994) (prohibiting 
“knowingly mak[ing], us[ing], or caus[ing] to be made or used, a false record or statement to 
conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the 
Government”). 
 156. Zissler, 154 F.3d at 873 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 161). 
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with the Act’s requirements, unconstitutionally disrupt the federal balance.157  
The Eighth Circuit,158 citing New York,159 rejected the university’s arguments 
and held that, because the states could avoid the requirements of the Act 
simply by declining federal grants, the False Claims Act was not 
unconstitutionally coercive.160 
B. United States v. Lopez 
Alfonso Lopez, Jr., arrived at his San Antonio high school on March 10, 
1992, with a concealed handgun.  When confronted by school authorities, 
Lopez admitted that he was carrying the handgun.  Lopez was arrested by local 
law enforcement officers and charged with firearm possession on school 
premises in violation of Texas criminal law.161  The state charges were 
dismissed when federal prosecutors charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act (GFSZA).162  The GFSZA prohibits any individual 
“knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has 
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”163  Lopez attacked his 
indictment on the ground that section 922(q) is beyond the reach of Congress’ 
power under the Commerce Clause.164 
The Supreme Court165 began its analysis with “first principles.”166  First, 
the Court stated, the federal government is a government of enumerated 
 
 157. See Zissler, 154 F.3d at 873.  The University is an instrumentality of the State of 
Minnesota and, for the purposes of this case, was entitled to the same defenses to which the state 
would be entitled.  See id. at 871 n.2. 
 158. Judge Richard S. Arnold wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel. 
 159. See Zissler, 154 F.3d at 873 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 161). 
 160. See id.  The Eighth Circuit relied, as it did in Cheyenne River, upon Dole for the 
proposition “that the Tenth Amendment allows . . . ‘the indirect achievement of objectives which 
Congress is not empowered to achieve directly,’ through conditional federal funding.”  Id. 
(quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 210). 
  Following Zissler, the Eighth Circuit briefly noted in Nebraska v. Central Interstate 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Comm’n, No. 98-3858, 1999 WL 615506, at *2 n.3, *4 
(8th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999), the State of Nebraska’s citation to New York, as well as Printz, in 
support of the general principle of state sovereignty.  The court determined, however, that neither 
New York nor Printz was relevant to the case at bar.  See id.  The Eighth Circuit’s disposition of 
Central Interstate is discussed further at Part II.E.2 infra in the context of Printz. 
 161. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). 
 162. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress 
shall have the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
 165. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.  Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred separately.  
Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined.  
Justices Stevens and Souter also wrote their own dissenting opinions. 
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powers, while the powers reserved to the states are numerous and undefined.167  
According to the Court, the federal division of power between the states and 
the national government, like the separation of powers among the branches of 
government, reduces the risk of accumulation and abuse of power.168 
As the Court stated, one of the enumerated powers, the power relied upon 
by Congress in enacting the GFSZA, is Congress’ authority to regulate 
interstate commerce.169  Embarking on an abbreviated review of its Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, the Court commented that, since its first construction of 
the commerce power, it consistently had recognized the inherently limited 
nature of that power.170  Although the Court’s New-Deal-era cases had “greatly 
expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under th[e] 
[Commerce] Clause,”171 those cases and succeeding cases acknowledged the 
necessary limits of the interstate commerce power in a federal system of 
government.172  From its modern precedent, the Court construed three 
categories of activity that are appropriate subjects for regulation under the 
interstate commerce power: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce;”173 (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or 
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from 
 
 166. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. 
 167. See id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are 
few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and 
indefinite.”)). 
 168. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“Just as the separation 
and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the 
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the 
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”)). 
 169. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. 
 170. See id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (“The 
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the 
language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.”)). 
 171. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 36-38; Darby, 312 
U.S. at 118; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (rejecting the distinction between 
direct and indirect effects of regulated activity on interstate commerce and holding that 
application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act to homegrown wheat is within Congress’ 
commerce power)). 
 172. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80; Perez, 402 U.S. at 155-
56; Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196-97; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964); Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964)). 
 173. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Darby, 312 U.S. at 114 and quoting Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, 379 U.S. at 256 (“[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce 
free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to 
question.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). 
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intrastate activities;”174 and (3) “those activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”175 
Having established this constitutional framework for analysis of 
congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause, the Court turned to an 
application of the framework to section 922(q) of the GFSZA.  Because section 
922(q) clearly does not purport to regulate either the channels of interstate 
commerce or an instrumentality of interstate commerce, it could be justified 
only as a regulation of an activity substantially affecting interstate 
commerce.176 
Contrasting the case at bar with Wickard v. Filburn,177 “perhaps the most 
far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate 
activity,”178 the Court determined that “[s]ection 922(q) is a criminal statute 
that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”179  Unlike the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act construed in Wickard, section 922(q) is not a 
regulation of economic activities that, when considered collectively, 
substantially affect interstate commerce.180  Nor does the text of section 922(q) 
include a jurisdictional requirement to make certain that any firearm, the 
possession of which is prosecuted under section 922(q), has moved in or 
otherwise affected interstate commerce.181  As the Court conceded, it generally 
 
 174. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (holding 
that Congress, in exercising its power under the Commerce Clause, may regulate the intrastate 
operation of the instrumentalities of commerce to foster and protect interstate commerce); 
Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (holding application of Safety Appliance 
Act to vehicles in interstate commerce is within interstate commerce power);  quoting Perez, 402 
U.S. at 150 (“[F]or example, the destruction of an aircraft, or . . . thefts from interstate 
shipments.”)). 
 175. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37; Wirtz, 392 
U.S. at 196 n.27). 
 176. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
 177. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 178. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (explaining the Wickard Court’s determination that production 
and consumption of homegrown wheat, in the aggregate, substantially influences interstate and 
foreign commerce). 
 179. Id. at 561.  The Court stated that “[u]nder our federal system, the States possess primary 
authority for defining and enforcing criminal law” and expressed its concern that “[w]hen 
Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it affects a change in 
the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.”  Id. at 561 n.3 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
 180. See id. at 561; see also id. at 567 (“The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in 
no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any 
sort of interstate commerce.”). 
 181. See id. at 561; see also id. at 567 (“[Lopez] was a local student at a local school; there is 
no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that 
his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.”). 
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does not require congressional findings regarding the substantial effects of a 
regulated activity on interstate commerce.  Nonetheless, the Court noted, when 
the regulated activity’s bearing on interstate commerce is not readily apparent, 
such findings could lend support to Congress’ conclusion that the activity is 
susceptible of regulation.  In this case, Congress failed to document the effect, 
if any, of guns in school zones on interstate commerce.182 
Next, the Court refuted the government’s contention that possession of a 
gun near a school does in fact substantially affect the national economy by 
necessitating insurance to distribute the costs of gun-related crime, impeding 
travel to unsafe areas of the country, and diminishing the ability of schools to 
cultivate economically productive citizens.183  According to the Court, the 
government’s arguments would allow Congress to regulate any activity 
deemed a factor in the economic productivity of individual citizens, even in the 
areas of criminal law and education traditionally reserved for state 
regulation.184  The Court refused the government’s invitation “to pile inference 
upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort 
retained by the States.”185  To do otherwise, said the Court, would be to 
conclude “that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose 
something not enumerated and that there never will be a distinction between 
what is truly national and what is truly local.”186 
Finally, the Court conceded that its resolution of the case would engender 
some legal uncertainty, but depicted such uncertainty as an unavoidable 
consequence of the constitutional system of enumerated powers, which, in the 
absence of a plenary police power, necessitates imprecise judicial line-
drawing.187 
1. United States v. Mosby 
The Eighth Circuit’s first occasion to discuss Lopez came in United States 
v. Mosby.188  Ivory Mosby,189 a felon, was convicted for possessing firearm 
 
 182. See id. at 562-63.  Congressional findings regarding the impact of guns in and around 
schools on interstate commerce were added to § 922(q) in Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2131 
(1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)-(I) (1994)). 
 183. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64. 
 184. See id. at 564. 
 185. Id. at 567. 
 186. Id. at 567-68 (citing Gibbons, 9 Wheat. at 195, and Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 
30). 
 187. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566-67. 
 188. 60 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 189. Mosby presumably has found religion since his conviction and now goes by Rafiz Zareef 
Muhaymin.  See Mosby, 60 F.3d at 454. 
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ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).190  Because the gun 
cartridges possessed by Mosby were manufactured entirely within the state of 
Minnesota, and Mosby was found in possession of the cartridges within that 
state,191 he claimed that the conduct for which he was convicted was not “in or 
affecting commerce” for the purposes of section 922(g)(1).192 
The Eighth Circuit193 rejected Mosby’s construction of section 922(g)(1) as 
too constricted.  The court determined, based on the text of the statute, that the 
interstate commerce element of section 922(g)(1) does not limit to commerce 
in ammunition the commerce that Mosby’s possession of ammunition must be 
“in or affecting.”  Rather, according to the court, commerce of any type, 
including commerce in the component parts of ammunition, is relevant to 
prove the interstate commerce element.194  Because the components of 
Mosby’s cartridges were imported from other states, Mosby possessed 
ammunition in interstate commerce as prohibited by section 922(g)(1).195 
Finally, the Eighth Circuit determined that, “[a]lthough the recent Supreme 
Court decision in United States v. Lopez limits Congress’s exercise of its 
commerce power, that power remains broad enough to support application of 
section 922(g)(1) in this case.”196  The Eighth Circuit explained Lopez’s 
recognition of three categories of activity susceptible of regulation under the 
interstate commerce power, and determined that section 922(g)(1) could be 
categorized as a regulation of either “‘the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,’” or “‘those activities 
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.’”197  Based on its finding 
that the ammunition components in question were in interstate commerce, the 
 
 190. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994), providing: 
It shall be unlawful for any person– 
  (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for 
a term exceeding one year; 
. . . . 
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which 
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
 191. Mosby was unusual in this respect.  As the Eighth Circuit explained, in a typical § 922(g) 
case, evidence exists that the ammunition or firearm in question was manufactured in a state other 
than the state in which the defendant was caught possessing it, logically implying that the firearm 
must have traveled interstate.  See Mosby, 60 F.3d at 455. 
 192. See id. 
 193. Judge Frank J. Magill wrote for the court. 
 194. See Mosby, 60 F.3d at 456-57.  The Eighth Circuit relied in part on the statutory 
definition of “ammunition,” which includes ammunition as well as its component parts.  See 18 
U.S.C § 921(a)(17)(A) (1994) (“The term ‘ammunition’ means ammunition or cartridge cases, 
primers, bullets, or propellant powder designed for use in any firearm.”). 
 195. See Mosby, 60 F.3d at 457. 
 196. Id. at 456. 
 197. Id. at 456 n.3 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59). 
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court concluded that the instant application of section 922(g)(1) fell into the 
category of “things in interstate commerce.”198 
2. United States v. Robinson 
In United States v. Robinson,199 the Eighth Circuit200 addressed Frank 
Robinson’s contention that the federal carjacking statute exceeds the power of 
Congress under the Commerce Clause.201  Robinson had been convicted under 
the statute for ordering Cornelius Mosley and his family out of their van at 
gunpoint at a St. Louis, Missouri gas station, and then driving away in the van.  
Mosley had rented the van in Mississippi to attend his father’s funeral in St. 
Louis.202 
Although the Eighth Circuit described Robinson’s constitutional claim as 
his “one possibly meritorious argument,”203 the court was confident that the 
carjacking statute was not an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ power 
under the Commerce Clause.204  Nonetheless, the court felt compelled to 
discuss the issue further in light of Lopez.205  As in Mosby, the Eighth Circuit 
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s recognition of three categories of activity 
regulable under the interstate commerce power.206  The Eighth Circuit recalled 
the Supreme Court’s initial determination that the GFSZA was not a regulation 
of the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or of an item in 
interstate commerce, and that the statute, therefore, could be sustained only as 
a regulation of an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce.207  As 
the Eighth Circuit saw it, Lopez held that the GFSZA did not regulate an 
activity substantially affecting interstate commerce because the statute, by its 
terms, had nothing to do with commerce and lacked a “‘jurisdictional element 
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession 
in question affects interstate commerce.’”208  The Eighth Circuit also noted the 
Supreme Court’s finding that Congress had failed to document any commercial 
effects of guns in school zones.209 
 
 198. Id. at 456 n.3. 
 199. 62 F.3d 234 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 200. Again, Judge Magill wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel. 
 201. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1995), which establishes penalties for “[w]hoever, with the intent 
to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or 
received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and 
violence or intimidation, or attempts to do so . . . .” 
 202. See Robinson, 62 F.3d at 235. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. at 235-36. 
 205. See id. at 236. 
 206. See id. at 236 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59). 
 207. See Robinson, 62 F.3d at 236 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559). 
 208. See id. at 236 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
 209. See id. at 236. 
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Turning to the case sub judice, the Eighth Circuit determined that Congress 
acted within its commerce power in enacting the carjacking statute.210  Because 
the statute limits its prohibition of carjacking to vehicles that have been 
“transported, shipped, or received in interstate commerce,”211 it “fits squarely 
within the second category of activities regulable by Congress under the 
commerce clause.”212  Furthermore, the statute contains a jurisdictional 
element requiring a case-by-case showing that the vehicle in question has 
moved in interstate commerce.213  Finally, the Eighth Circuit noted Congress’ 
findings that vehicles stolen by carjacking often are shipped to other states for 
retitling, exported to other countries, or disassembled and distributed for resale 
as replacement parts.214  For these reasons, the Eighth Circuit held, “Lopez . . . 
does not render the carjacking statute unconstitutional, and . . . the carjacking 
statute is a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce clause powers.”215 
3. United States v. Rankin 
The Eighth Circuit again considered a Lopez challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g) in United States v. Rankin.216  Elbert Rankin had been convicted under 
section 922(g) as a felon in possession of a sawed-off shotgun and 
ammunition.217  Based on the Lopez decision, he moved to dismiss the section 
922(g) charge against him for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.218 
The Eighth Circuit219 began its analysis by reiterating the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Lopez that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) is “‘a criminal statute that by its 
terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, 
however broadly one might define those terms.’”220  Contrasting section 922(q) 
with section 922(g), the Eighth Circuit determined that the latter statute 
“clearly is tied to interstate commerce.”221  Furthermore, the court concluded 
that Rankin had failed to show that the firearm and ammunition in his 
possession lacked the required jurisdictional nexus with interstate commerce.  
The court based its conclusion on evidence that the shotgun was manufactured 
in New York, the ammunition was manufactured in Illinois, and Rankin was 
 
 210. See id. 
 211. See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1995)). 
 212. See Robinson, 62 F.3d at 236-37. 
 213. See id. at 237 (citing Mosby, 60 F.3d at 456). 
 214. See id. at 237; see also 138 CONG. REC. H11821-22 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992); H.R. REP. 
NO. 102-851(I), at 13-17 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829, 2830-33. 
 215. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 237. 
 216. 64 F.3d 338 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). 
 217. See id. at 339. 
 218. See id. 
 219. The three-judge panel, consisting of Judges Pasco M. Bowman, J. Smith Henley, and 
Morris Sheppard Arnold, filed a per curiam opinion. 
 220. Rankin, 64 F.3d at 339 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
 221. Id. at 339. 
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found in possession of the gun and ammunition in St. Louis, Missouri.  
Therefore, the court denied Rankin’s motion as “without merit.”222 
4. United States v. Jensen 
In United States v. Jensen,223 Donald Leroy Jensen challenged his 
conviction for money laundering on the ground that Congress lacked the power 
to enact 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(3)(B) and (C),224 the provisions under which 
Jensen was convicted.  Jensen’s money laundering conviction arose out of 
transactions in which he accepted money from a government informant who 
had represented that the money consisted of drug proceeds.225 
The Eighth Circuit226 noted Jensen’s citation of Lopez as support for his 
constitutional attack on section 1956 and briefly recalled that the Supreme 
Court, in Lopez, had struck down the GFSZA because Congress lacked the 
power under the Commerce Clause to enact that statute.227  Nonetheless, the 
Eighth Circuit concluded that the reasoning of Lopez was inapplicable to 
 
 222. Id.  In the months and years following the Rankin decision, the Eight Circuit filed 
numerous opinions, most of them unpublished per curiam opinions, that reject similar Lopez 
challenges to § 922(g) and rely heavily on Mosby, Rankin, and other cases in that line.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Perkins, No. 95-1744, 1995 WL 564526 (8th Cir. Sept. 25, 1995) (per curiam); 
United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Scott, 
No. 95-2527, 1995 WL 601293 (8th Cir. Oct. 12, 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Harris, No. 
95-2718, 1995 WL 644950 (8th Cir. Nov. 3, 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Bobo, No. 95-
2777, 1995 WL 644947 (8th Cir. Nov. 3, 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Merrifield, No. 95-
2872, 1995 WL 681473 (8th Cir. Nov. 17, 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Malone, No. 95-
3191, 1995 WL 695938 (8th Cir. Nov. 27, 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 
1101, 1103-04 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Corbett, No. 95-3238, 1996 WL 156702 (8th Cir. 
Apr. 5, 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Dotson, No. 95-3653, 1996 WL 193151, at *2 (8th 
Cir. Apr. 23, 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Robertson, No. 95-3228, 1996 WL 304359 (8th 
Cir. Jun. 7, 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Barry, 98 F.3d 373, 378 (8th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Curtin, No. 96-2968, 1996 WL 697259 (8th Cir. Dec. 6, 1996) (per curiam); United 
States v. Johnson, No. 96-3378EM, 1997 WL 165176 (8th Cir. Apr. 9, 1997) (per curiam); United 
States v. Crawford, 130 F.3d 1321, 1322 n.1 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Pollard, No. 97-
3722, 1998 WL 42579 (8th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998) (per curiam). 
 223. 69 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 224. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B), (C) (1994).  That section provides penalties for: 
(3) [w]hoever, with the intent– 
. . . 
  (B) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of 
property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or 
  (C) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law, conducts 
or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving property represented to be the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or property used to conduct or facilitate specified 
unlawful activity. . . . 
 225. See Jensen, 69 F.3d at 908-09. 
 226. Judge John R. Gibson wrote for the panel. 
 227. See Jensen, 69 F.3d at 910 n.5 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68). 
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Jensen’s money laundering case because, “[i]n enacting the money laundering 
statute, Congress exercised its authority not only under the Commerce Clause, 
but also under its authority to collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.”228 
5. United States v. Brown 
In United States v. Brown,229 the Eighth Circuit took up Corey D. Brown’s 
claim that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)230 is unconstitutional because Congress does 
not have the power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the intrastate use or 
possession of weapons.231 
After enumerating the three categories of activity that the Lopez Court 
identified as regulable under the Commerce Clause, the Eighth Circuit232 
turned its attention to categorizing section 924(c)(1).  Section 924(c)(1) was 
implicated in the present case when Brown “‘use[d] or carrie[d]’” a firearm 
while possessing, with the intent to distribute, crack cocaine as prohibited by 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).233  The court noted in rapid succession that “intrastate 
drug activity affects interstate commerce,”234 that Congress has the power to 
“regulate both interstate and intrastate drug trafficking under the Commerce 
Clause,”235 and that section 841(a)(1) is a “valid exercise of Congress’s 
 
 228. Id.  
 229. 72 F.3d 96 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 230. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994) (providing an additional prison term for anyone who, 
“during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which he may be 
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm . . . .”). 
 231. See Brown, 72 F.3d at 96.  Brown also challenged his 181-month prison sentence 
imposed under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) for drug trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  See 
id.  Brown claimed that § 841(b), which establishes a 100-to-1 ratio between penalties for crack 
cocaine and powder cocaine, violated his equal protection and due process rights, is void for 
vagueness, and should not be applied on account of the rule of lenity.  See id. at 97 (citing United 
States v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 1213, 1219-20 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1137 (1996)).  
For an extended discussion of the Eighth Circuit’s treatment of like challenges to § 841(b), see 
Cristian M. Stevens, Note, Criticism of Crack Cocaine Sentences Is Not What It Is Cracked Up 
To Be: A Case of First Impression Within the Ongoing Crack vs. Cocaine Debate, 62 MO. L. 
REV. 869 (1997). 
 232. The panel, consisting of Judges Roger L. Wollman, Frank J. Magill, and David R. 
Hansen, filed a per curiam opinion. 
 233. Brown, 72 F.3d at 97 (quoting § 924(c)(1)); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994) 
(making it unlawful for any person “to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent 
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance . . . .”). 
 234. Brown, 72 F.3d at 97 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1994) (containing congressional findings 
that “[a] major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate and foreign 
commerce”)). 
 235. Id. (citing United States v. Curtis, 965 F.2d 610, 616 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating, prior to 
Lopez, that “[u]nder its authority to regulate commerce . . . Congress may regulate both interstate 
and intrastate traffic and possession of controlled substances”)). 
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Commerce Clause power.”236  Thus, the Eighth Circuit rejected Brown’s Lopez 
challenge, finding that the predicate offense triggering Brown’s section 
924(c)(1) conviction, drug trafficking activity prohibited by section 841(a)(1), 
is “‘an activity that substantially affect[ed] interstate commerce’” for the 
purposes of Lopez.237 
6. United States v. Farmer 
Thomas Lee Farmer was convicted for attempting to rob a Hy-Vee 
convenience store in Waterloo, Iowa.238  Farmer’s plan was foiled when police 
promptly arrived at the scene shortly after Farmer had entered the store.239  
Farmer claimed on appeal that the Hobbs Act,240 the statute under which he 
was convicted, was not intended by Congress to reach the kind of “garden-
variety, single local robbery” attempted by Farmer.241 
The Eighth Circuit242 agreed that the Hobbs Act prohibits only the kind of 
robberies that “obstruct, delay, or affect interstate commerce or the movement 
of any article or commodity in commerce,” but determined that the attempted 
 
 236. Id. (citing United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1995)).  In United 
States v. Bell, as in Brown, the Eighth Circuit rejected “Bell’s attempt to extrapolate the reasoning 
and holding of Lopez to § 924(c)(1).”  See United States v. Bell, 90 F.3d 318, 320 (8th Cir. 1996).  
The court cited to Brown and held that § 924(c)(1) is not unconstitutional because the underlying 
drug-trafficking violation of § 841(a)(1) substantially affects interstate commerce.  See Bell, 90 
F.3d at 320-21 (listing cases decided “both before and after Lopez,” including Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 
1111-12; United States v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481, 498 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
McMillian, 535 F.2d 1035, 1037 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
  In Wolfe v. United States, the Eighth Circuit considered a Lopez challenge to § 841(a)(1) 
in its own right, not as the predicate for a § 924(c)(1) conviction.  See Nos. 95-2780, 95-3785, 
1996 WL 416754 (8th Cir. Jul. 26, 1996) (per curiam).  The court rejected Wolfe’s claim, relying 
on its decision in Brown that § 841(a)(1) is a valid exercise of the commerce power.  See id. 
(citing Brown, 72 F.3d at 97).  Likewise, in United States v. Patterson, the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that a Lopez challenge to § 841(a)(1) “lack[ed] merit” based on the court’s holding in 
Brown that “section 841(a)(1) is a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power under Lopez.”  
140 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 245 (1998) (citing Brown, 72 F.3d at 97; 
Curtis, 965 F.2d at 616; Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1111-12). 
 237. See Brown, 72 F.3d at 97 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559). 
 238. See United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 
1028 (1996). 
 239. Id. 
 240. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).  Section 1951(a) states: 
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of 
any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires 
so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in 
furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned . . . . 
Id. 
 241. Farmer, 73 F.3d at 843. 
 242. Then-Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold wrote the opinion of the court. 
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robbery of the Waterloo convenience store affected interstate commerce.243  
The court noted that the Hy-Vee chain consists of hundreds of stores 
throughout seven states and that those stores sell products originating from all 
fifty states and some foreign countries.244  The Eighth Circuit had “no doubt of 
the power of Congress to protect from violence businesses that are part of an 
interstate chain.”245  The court acknowledged the narrow holding of Lopez 
invalidating the GFSZA, but concluded that Lopez “has no application to cases 
of commercial establishments, such as the Hy-Vee store involved here.”246 
7. United States v. Miller 
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Miller,247 again scrutinized 18 
U.S.C. § 922 in light of Lopez, but this time the court dealt with a challenge to 
subsection (u) of that statute, which prohibits stealing a firearm from a gun 
dealer.248  Eric V. Miller, who pleaded guilty and was convicted under section 
922(u), claimed that the statute violated the Tenth Amendment.249 
 
 243. Farmer, 73 F.3d at 843. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, for the proposition that Congress is empowered to 
“protect . . . persons or things in interstate commerce.”).  The Eighth Circuit has relied on Farmer 
several times in rejecting similar Lopez challenges to the Hobbs Act.  In United States v. Hoskins, 
the court dismissed Hoskins’ claim that the Hobbs Act could not prohibit the robbery of local 
businesses and, therefore, did not apply to the series of restaurant robberies in which Hoskins 
engaged.  See United States v. Hoskins, No. 96-1094, 1996 WL 272526 (8th Cir. May 22, 1996) 
(per curiam). Similarly, in United States v. Mosley, Mosley argued that the Hobbes Act was 
unconstitutional as applied to his robbery of a gas station because Congress lacks the power to 
criminalize local robberies.  See No. 97-1315, 1998 WL 51373, at *2 (8th Cir. Feb. 6, 1998) (per 
curiam).  The court found, and Mosley conceded, that Mosley’s argument was the same argument 
rejected in Farmer.  Based on evidence that the Arkansas gas station targeted by Mosley served 
interstate travelers and sold products originating in Tennessee, Missouri, and Texas, the Eighth 
Circuit once again rejected the Lopez challenge to the Hobbs Act. See id.  Finally, in United 
States v. Vong, the court cited to Farmer for the proposition that “Lopez does not apply to cases 
involving commercial establishments.”  171 F.3d 648, 654 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Farmer, 73 
F.3d at 843).  The court held that, because the Hobbs Act expressly requires a jurisdictional 
nexus, Congress did not exceed the power granted to it by the Commerce Clause.  See Vong, 171 
F.3d at 654. 
 247. 74 F.3d 159 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 248. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(u) (1994).  Section 922(u) states: 
It shall be unlawful for a person to steal or unlawfully take or carry away from the person 
or the premises of a person who is licensed to engage in the business of importing, 
manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, any firearm in the licensee’s business inventory 
that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
Id. 
 249. See Miller, 74 F.3d at 159. 
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The Eighth Circuit250 began with a cursory review of its precedent 
sustaining subsection (g) of section 922,251 a provision whose operative 
language parallels that of section 922(u).252  The court had held in its previous 
cases that section 922(g), by virtue of its interstate-commerce element, 
“ensured through case-by-case inquiry that the firearm in question affected 
interstate commerce.”253  Analogizing section 922(u) to section 922(g), the 
Eighth Circuit determined that the element of section 922(u) requiring the 
shipment or transportation of the firearm in interstate commerce likewise 
ensures that the firearm affects interstate commerce.254  Thus, the Eight Circuit 
concluded that Miller’s Lopez challenge must fail.255 
8. United States v. Dinwiddie 
Regina Rene Dinwiddie, an anti-abortion demonstrator, was found to have 
violated the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)256 by 
obstructing and using physical force against the patients and staff members of 
a Planned Parenthood abortion clinic in Kansas City, Missouri.257  Dinwiddie 
was enjoined from further violating FACE and from coming within 500 feet of 
any reproductive health facility except to engage in certain specified 
 
 250. Judges Wollman, Magill, and Hansen filed a per curiam opinion. 
 251. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994).  For an exhaustive list of Eighth Circuit cases sustaining 
§ 922(g) against Lopez challenges, see supra note 222. 
 252. See supra note 190 for the language of § 922(g). 
 253. Miller, 74 F.3d at 159-60 (citing Shelton, 66 F.3d at 992; Rankin, 64 F.3d at 339). 
 254. Id. at 160. 
 255. See id. at 159.  In several subsequent cases, as in Miller, the Eighth Circuit relied on its 
substantial body of § 922(g) precedent to dispose of Lopez challenges to other provisions of § 922 
containing jurisdiction elements.  In United States v. Schulze, the court held that a Lopez 
challenge to undifferentiated “weapons-related convictions” was foreclosed by Bates and Shelton 
“[b]ecause the provisions under which Shulze was charged contain an interstate commerce 
requirement.”  Schulze,  No. 95-3356ND, 1997 WL 94706 at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 6, 1997) (per 
curiam)  (citing Bates, 77 F.3d at 1103-04; Shelton, 66 F.3d at 992).  Also, in United States v. 
Kocourek, the Eighth Circuit rejected a Lopez challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) (1994), which 
proscribes possession of a stolen firearm and contains a jurisdictional element “virtually identical 
to that of section 922(g),” for the same reason the court rejected a similar challenge to § 922(g) in 
Shelton.  United States v. Kocourek, No. 96-1963, 1997 WL 307160, at *1 (8th Cir. May 22, 
1997) (per curiam). 
 256. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1994), which provides penalties for anyone who: 
[B]y force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates 
or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because 
that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or 
class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services. 
Id. 
 257. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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activities.258  On appeal, Dinwiddie claimed that Congress lacked the power to 
enact FACE under the Commerce Clause.259 
Paraphrasing the Lopez Court’s enumeration of the three types of activities 
subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause, the Eighth Circuit260 
recognized Congress’ power “to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, 
to regulate or protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or people or 
things involved in interstate commerce, and to regulate conduct that has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.”261  Elaborating upon the second 
category, the Eighth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court’s determination that 
Congress may “‘protect  . . . person or things in interstate commerce, even 
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.’”262  Due to the 
interstate nature of the Planned Parenthood clinic’s clientele and the fact that 
some of the clinic’s staff do not reside in Missouri, the Eighth Circuit found 
that the patients and staff of the clinic, as well as the clinic itself, are engaged 
in interstate commerce when they obtain or provide reproductive health 
services.263  Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that FACE, as applied to 
the Planned Parenthood clinic, and its staff and patients, “is a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power to protect people and businesses involved in interstate 
commerce.”264 
The Eighth Circuit then proceeded to a discussion of the third Lopez 
category, acknowledging that Congress’ power to regulate activities 
substantially affecting interstate commerce extends to “purely intrastate 
activity if, in the aggregate, the activity has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.”265  The court concluded that the activity prohibited by FACE 
substantially affects interstate commerce because, as congressional findings 
established, such conduct diminishes interstate commerce in reproductive 
health services.266  The court cited to Katzenbach and Wickard for the settled 
proposition that activities having such a diminishing effect on commerce may 
be regulated by Congress267 and further noted that “in Lopez, the Supreme 
Court did not overturn Katzenbach v. McClung, Wickard v. Filburn, or any 
 
 258. See id. at 918. 
 259. See id. at 919. 
 260. Then-Chief Judge Arnold again wrote for the panel. 
 261. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 919. 
 262. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 and citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 150). 
 263. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 919-20. 
 264. Id. at 920. 
 265. Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60; Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258; Wickard, 
317 U.S. at 125). 
 266. See id. 
 267. See id. (citing Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299-300; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29). 
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other opinion holding that Congress has the power to regulate conduct that 
reduces interstate commerce in a good or service.”268 
Next, the Eighth Circuit distinguished FACE from the GFSZA, the statute 
struck down in Lopez, on the basis that FACE does not require courts to “‘pile 
inference upon inference’” to determine that the conduct it prohibits 
substantially affects interstate commerce.269  Rather, as congressional findings 
revealed, a direct causal relationship exists between the obstruction of abortion 
clinics by protesters and the decline in services provided by those clinics.270 
Finally, the court considered Dinwiddie’s argument that FACE is not a 
valid regulation of activity substantially affecting interstate commerce because 
it regulates, not commercial entities themselves, but private conduct affecting 
commercial entities.271  The court dismissed this argument and explained that 
Congress’ power to regulate commerce is not limited to commercial entities.272  
Thus, the court held that, “Lopez notwithstanding, FACE is a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power to regulate activity that substantially affects interstate 
commerce.”273  Having concluded that FACE was properly enacted under the 
Commerce Clause, the court declined to consider section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as an alternative source of congressional power to enact FACE.274 
9. United States v. Flaherty 
In United States v. Flaherty,275 the Eighth Circuit considered John Charles 
Flaherty’s claim that the evidence presented against him at trial to prove the 
 
 268. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921. The Eighth Circuit cited to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Lopez, in which he stated that post-New Deal cases like Darby, Wickard, Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Katzenbach v. McClung, and Perez “are within the fair ambit of the Court’s practical conception 
of commercial regulation and are not called in question by our decision today.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 573-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy wrote separately to advocate moderation in 
the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause, cautioning that “[s]tare decisis operates with 
great force in counseling us not to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting 
the congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature.”  Id. at 574.  Justice 
Kennedy nonetheless joined the opinion of the Court out of concern that “[w]ere the Federal 
Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having 
nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of 
federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.”  Id. at 
577. 
 269. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567). 
 270. See id. 
 271. See id. at 920 (citing United States v. Wilson as “the only opinion holding that FACE is 
not within Congress’s commerce power”); United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), 
rev’d, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 272. See Dinwiddie, at 920-21. 
 273. Id. at 921. 
 274. Id. at 921 n.4. 
 275. 76 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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interstate commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)276 was insufficient to 
convict Flaherty of arson under that statute.  Flaherty had set fire to his own 
restaurant, Eddy’s Hamburgers and Malt Shop in Long Lake, Minnesota, in 
order to collect the proceeds of an insurance policy.277  Based on Lopez, 
Flaherty argued that the Government was required to show a substantial 
relationship between the restaurant and interstate commerce, but had proven, 
consistent with the jury instruction given, only that the restaurant was heated 
with gas from outside of Minnesota.278  Unfortunately, Flaherty had waived the 
interstate commerce issue by failing to raise it at trial.279  All the same, the 
court280 sustained the jury instruction because it “mirror[ed]” an instruction 
approved in a pre-Lopez case.281 
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit expressed that even had Flaherty not 
waived the issue, Lopez would not have applied to this case.282  The court 
explained that the GFSZA, “by its terms, had ‘nothing to do with commerce or 
any sort of economic enterprise,’ nor did it contain a requirement that the 
possession [of a firearm] be connected in any way to interstate commerce.”283  
By contrast, section 844(i) prohibits the burning of business property and 
requires the government to show that the property is “‘used in interstate or 
foreign commerce.’”284  The Eight Circuit concluded that, because Lopez does 
not deal with the amount of evidence sufficient to prove a jurisdictional 
element, it was not controlling.285 
 
 276. See 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994) (establishing penalties for anyone who “maliciously 
damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any 
building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in 
any activity affecting interstate . . . commerce.”). 
 277. See Flaherty, 76 F.3d at 969-70. 
 278. See id. at 973. 
 279. See id.  Again, in United States v. Baker, the Eighth Circuit, relying on Flaherty, 
determined that the appellant had waived his Lopez argument.  See 98 F.3d 330, 337-38 (8th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1179 (1997).  Baker claimed that 18 U.S.C. § 175 (1994), which 
prohibits possession of a toxin for use as a weapon, “was not a valid exercise [of the commerce 
power] in light of . . . Lopez.”  Id. at 337.  The Eighth Circuit found, however, that Baker had 
failed to raise the issue in the district court and held that such failure amounts to a waiver of the 
issue.  See id. at 337-38 (citing Flaherty, 76 F.3d at 973). 
 280. United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 1996).  Judge Diana E. Murphy wrote for 
a two-judge majority.  Judge John R. Gibson dissented on grounds independent of the Lopez 
issue. 
 281. Flaherty, 76 F.3d at 973 (citing United States v. Ryan, 41 F.3d 361 (8th Cir. 1994) (en 
banc) (approving, in a § 844(i) arson case, an instruction stating, “If you find from the 
evidence . . . [that] natural gas used to heat the building . . . was supplied from outside the state of 
Iowa, then the required affect [sic] on interstate commerce has been proved.”)). 
 282. See id. 
 283. Id. at 974 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
 284. Id. (quoting § 844(i)). 
 285. See id. 
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10. United States v. Monteleone 
The Eighth Circuit yet again considered a Lopez challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 
922 in United States v. Monteleone.286  Salvatore Monteleone had been 
convicted for transferring a firearm to a convicted felon in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(d).287  Monteleone had contacted the ATF to declare his 
ownership of the gun, which had been confiscated from the home of his half 
brother, a convicted felon.  He claimed that section 922(d), lacking an 
interstate commerce element, is beyond Congress’ commerce power.288 
The Eighth Circuit289 acknowledged that section 922(d) lacks an interstate 
commerce element, and thus is applicable to completely intrastate transactions, 
but it “d[id] not feel that the statute is rendered unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court’s narrow holding in Lopez.”290  Reviewing the three Lopez 
categories, the Eighth Circuit determined that section 922(d) could be 
sustained only as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate 
commerce.291  The Eighth Circuit distinguished the GFSZA and section 922(d) 
on the basis that the GFSZA proscribes mere possession of a firearm, while 
section 922(d) deals with disposal of firearms, “an inherently commercial 
activity.”292  According to the court, “the disposal of a firearm . . . , even when 
consummated in a completely intrastate transaction, is a commercial activity 
‘that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect . . . interstate 
commerce.’”293 
Turning to congressional findings regarding section 922(d), the court 
found that the statute was a response to firearms trafficking in interstate and 
foreign commerce.294  However, it had been ineffective as originally enacted 
because it applied only to federally licensed firearms dealers and 
manufacturers.295  To close a loophole whereby dealers and manufacturers set 
up strawmen to engage in transactions with convicted felons, Congress had 
 
 286. 77 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 287. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (1994), which states: 
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any 
firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that such person– 
(1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a 
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . . 
 288. See Monteleone, 77 F.3d at 1091. 
 289. Judge Floyd R. Gibson wrote the opinion of the court. 
 290. Monteleone, 77 F.3d at 1091. 
 291. See id. at 1091-92. 
 292. Id. at 1092 (citing United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1354 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(“[A]cquisition of firearms is more closely related to interstate commerce than mere 
possession.”), aff’d, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)). 
 293. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567). 
 294. See id. 
 295. See Monteleone, 77 F.3d at 1092. 
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amended the statute to expand its coverage beyond dealers and manufacturers 
by applying it to “‘any person.’”296  Based on this legislative history, the 
Eighth Circuit determined that section 922(d) is “‘an essential part of a larger 
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be 
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.’”297  For these reasons, 
the Eighth Circuit held that Congress enacted section 922(d) validly pursuant 
to its power granted by the Commerce Clause.298 
11. United States v. Baker 
In United States v. Baker,299 Robert M. Baker challenged his conviction 
under the Travel Act300 claiming that the conduct for which he was convicted 
had an insufficient nexus to interstate commerce.301  Baker, a St. Louis police 
officer, had been convicted for extorting money from a motorist during an 
early-morning traffic stop and for compelling the motorist, who reported the 
incident the next day, to withdraw $300 from an automatic teller machine 
(ATM) to avoid the costs of defending himself in court.302 
The Eighth Circuit303 determined that federal jurisdiction under the Travel 
Act was established by evidence that Baker committed extortion by forcing the 
motorist to withdraw money from an ATM which, for the purposes of the 
Travel Act, was “‘a facility in interstate or foreign commerce.’”304  
Furthermore, the court concluded that the jurisdictional element of the Travel 
 
 296. Id. (quoting § 922(d)). 
 297. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
 298. See id.  In Kocourek, after disposing of a Lopez challenge to § 922(j), the Eighth Circuit 
relied on Monteleone to sustain 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(1)(A) (1994).  See Kocourek, 1997 WL 
307160, at *1; see also supra note 248.  Section 922(x)(1)(A) prohibits transferring a handgun to 
a juvenile and, like § 922(d), lacks an interstate commerce element.  See Kocourek, 1997 WL 
307160, at *1.  The Eighth Circuit, nonetheless, concluded that § 922(x)(1)(A) “may be sustained 
as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to regulate activities that have a substantial relation to 
interstate commerce.”  Id. (citing Monteleone, 77 F.3d at 1092). 
 299. 82 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 300. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (1994), which establishes penalties for any person who uses 
“any facility in interstate or foreign commerce,” with the intent to “promote, manage, establish, 
carry on, or facilitate . . . any unlawful activity,” and thereafter engages or attempts to engage in 
such activity.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (1994), which defines “unlawful activity” for the 
purposes of § 1952(a) as, among other things, “extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws 
of the State in which committed.” 
 301. Baker, 82 F.3d at 275. 
 302. See id. at 274-75. 
 303. Judge James B. Loken wrote for a two-judge majority.  Judge Theodore McMillian 
dissented and did not reach the Lopez issue.  Judge McMillian would have found that use of the 
ATM was not a part of the plan to commit extortion and, therefore, did not have a “sufficient 
nexus to the offense to fall within the jurisdictional limits of the Travel Act.”  See Baker, 82 F.3d 
at 278 (McMillian, J., dissenting). 
 304. Baker, 82 F.3d at 275 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (1994)). 
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Act ensures a sufficient nexus between conduct prosecuted under the Act and 
interstate commerce regulable under the Commerce Clause because 
“‘Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce . . . even though the threat may come only from intrastate 
activities.’”305 
12. United States v. Elliot 
The Eighth Circuit’s next opportunity to take an extended look306 at the 
Lopez decision was United States v. Elliot.307  The court was faced with Forriss 
D. Elliot’s claim that the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. section 1341,308 may not 
be applied to purely intrastate mailings because such mailings do not have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce, as required by Lopez.309  Elliot, a St. 
Louis attorney acting as a special assistant attorney general for the State of 
Missouri, was convicted under the mail fraud statute for grossly overbilling the 
state via the U.S. mail. Elliot claimed that because all of his fraudulent bills 
were mailed and received in Missouri, the mail fraud statute was 
inapplicable.310 
The Eighth Circuit311 explained that the Supreme Court struck down the 
GFSZA in Lopez because possession of a gun near a school does not have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.312  The mail fraud statute, however, 
was enacted, not under the interstate commerce power, but under the postal 
power,313 which gives Congress the authority to regulate even purely intrastate 
 
 305. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558). 
 306. Before the Elliot case, the court briefly dealt with a Lopez challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 
842(i) (1994), which prohibits felons from possessing explosives that “have been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”  See United States v. Folen, 84 F.3d 1103, 1104 
(8th Cir. 1996).  The court, citing to precedent upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) based on its 
jurisdictional element, held that Congress did not exceed its power under the Commerce Clause 
by enacting § 842(i) because the statute’s “express jurisdictional element ensures that it regulates 
only the possession of explosives that have traveled in interstate commerce.”  Id. (citing Bates, 77 
F.3d at 1104; Shelton, 66 F.3d at 992). 
 307. 89 F.3d 1360 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 308. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994), which establishes penalties for anyone who: 
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, . . . for the 
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post 
office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or 
delivered by the Postal Service . . . . 
Id. 
 309. See Elliot, 89 F.3d at 1363. 
 310. See id. at 1362-63. 
 311. Judge Pasco M. Bowman wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel. 
 312. See Elliot, 89 F.3d at 1364. 
 313. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (granting Congress the power to “establish Post Offices 
and post Roads”). 
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mail.314  The Eighth Circuit thus concluded that Lopez, a Commerce Clause 
case, “has no application whatsoever to the mail fraud statute.”315 
13. United States v. McMasters 
In United States v. McMasters,316 the Eighth Circuit returned to the issue 
of the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), the federal arson statute, in light 
of Lopez.  McMasters and his co-defendants, who conspired to blow up a rival 
drug dealer’s residence in Clinton, Iowa, argued that section 844(i) exceeds 
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.317 
At the outset, the Eighth Circuit318 recounted the Lopez decision at length, 
recalling the Supreme Court’s determination that the GFSZA did not have an 
interstate commerce element or any legislative history regarding the impact of 
the prohibited activity on interstate commerce.319 The Eight Circuit also noted 
the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the GFSZA “could not ‘be sustained 
under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are 
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce.’”320  In contrast, said the Eighth 
Circuit, section 844(i) contains a jurisdictional element requiring that any 
property, the destruction of which is prohibited by the statute, be “‘used in 
interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce.’”321 Also, the legislative history of section 844(i) reveals Congress’ 
respect for the limits of its commerce power and contains congressional 
findings that the conduct prohibited by the statute has an adverse impact on 
interstate commerce.  The Eighth Circuit concluded that because section 844(i) 
is a regulation of the situs of commercial transactions that, in the aggregate, 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the statute was enacted within 
the commerce power and is constitutional on its face.322 
Nonetheless, the Eight Circuit did not conclude its analysis because, 
although the court had determined that section 844(i) is facially valid, “the 
applicability of section 844(i) in various circumstances may be ‘threaten[ed 
by] legal uncertainty’” due to the Lopez decision.323  McMasters’ argument 
 
 314. See Elliot, 89 F.3d at 1364. 
 315. Id. at 1364. 
 316. 90 F.3d 1394 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1099 (1997). 
 317. See id. at 1396-97. 
 318. Judge Magill wrote for the court. 
 319. See McMasters, 90 F.3d at 1397-98. 
 320. Id. at 1398 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
 321. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994)). 
 322. See id. 
 323. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).  The passage from Justice 
Breyer’s dissent quoted by the Eighth Circuit in McMasters reads in its entirety: “The third legal 
problem created by the Court’s holding is that it threatens legal uncertainty in an area of law that, 
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that the particular application of the statute to his case was unconstitutional 
since he had planned to bomb a private residence, not a commercial building, 
was rejected by the Eighth Circuit because the residence targeted by 
McMasters was rental property that received utility services from sources 
outside of Iowa and because “rental real estate represents an ongoing 
commercial enterprise, which frequently has interstate connections.”324  The 
Eighth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s unanimous holding in Russell v. 
United States, a pre-Lopez decision, that the application of section 844(i) to the 
arson of an apartment building is constitutional.325  Lopez did not overrule 
Russell, according to the Eighth Circuit, although “it is possible . . . that Lopez 
limited the reach of section 844(i) by articulating a more stringent standard.”326  
Under Lopez, to be within Congress’ interstate commerce power, the rental 
property at issue must be used for an activity that has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.327 Already having concluded that the rental of real estate 
is a kind of economic activity that, in the aggregate, might have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce, the court held that “the rental status of [the 
victim’s] residence provided the necessary nexus to interstate commerce for 
federal jurisdiction over the defendants’ conspiracy to commit arson.”328 
 
until this case, seemed reasonably well settled.”  Justice Breyer essentially argued in his dissent 
that “[h]aving found that guns in schools significantly undermines the quality of education in our 
Nation’s classrooms, Congress could also have found, given the effect of education upon 
interstate and foreign commerce, that gun related violence in and around schools is a 
commercial . . . problem.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 620 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer 
presented three basic arguments, criticizing the Court’s holding.  First, he stated that the majority 
opinion “[ran] contrary to modern Supreme Court cases that have upheld congressional actions 
despite connections to interstate or foreign commerce that are less significant than the effect of 
school violence.”  Id. at 625 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Second, the majority sought to make a 
“critical distinction between ‘commercial’ and noncommercial ‘transaction[s].’ ”  Id. at 627 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).  Finally, as quoted by the Eighth Circuit 
in McMasters, the Court’s opinion “threaten[ed] legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until this 
case, seemed reasonably well settled.”  Id. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 324. McMasters, 90 F.3d at 1398. 
 325. See id. (quoting Russell, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985) (“[Section 844(i)] only applies to 
property that is ‘used’ in an ‘activity’ that affects commerce.  The rental of real estate is 
unquestionably such an activity.”)). 
 326. Id. at 1399. 
 327. See id. 
 328. Id.  In United States v. Melina, the Eighth Circuit again addressed a Lopez challenge to § 
844(i).  See 101 F.3d 567, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1996).  Citing McMasters and discussing Flaherty at 
length, the court determined that Melina, a co-defendant of Flaherty, had waived the Lopez issue 
and that, even if he had not waived the issue, the court had “rejected this precise argument in 
Flaherty, holding that Lopez was simply inapplicable.”  Id. (citing McMasters, 90 F.3d at 1397-
99; Flaherty, 76 F.3d at 973).  Finally, in United States v. Rea, the court reviewed § 844(i) in 
light of Lopez for the last time to date.  See 169 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 1999).  Citing Melina and 
Flaherty, the Eighth Circuit explained that “Lopez is inapposite to convictions secured pursuant to 
section 844(i) and does not raise the government’s evidentiary burden on the jurisdictional 
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14. United States v. Crawford 
After being convicted for failure to pay child support under the Child 
Support Recovery Act (CSRA),329 Lynn Truman Crawford challenged the 
CSRA as an accretion of Congress’ regulatory power under the Commerce 
Clause and a violation of the Tenth Amendment.330  Crawford, an emergency 
room physician residing in Texas, had separated from his wife, who retained 
custody of the couple’s two children and moved to Missouri.  Because 
Crawford failed to make monthly child support payments as ordered by a 
Texas state court, he was indicted and convicted under the CSRA in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.331  Crawford maintained 
that the CSRA is not a valid enactment within any of the three Lopez 
categories because child support is unrelated to interstate commerce.332 
The Eighth Circuit333 first established that the constitutional issue 
presented by Crawford was governed by Lopez and reiterated the three Lopez 
categories.334  The court found that payment of child support for a child 
residing in another state requires that money cross state boundaries, and 
therefore, “[s]uch payments . . . are things in, or having a substantial relation 
to, interstate commerce” and are regulable “within either the second or the 
third category of regulations recognized in Lopez.”335  In support, the Eighth 
Circuit recalled the Supreme Court’s holding in Wickard that discrete activities 
having only a trivial effect on interstate commerce may nonetheless be 
regulated under the interstate commerce power if their combined effect on 
interstate commerce is substantial.336  The Eighth Circuit also determined that 
the CSRA fits within the first Lopez category because child support on behalf 
of out-of-state children necessitates the movement of money through the 
channels of interstate commerce.337  Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that 
Congress did not exceed its power under the Commerce Clause when it 
enacted the CSRA and, therefore, denied Crawford’s claim that the CSRA 
violated the Tenth Amendment.338 
 
element of the offense.”  Id. at 1113 (citing Melina, 101 F.3d at 573; Flaherty, 76 F.3d at 973-
74). 
 329. See 18 U.S.C. § 228 (a) (1994) (providing punishment for anyone who “willfully fails to 
pay a support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State”). 
 330. United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397, 1398 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 
341 (1997). 
 331. See id. at 1398-99. 
 332. See id. at 1400. 
 333. Judge McMillian wrote for the panel. 
 334. See Crawford, 115 F.3d at 1399-1400. 
 335. Id. at 1400. 
 336. See id. (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-67). 
 337. See id. 
 338. See id. at 1401; see also supra note 147 for a discussion of Crawford as it deals with a 
Tenth Amendment challenge based on New York. 
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15. United States v. Wright 
In United States v. Wright,339 the Eighth Circuit considered Larry G. 
Wright’s contention that the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)340 
exceeded Congress’ commerce power.  Wright had been indicted under the 
VAWA for traveling from Omaha, Nebraska, to Council Bluffs, Iowa, to 
violate a protection order issued against him by a Nebraska state court.341 
Initially, the Eighth Circuit342 recited the now familiar Lopez categories 
and determined that section 2262(a)(1) of the VAWA could not fit within the 
third Lopez category because that category “‘define[s] the extent of Congress’s 
power over purely intra state commercial activities,’ that nonetheless have 
interstate effects,” while section 2262(a)(1) deals with only interstate travel.343  
Section 2262(a)(1) nonetheless was a constitutional exercise of the commerce 
power because, as the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit had held many 
times, “crossing state lines is interstate commerce regardless of whether any 
commercial activity is involved.”344  If the case were otherwise and crossing 
state lines, without more, did not constitute interstate commerce, then 
numerous federal statutes in addition to section 2262(a)(1) likely would exceed 
the interstate commerce power.345  The Eighth Circuit concluded that, because 
section 2262(a)(1) prohibits interstate travel for the purpose of violating a 
protection order, it was validly enacted under “Congress’s authority ‘to keep 
 
 339. 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 340. See 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1) (1994).  The section punishes: 
  A person who travels across a State line or enters or leaves Indian country with the 
intent to engage in conduct that– 
(A)(i) violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against 
credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or 
persons for whom the protection order was issued; or 
(ii)  would violate subparagraph (A) if the conduct occurred in the jurisdiction in 
which the order was issued; and 
(B)  subsequently engages in such conduct. 
Id. 
 341. See Wright, 128 F.3d at 1274. 
 342. Judge George G. Fagg wrote the opinion of a unanimous three-judge panel. 
 343. Wright, 128 F.3d at 1275 (quoting United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 671 (1995) 
(per curiam)). 
 344. Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 255-56; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 
160, 172 n.1 (1941); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917); Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1997); Robinson, 62 F.3d 
at 235, 237 n.4; Lupino v. United States, 268 F.2d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1959)). 
 345. See Wright, 128 F.3d at 1275.  As examples of statutes whose validity would be in 
doubt, the Eighth Circuit cited the Animal Enterprise Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (Supp. 1994) 
(prohibiting interstate travel for the purpose of causing physical disruption to an animal 
enterprise); 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (prohibiting interstate flight to avoid prosecution); 18 U.S.C. § 
2101 (prohibiting interstate travel with intent to incite a riot); the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) 
(prohibiting interstate travel for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with a minor). 
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the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses.’”346  
Having held that section 2262(a)(1) falls within the commerce power, the 
Eighth Circuit summarily rejected Wright’s argument that the statute violates 
the Tenth Amendment.347 
16. United States v. Bausch 
Following Wright, the Eighth Circuit’s next authoritative application348 of 
Lopez was United States v. Bausch.349  James Donald Bausch had been 
convicted for possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(a)(4)(B)350 after he photographed, with a camera manufactured in Japan, 
two minors in sexually suggestive nude poses.351  Bausch claimed that 
Congress lacks the power to prohibit the possession of child pornography when 
the pornography has neither moved in nor is intended for interstate 
commerce.352  Therefore, Bausch argued, Congress exceeded its commerce 
power in enacting section 2252(a)(4)(B).353 
The Eighth Circuit,354 after briefly recounting the three Lopez categories, 
determined that section 2252(a)(4)(B) “is a proper exercise of Congress’s 
commerce power under the third category.”355  By requiring that the child 
pornography, or the materials used to produce it, be transported in interstate or 
 
 346. Wright, 128 F.3d at 1276 (quoting Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491). 
 347. See id.; see also supra note 147 for a brief discussion of Wright as an application of New 
York. 
 348. See 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i) (providing that “[u]npublished opinions are not precedent and 
parties generally should not cite them”).   After Wright but before Bausch, the Eighth Circuit 
considered a Lopez challenge to unspecified “drug and weapons charges, including engaging in a 
continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.”  Walkner v. United States, No. 
96-2191, 1997 WL 709304 (8th Cir. Nov. 14, 1997) (per curiam); see also 21 U.S.C. § 848.  The 
court summarily rejected the Lopez argument because “the statutes under which Walkner was 
prosecuted are valid under the Commerce Clause.”  Walkner, 129 F.3d at 123. 
 349. 140 F.3d at 739 (8th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 806 (1999). 
 350. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (1994), which prohibits: 
[K]nowingly possess[ing] 3 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or 
other matter which contain any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped 
or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials 
which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by 
computer, if– 
(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct; and 
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct . . . . 
Id. 
 351. See Bausch, 140 F.3d at 740. 
 352. See id. 
 353. See id. at 740-41. 
 354. Judge Fagg again wrote for the panel. 
 355. Bausch, 140 F.3d at 741 (citing United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652 (1998)). 
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foreign commerce, section 2252(a)(4)(B) “ensures, through a case-by-case 
inquiry, that each defendant’s pornography possession affected interstate 
commerce.”356  Because Bausch had taken the pictures with a camera that was 
manufactured in Japan and had moved in interstate or foreign commerce, the 
application of section 2252(a)(4)(B) to Bausch’s case was proper.357  The 
Eighth Circuit further held that “§ 2252(a)(4)(B) is not beyond Congress’s 
commerce power, and thus is not facially unconstitutional.”358 
17. United States v. Hall 
United States v. Hall359 is the first case in which the Eighth Circuit has 
held that a congressional statute, as applied, exceeds the commerce power in 
light of Lopez.  Everett Hall was convicted for possessing an unregistered 
firearm silencer in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).360  He challenged his 
indictment on the basis that section 5861(d) lacks a jurisdictional element 
requiring that the silencer at issue have some connection to interstate 
commerce.361  Therefore, claimed Hall, the statute could not be applied to his 
 
 356. Id. 
 357. See id. 
 358. Id.  Following Bausch, the Eighth Circuit handed down several cases dealing only briefly 
with Lopez.  The dissenting opinion in In re Young included a short summary of Lopez and 
citations to Lopez for the propositions that “the separation of powers . . . plays a vital role in 
securing freedom for all” and that the courts must “‘intervene when one or the other [branch] of 
Government has tipped the scales too far.’”  141 F.3d at 865 (Bogue, J., dissenting) (citing and 
quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577, 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  In re Young essentially is an 
application of the Supreme Court’s City of Boerne decision and is discussed in that capacity at 
infra Part II.D.3.  Similarly, in United States v. Weaselhead, the Eighth Circuit relied on Lopez 
for its determination that Congress’ power under the Indian Commerce Clause is subject to 
“‘judicially enforceable outer limits.’”  156 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 566), reh’g en banc granted, opinion and judgment vacated, (order of Dec. 4, 1998), on 
reh’g en banc, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 82 (1999).  Weaselhead is further 
discussed in the context of Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne.  See infra notes 498 and 598.  
Finally, in United States v. Puckett, the Eighth Circuit summarily rejected a Lopez challenge to 21 
U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (1994), which prohibits opening or maintaining a place for the purpose of 
distributing a controlled substance.  See 147 F.3d 765, 769 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998).  The court 
sustained § 856(a)(1) based on congressional findings that intrastate drug trafficking affects 
interstate commerce.  See id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (1994) (finding that “[i]ncidents of the 
[drug] traffic which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, 
local distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate 
commerce.”)). 
 359. 171 F.3d 1133 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 360. See id. at 1138; see also 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (making it unlawful for anyone to “receive 
or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and 
Transfer Record”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(C) (defining “firearm” for the purposes of § 
5861(d) to include “any firearm muffler or firearm silencer”). 
 361. See Hall, 171 F.3d at 1138. 
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apparently intrastate possession of a silencer without exceeding the bounds of 
the Commerce Clause. 362 
The Eighth Circuit363 began by reiterating the Supreme Court’s statement 
in Lopez that Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate even wholly intrastate activities that, “‘through repetition elsewhere, 
substantially affect [some] sort of interstate commerce.’”364  To determine 
whether the intrastate possession of a silencer substantially affects interstate 
commerce, the Eighth Circuit asked three questions.  First, the court inquired 
whether section 5861(d) contains a “‘jurisdictional element which would 
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [silencer] possession in question 
affects interstate commerce.’”365  The Eighth Circuit answered this question in 
the negative.366  Second, the court asked whether Hall’s intrastate possession of 
a silencer arose out of, or was connected to, a commercial transaction, making 
it “‘an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate [silencer possession] 
were regulated.’”367  The Eighth Circuit, agreeing with Hall’s contention that 
the completely intrastate possession of a silencer has “‘nothing to do with 
“commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise,’” again answered in the 
negative.368  The last inquiry by the court was whether Congress, in the course 
of enacting section 5861(d), created any legislative history regarding the affect 
of intrastate possession of a silencer on interstate commerce.  The court 
concluded that “Congress made no legislative findings, either explicit or 
implicit, from which we may reliably conclude that the intrastate possession of 
silencers imposes ‘substantial burdens’ on interstate commerce.”369  The 
Eighth Circuit thus held that the section 5861(d) charge against Hall could not 
be sustained under the Commerce Clause.370 
The court’s analysis was not finished, however, because the application of 
section 5861(d) to Hall’s possession of an unregistered silencer might be 
supported by an alternative source of congressional power.  Thus, the court 
 
 362. See id.  The government failed to present any evidence of a connection between Hall’s 
silencer and interstate commerce.  Instead, the government argued that Congress has the power to 
regulate even wholly intrastate possession of a silencer.  See id. 
 363. Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold wrote the opinion of the court.  Judge Owen M. Panner, a 
district court judge sitting by designation, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.  
Judge Panner’s disagreement was with the court’s resolution of the Lopez issue.  See id. at 1155 
(Panner, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also infra notes 374-76 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Panner’s concurring opinion. 
 364. Hall, 171 F.3d at 1138 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567) (alteration by Eighth Circuit). 
 365. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561) (alteration by Eighth Circuit). 
 366. See id. at 1138-39. 
 367. Id. at 1139 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561) (alteration added). 
 368. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
 369. Hall, 171 F.3d at 1139-40 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562). 
 370. See id. at 1140. 
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turned its attention to the government’s argument that the authority to 
prosecute Hall under the relevant statute was based on the Taxing Clause.371  
After an extended discussion of section 5861(d) as a tax regulation and a 
firearm registration enforcement provision,372 the court concluded that 
“Congress had the authority under the taxing clause to define as a crime the 
possession of an unregistered silencer.”373 
The concurring judge agreed that Hall’s section 5861(d) conviction was 
not to be overturned, but disagreed with the court’s determination that the 
conviction could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause.374  He stated 
that “Congress could properly conclude that a uniform standard and regulatory 
scheme are needed to manage firearms, silencers, and similar dangerous 
devices, which are readily transportable,” and distinguished section 5861(d) 
from the GFSZA (struck down in Lopez) on that basis.375  Thus, the concurring 
judge would have held that section 5861(d), as applied to Hall’s case, was 
within Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.376 
18. United States v. Emery 
In United States v. Emery,377 Tony Emery was convicted of killing a 
federal informant in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C).378  Emery claimed 
that section 1512(a)(1)(C) is unconstitutional in light of Lopez because it 
regulates activity that falls outside of Congress’ commerce power and lacks a 
jurisdictional element.379  The Eighth Circuit380 dismissed Emery’s arguments 
stating that “the statute in question does not derive its authority from 
Congress’s authority over interstate commerce, but from Congress’s power to 
maintain the integrity of federal proceedings and investigations.”381  Thus, the 
constitutionality of section 1512(a)(1)(C) did not turn on its relationship to 
interstate commerce, and Lopez was inapt.382 
 
 371. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; supra note 89 for the text of the Taxing 
Clause. 
 372. Section 5861(d) essentially is an enforcement mechanism for 26 U.S.C. § 5821 (1994) 
(imposing a $200 tax on each firearm made) and 26 U.S.C. § 5841 (1994) (establishing the 
National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record and requiring registration of firearms). 
 373. Hall, 171 F.3d at 1140-42. 
 374. See id. at 1155 (Panner, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 375. Id. (Panner, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 376. See id. 
 377. 186 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 378. See id. at 924; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (1994) (prohibiting killing a person 
with the intent to “prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer or 
judge of the United States of information relating to the commission . . . of a Federal offense”). 
 379. See id. 
 380. Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold wrote for the court. 
 381. Emery, 186 F. 3d at 924-25. 
 382. See id. 
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19. United States v. Danks 
Finally, in United States v. Danks,383 Danks was indicted for possessing a 
firearm within a school zone, which is prohibited by the amended version of 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), the very statute struck 
down by the Supreme Court in Lopez.384  Danks argued that the GFSZA, even 
as amended, exceeded Congress’ interstate commerce power.385 
The Eighth Circuit386 explained that in Lopez, the Supreme Court struck 
down the original GFSZA in part because the statute “lacked a ‘jurisdictional 
element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm 
possession in question affect[ed] interstate commerce.’”387  In direct response 
to the Supreme Court’s holding in Lopez, Congress amended the GFSZA to 
include a jurisdictional requirement that any firearm unlawfully possessed 
under the statute “‘has moved in or . . . otherwise affects interstate or foreign 
commerce.’”388  Danks argued, nonetheless, that the mere insertion of a 
jurisdictional element did not transform the statute into a constitutional 
exercise of Congress’ commerce power under Lopez.389  The Eighth Circuit, 
relying on its considerable precedent upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)390 by virtue 
of that section’s interstate commerce element, concluded that the amended 
GFSZA “contains language that ensures, on a case-by-case basis, that the 
firearm in question affects interstate commerce.”391  The court therefore held 
that the amended GFSZA satisfies Lopez and does not exceed the interstate 
commerce power.392 
C. Seminole Tribe v. Florida 
The Supreme Court, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,393 held that a provision 
of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) that authorizes Indian tribes to 
 
 383. No. 98-4147, 1999 WL 615445 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 1999) (per curiam). 
 384. See id. at *1; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1997) (making it unlawful for 
“any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects 
interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to 
believe, is a school zone”). 
 385. See Danks, 1999 WL 615445, at *1. 
 386. Judges McMillian, Richard S. Arnold, and Hansen filed a per curiam opinion. 
 387. Danks, 1999 WL 615445, at *1 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1997), the terms 
of which can be found at the text accompanying supra note 163. 
 388. Id. (quoting § 922(q)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1997)). 
 389. See id. 
 390. See id. (citing Shelton, 66 F.3d 991 (1995)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994) and 
supra note 190 for the text of § 922(g). 
 391. Id. at *2 (citing Shelton, 66 F.3d at 992; Bates, 77 F.3d at 1104; Robinson, 62 F.3d at 
236-37). 
 392. See Danks, 1999 WL 615445, at *2. 
 393. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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sue states in federal court violates the Eleventh Amendment.394  The IGRA, 
enacted under the Indian Commerce Clause,395 requires that a state, upon 
request by an indigenous Indian tribe, “negotiate with the Indian tribe in good 
faith to enter into . . . a compact” to govern Indian gaming activities.396  To 
enforce the state’s good-faith duty to negotiate, the IGRA establishes federal 
jurisdiction over “any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from 
the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe . . . or to 
conduct such negotiations in good faith.”397  Claiming jurisdiction under the 
IGRA, the Seminole Tribe of Florida filed suit in federal court against the State 
of Florida and its governor.398  The tribe, requesting an injunction, alleged that 
Florida and its governor had violated the substantive provisions of the IGRA 
by refusing to negotiate with the tribe.399 
According to the Supreme Court,400 the tribe’s lawsuit presented two 
distinct issues for review.  First, the Court would decide whether “the Eleventh 
Amendment prevent[s] Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes 
against States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted 
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.”401  Second, the Court would decide 
whether “the doctrine of Ex parte Young permit[s] suits against a State’s 
Governor for prospective injunctive relief to enforce the good-faith bargaining 
requirement of the Act.” 402 
The Court began by reviewing its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, 
which, for over a century, has held that “federal jurisdiction over suits against 
unconsenting States ‘was not contemplated by the Constitution when 
establishing the judicial power of the United States.’”403  Because Florida 
clearly had not consented to suit by the Indian tribe, the tribe argued that either 
the IGRA abrogated Florida’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in 
 
 394. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). 
 395. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress shall have the power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes”). 
 396. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1994). 
 397. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). 
 398. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51-52. 
 399. See id. at 52. 
 400. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Justices O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.  Justice Stevens dissented, as did Justice Souter.  Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer joined in Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion. 
 401. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 53. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. at 54 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890), holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment immunizes an unconsenting state from suit by one of its own citizens in federal 
court). 
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federal court or the Ex parte Young exception to immunity allowed the suit to 
proceed against Florida’s governor.404 
The Court, pointing to the numerous IGRA provisions referring to states as 
defendants in suits brought under the statute,405 determined that “Congress has 
in section 2710(d)(7) provided an ‘unmistakably clear’ statement of its intent 
to abrogate” state sovereign immunity.406  The Court thus proceeded to the 
issue of whether Congress was empowered by the Indian Commerce Clause, 
pursuant to which the IGRA was enacted,407 to abrogate state immunity as it 
had purported to do in the IGRA.408  The Court previously had found 
congressional power to abrogate state immunity under only two constitutional 
provisions.409  In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,410 the Court had determined that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “expand[ed] federal power at the expense of state 
autonomy,” and therefore, “fundamentally altered the balance of state and 
 
 404. See id. at 55.  See also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing suits in federal 
court seeking prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities for 
continuing violations of federal law). 
 405. As examples of IGRA provisions clearly identifying states as defendants in IGRA 
lawsuits, the Court listed: § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (providing that “[t]he United States district courts 
shall have jurisdiction over . . . any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the 
failure of a State to enter into negotiations”); § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(II) (providing that, if the 
plaintiff-tribe meets its burden of proof, then the “burden of proof shall be upon the State”); § 
2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (providing that, if “the court finds that the state has failed to negotiate in good 
faith . . . , the court shall order the State and the Indian tribe to conclude . . . a compact”); § 
2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) (providing that “the State shall . . . submit to a mediator appointed by the court 
a proposed compact”); § 2710(d)(7)(B)(v) (providing that “[t]he mediator appointed by the 
court . . . shall submit to the State . . . the compact selected by the mediator”); § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi) 
(providing that “[i]f the State consents to a proposed compact . . . , the proposed compact shall be 
treated as a Tribal-State compact”); § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) (providing that “[i]f the State does not 
consent . . . to a proposed compact . . . , the mediator shall notify the Secretary”).  See Seminole 
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56-57. 
 406. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989) 
(“Congress may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court 
only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” (internal quotation 
omitted)). 
 407. See id. at 60 (“[P]etitioner does not challenge the . . . conclusion that the Act was passed 
pursuant to . . . Congress’ power under the Indian Commerce Clause . . . .”). 
 408. See id. at 57-59 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (stating that 
“[b]ecause of the Eleventh Amendment, States may not be sued in federal court unless they 
consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, ‘pursuant to a valid exercise of power,’ 
unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity,” and citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 
U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976) (holding that a state may be sued in federal court for prospective relief 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because that statute was enacted pursuant to § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which limits the Eleventh Amendment principle of state sovereign 
immunity)). 
 409. See id. at 59.  
 410. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
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federal power struck by the Constitution.”411  The Fitzpatrick Court held that 
the ratification of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment412 extended federal 
power into the realm of state sovereignty previously guarded by the Eleventh 
Amendment.413  Therefore, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,414 
empowering Congress to enforce section 1 and the other substantive415 sections 
of the amendment, allowed Congress to abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.416  In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.417 a plurality of 
the Court, with a fifth vote from Justice White concurring in the result,418 
reasoned that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to abrogate the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in order to fully make use of the interstate 
commerce power.419   
The Seminole Tribe argued that the Union Gas plurality’s conclusions 
regarding the Interstate Commerce Clause should apply equally to the Indian 
Commerce Clause, and therefore Union Gas meant that the Indian commerce 
power included the power to abrogate sovereign immunity.420  Rather than 
come to that result, the Court overruled Union Gas on the basis that the 
plurality opinion had deviated from the Court’s “established federalism 
jurisprudence and essentially eviscerated . . . Hans [v. Louisiana].”421  The 
Court explained that the Union Gas plurality, by allowing Congress to 
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment and thereby subject the states to suit 
pursuant to the interstate commerce power, had ignored the established 
principle that Article III exhaustively sets forth the subjects of federal court 
 
 411. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455). 
 412. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which states in pertinent part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
 413. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. 
 414. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 415. “Substantive” in this context refers simply to the fundamental difference between § 5, 
which is a procedural enforcement provision, and the other sections of the amendment, which are 
not merely procedural.  It has nothing to do with the substantive, versus procedural, nature of the 
due process right protected in § 1 against deprivation by the states. 
 416. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. 
 417. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 418. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-60 (citing Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 57 (White, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
 419. See id. at 59 (citing Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20). 
 420. Id. at 60. 
 421. Id. at 64 (citing Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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jurisdiction.422  Therefore, the Court declined to follow stare decisis and 
overruled the Union Gas decision.423 
By overruling Union Gas, the Court “reconfirm[ed] that the background 
principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is 
not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the 
regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the 
Federal Government.”424  Thus, the Court held that, even when Congress has 
plenary power to regulate a particular area, such as Indian commerce, it may 
not seek to enforce its regulations by abrogating the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity to suit in federal court.425 
The Court acknowledged the criticism that its holding would mean that 
state violations of federal statutory schemes over which the federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction, like the bankruptcy, copyright, and antitrust laws, would 
go unremedied.426  The Court explained, however, that “several avenues 
remain open for ensuring state compliance with federal law,”427 such as suits 
by the federal government against the states in federal court, injunctive relief 
under the Ex parte Young doctrine, and Supreme Court review of federal 
questions arising from state court proceedings.428  The Court also stated, “[I]t 
has not been widely thought that the federal antitrust, bankruptcy, or copyright 
statutes abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity . . . .  [T]here is no 
established tradition in the lower federal courts of allowing enforcement of 
those federal statutes against the States.”429 
Next, the Court turned to the tribe’s claim that, even if Florida was not 
amenable to suit, the tribe still could sue the governor of Florida under the Ex 
parte Young exception.430  The Court explained that Ex parte Young allows for 
suits seeking prospective injunctive relief for continuing violations of federal 
law by state officials.431  In the present case, however, the governor’s alleged 
violation of federal law was his failure to compel the State of Florida to 
 
 422. See id. at 64-65 (citing Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 38, 39 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 423. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66. 
 424. Id. at 72. 
 425. See id. 
 426. See id. at 73 n.16. 
 427. Id. 
 428. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14 (citing United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 
644-45 (1892) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not exempt states from suit by the 
United States in federal court and stating that “the permanence of the Union might be 
endangered” were it otherwise); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 
Wheat. 264 (1821) (holding that an appeal to the United States Supreme Court from a state 
court’s determination of a federal question in favor of a state is not a suit “commenced or 
prosecuted” against a state for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment)). 
 429. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73 n.16. 
 430. See id. at 73. 
 431. See id. 
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negotiate in good faith, a duty imposed under the IGRA’s elaborate regulatory 
regime.432  Because “Congress ha[d] prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for 
the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should 
hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against 
a state officer based upon Ex parte Young.”433  The Court therefore declined to 
apply Ex parte Young to allow the tribe’s suit to proceed, and held that 
Florida’s governor, like the state itself, was immune from suit.434 
1. National Cattle Congress, Inc. v. Iowa Racing & Gaming Commission 
(In re National Cattle Congress, Inc.) 
The Eighth Circuit’s first material discussion435 of Seminole Tribe was in 
National Cattle Congress, Inc. v. Iowa Racing & Gaming Commission (In re 
National Cattle Congress).436  The National Cattle Congress, Inc. (NCC), 
which operated a pari-mutuel dog track under a license granted by the Iowa 
Racing and Gaming Commission, had filed for bankruptcy due to severe 
financial losses.437  When the commission resolved to revoke the NCC’s 
license, the NCC moved the bankruptcy court to stay the commission’s 
resolution as a violation of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code.438 The bankruptcy court granted a stay against the commission, and the 
federal district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order.439  The commission 
appealed to the Eighth Circuit arguing, based on the Supreme Court’s 
intervening decision of Seminole Tribe, that the bankruptcy court’s order 
violated Iowa’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.440 
 
 432. See id. 
 433. Id. at 74. 
 434. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76. 
 435. Before In re National Cattle Congress, the Eighth Circuit decided two cases in which it 
made brief mention of Seminole Tribe.  First, in Mausolf v. Babbitt, the court held that 
prospective intervenors under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) must have Article III 
standing to intervene in federal court.  85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996).  The court relied on 
Seminole Tribe, among other cases, for the basic premise that “Congress cannot circumvent 
Article III’s limits on the judicial power.”  Id. at 1300 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65 
(stating that, before Union Gas, it seemed “fundamental that Congress could not expand the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III.”)).  Second, in Gaming Corp. 
of America v. Dorsey & Whitney, the court acknowledged that “[t]he Supreme Court recently held 
[§ 2710(d)(7)(A) of the IGRA] unconstitutional under the Eleventh Amendment.”  88 F.3d 536, 
545 n.10 (8th Cir. 1996).  In support of its holding that the IGRA completely preempts the area of 
Indian gaming regulation, the Eighth Circuit cited to the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation in 
Seminole Tribe that “Indian commerce is ‘under the exclusive control of the Federal 
Government.’”  Id. at 548 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72). 
 436. 91 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 437. See id. 
 438. See id. at 1114. 
 439. See id. 
 440. See id. 
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According to the Eighth Circuit,441 the holding of Seminole Tribe was that 
“the Indian Commerce Clause . . . does not grant Congress the power to 
abrogate a State’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”442  The Eighth 
Circuit also acknowledged that Seminole Tribe expressly overruled the holding 
of Union Gas that Congress has authority under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.443  
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the commission’s claim of 
immunity “may be a complex and serious issue” in light of Seminole Tribe 
and, without expressing its view on the merits of the Eleventh Amendment 
issue, remanded the case for further consideration.444 
2. Jensen v. Clark 
In Jensen v. Clarke,445 the Eighth Circuit considered whether the Eleventh 
Amendment, in light of Seminole Tribe, bars a federal court from awarding 
attorneys’ fees to private plaintiffs ancillary to prospective injunctive relief 
against state officials.  A number of inmates had sued the director of the 
Nebraska State Prison System and the warden of the Nebraska State 
Penitentiary in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,446 claiming that the state 
penitentiary’s practice of housing two men per cell violated the Eighth 
Amendment.447  The district court granted an injunction against the prison 
officials and awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.448  The 
prison officials challenged the award of attorneys’ fees as a violation of 
Nebraska’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.449 
In Seminole Tribe, said the Eighth Circuit,450 the Supreme Court decided 
that Congress may abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity only if 
Congress’ “‘intention [is] unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,’” 
and Congress legislates “‘pursuant to a valid exercise of power.’”451  The 
 
 441. Judges Magill, Henley, and Loken filed a per curiam opinion. 
 442. In re National Cattle Congress, 91 F.3d at 1114. 
 443. See id. 
 444. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 n.16).  No subsequent direct history of the case 
exists, and therefore any disposition of the issue by the bankruptcy court on remand is 
unavailable. 
 445. 94 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 446. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).  For the text of § 1983, see supra note 141. 
 447. See Jensen, 94 F.3d at 1193-94; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 448. See id. at 1201; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994) (“In any action or proceeding to 
enforce a provision of section[s] . . . 1983 . . . of this title, . . . the court, in its discretion, may 
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the 
costs . . . .”). 
 449. See id. at 1201. 
 450. Then-Chief Judge Arnold wrote for the court. 
 451. Jensen, 94 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56). 
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prison officials’ argument was that section 1988 does not contain 
“unmistakably clear” language abrogating the states’ sovereign immunity, and 
therefore could not authorize the granting of attorneys’ fees against a state in 
federal court.452  But according to the Eighth Circuit, the prison officials were 
mistaken in their belief that the assessment of attorneys’ fees against a state 
requires abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment.  To the contrary, because 
attorneys’ fees are assessed as litigation costs and such costs “‘have 
traditionally been awarded without regard for the States’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity,’”453 the awarding of attorneys’ fees under section 1988 ancillary to 
prospective injunctive relief “‘is not subject to the strictures of the Eleventh 
Amendment.’”454  The Eighth Circuit therefore held that “section 1988 
attorneys’ fees do not depend on abrogation of sovereign immunity, and 
Seminole Tribe does not affect the fee award in this case.”455 
3. In re SDDS, Inc. 
In re SDDS, Inc.456 was “‘the latest in a seemingly never-ending series of 
cases arising from SDDS’s . . . struggle to develop a large-scale [solid waste 
disposal] facility.’”457  This time around, SDDS had moved to enjoin the State 
of South Dakota and various state officials, in their official capacities, from 
relitigating in South Dakota state court issues decided by the Eighth Circuit in 
a previous declaratory judgment action.458  The state officials’ defense was that 
such an injunction would violate South Dakota’s immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment.459 
The Eighth Circuit460 approached the claim of sovereign immunity by 
briefly retracing Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.  The court noted that, 
although the plain language of the Eleventh Amendment appears to immunize 
 
 452. See id. at 1201. 
 453. Id. (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 695 (1978) (holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar an award of attorneys’ fees against a state ancillary to prospective 
injunctive relief)). 
 454. Id. at 1202 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 279 (1989) (holding that the 
Eleventh Amendment has no application to the calculation of the amount of an award of 
attorneys’ fees against a state ancillary to prospective injunctive relief)). 
 455. Id.  In Weaver v. Clark, the Eighth Circuit, relying on Jensen, again rejected the 
argument that the Eleventh Amendment, in light of Seminole Tribe, immunizes state officials 
from fee awards under § 1988.  See 120 F.3d 852, 853 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Jensen, 94 F.3d at 
1202-03). 
 456. 97 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 457. See id. at 1032 (quoting SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47 F.3d 263, 265 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(SDDS VI)). 
 458. See In re SDDS, 97 F.3d at 1032. 
 459. See id. at 1032, 1034. 
 460. Judge Magill wrote for the court. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
588 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:529 
states only from suits brought by foreigners or citizens of other states,461 the 
Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe had yet again reaffirmed that: 
“the Eleventh Amendment . . . stand[s] not so much for what is says, but for 
the presupposition which it confirms.  That presupposition, first observed over 
a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana, has two parts: first, that each State is a 
sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that it is inherent in the 
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its 
consent.  For over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over 
suits against unconsenting States was not contemplated by the Constitution 
when establishing the judicial power of the United States.”462 
The Eighth Circuit further determined that the principle of state sovereign 
immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment does not distinguish between 
suits for money damages and suits for declaratory or injunctive relief.  The 
court reasoned that “‘[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in order 
to prevent federal court judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury; it 
also serves to avoid the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process 
of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.’”463 
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court 
discerned in Ex parte Young an exception to blanket Eleventh Amendment 
immunity allowing for suits “‘brought in federal court against state officials in 
their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief to prevent future 
violations of federal law.’”464  Applying the Ex parte Young exception, the 
Eighth Circuit determined that the state officials would not have been entitled 
to immunity from the declaratory suit previously decided by the court, and 
therefore could not claim to be immune from the present suit seeking an 
injunction to enforce that earlier decision.465 
4. Crawford v. Davis 
In Crawford v. Davis,466 Michelle Crawford, a student at the University of 
Central Arkansas (UCA), filed suit in federal court against the UCA and 
several university officials, in their official capacities, claiming she had been 
sexually harassed by one of her instructors in violation of Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972.467  The UCA and university officials, relying 
 
 461. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  For the language of the Eleventh Amendment, see supra 
note 394. 
 462. In re SDDS, 97 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54). 
 463. Id. (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58). 
 464. Id. (quoting Fond du Lac, 68 F.3d at 255). 
 465. See id. at 1035-36. 
 466. 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 467. See id. at 1282; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994) (providing that “[n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be . . . subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”). 
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on Seminole Tribe, claimed that they were immune from suit in federal court 
under Title IX because that statute was enacted pursuant to the Spending 
Clause, which does not grant Congress the power to abrogate the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.468 
The Eighth Circuit469 began by explaining that, in Seminole Tribe, the 
Supreme Court concluded that Congress properly abrogates the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity only “if it unequivocally expresses its intent to 
do so and if it legislates ‘pursuant to a constitutional provision granting 
Congress the power to abrogate.’”470  Regarding the first condition, the Eighth 
Circuit determined that Congress had unequivocally expressed its intent to 
abrogate the states’ immunity to suit under Title IX.471  The court construed the 
second condition as requiring only that Congress could have enacted the 
legislation at issue pursuant to a constitutional provision granting it the power 
to abrogate, not that Congress had the specific intent to legislate pursuant to 
that authority.472   
As established in Seminole Tribe, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is the only constitutional provision under which Congress properly may 
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.473  According to the 
Eighth Circuit, Title IX, the purpose of which is to remedy gender 
discrimination in education, is “appropriate legislation” under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment for enforcement of the substantive sections of the 
amendment because the Supreme Court previously had held that section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits exactly the kind of discrimination 
prohibited by Title IX.474  Therefore, Congress could have abrogated the states’ 
sovereign immunity pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, 
having unequivocally expressed its intention to abrogate, did so in Title IX.475 
 
 468. See Crawford, 109 F.3d. at 1282-83. 
 469. Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel. 
 470. Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1282-83 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59). 
 471. See id. at 1283 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1994) (stating that “[a] State shall not 
be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in 
Federal court for a violation of . . . title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 [20 U.S.C. 
1681 et seq.]”)). 
 472. See id. 
 473. See id. 
 474. See id. (citing United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (holding that Virginia 
failed to show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding women from the Virginia 
Military Institute and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment)); see also supra notes 412 and 414 for the pertinent text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 475. Subsequent to Crawford, the Eighth Circuit again faced the issue of Congress’ power to 
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity to Title IX claims in Prinsloo v. Arkansas 
State University.  112 F.3d 514, No. 96-3120, 1997 WL 234686 (8th Cir. May 9, 1997) (per 
curiam) (unpublished table decision).  The court stated that, “[i]n Crawford, the Court decided the 
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5. Moad v. Arkansas State Police Department 
In Moad v. Arkansas State Police Department,476 Arkansas state troopers 
sued their employer, the Arkansas State Police Department, for unpaid 
overtime under the FLSA.477  Relying on Seminole Tribe, the state argued that 
it was immune from suit in federal court under the FLSA because the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, pursuant to which the FLSA apparently was enacted, does 
not grant Congress the authority to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.478 
The Eighth Circuit479 began by repeating the Supreme Court’s 
determination in Seminole Tribe that “‘[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts the 
judicial power under Article III, and Article I . . . cannot be used to circumvent 
the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.’”480  The Eighth 
Circuit explained that, in Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court had held that the 
Indian Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to abrogate the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity and, by overruling Union Gas, explicitly had 
rejected the argument that Congress could abrogate Eleventh Amendment 
immunity pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.481 
The state troopers nonetheless argued that the FLSA could have been 
passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, which enables Congress to 
subject the states to suit in federal court.482  The Eighth Circuit dismissed the 
argument, however, because the troopers had failed to raise the issue in the 
district court and in their opening appellate brief.483  For the same reason, the 
court also rejected the troopers’ argument that Arkansas waived its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity by allowing itself to be sued under the FLSA prior to 
the Seminole Tribe decision.  Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that, “in enacting 
 
same issue we are asked to decide in this case . . . [and] squarely held that under Seminole 
Tribe . . . the Eleventh Amendment does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear Title 
IX claims.”  Id. (citing Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1282-83).  Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit noted 
that the Crawford court had explicitly rejected the argument that Congress enacted Title IX under 
the Spending Clause, not § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore lacked the power to 
abrogate the states’ immunity to Title IX actions.  Id. (citing Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1283).  
Likewise, in Lam v. Curators of the University of Missouri, the Eighth Circuit was “bound” by 
the holding of Crawford and, therefore, rejected the argument that “Seminole Tribe had divested 
the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over Title IX suits.”  122 F.3d 654, 656 (8th Cir. 
1997) (citing Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1282-83). 
 476. 111 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 477. See id. at 586.  See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1994) and supra note 121 for the pertinent text of 
the FLSA. 
 478. See Moad, 111 F.3d at 586-87. 
 479. Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel. 
 480. Moad, 111 F.3d at 586 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73). 
 481. See id. 
 482. See id. at 587. 
 483. See id. 
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the FLSA, Congress had no power to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment 
immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause.”484 
6. Santee Sioux Tribe v. Nebraska 
In Santee Sioux Tribe v. Nebraska,485 the Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska 
sought declaratory relief against the State of Nebraska and its governor for 
failing to negotiate with the tribe in good faith as required by the IGRA.486  
The state claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity under Seminole Tribe.487 
The tribe argued that the state had waived its sovereign immunity by enacting 
Nebraska Revised Statutes section 9-1,106, which references the IGRA,488 and 
that Nebraska’s governor was subject to suit under Ex parte Young.489 
The Eighth Circuit490 first recounted the holding of Seminole Tribe that 
“Congress lacked authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the 
 
 484. Id.  In several cases following Moad, the Eighth Circuit again approached the issue of 
Congress’ authority to subject the states to suit under the FLSA.  In Raper v. Iowa, the Eighth 
Circuit again noted that, “[i]n Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress lacks 
the power to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacts legislation under 
the Interstate Commerce Clause.”  115 F.3d 623, 623-24 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Moad, 111 F.3d 
at 586-87).  Furthermore, the Raper court, disposing of the issue that the Moad court had declined 
to decide, held that Congress could not have abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because the “FLSA’s overtime provisions 
cannot be regarded as serving a Fourteenth Amendment purpose.”  Id. at 624.  The court 
explicitly left for another day the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the 
authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity to enforce the equal-pay provisions of the 
FLSA.  Id.  In Rehberg v. Iowa Department of Public Safety, the Eighth Circuit held that Raper 
foreclosed the argument that Congress could have abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to allow state employees to sue in federal 
court for overtime compensation under the FLSA.  See 117 F.3d 1423, No. 96-4258, 1997 WL 
397025 (8th Cir. Jul. 16, 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (citing Raper, 115 F.3d 
at 624). 
 485. 121 F.3d 427 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 486. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1994); see also supra notes 130 and 405 and 
accompanying text for the pertinent text of § 2710(d) of the IGRA. 
 487. Id. at 430. 
 488. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-1, 106 (Supp. 1996), which states in pertinent part: 
(1) Upon request of an Indian tribe having jurisdiction over Indian lands in Nebraska, 
the Governor or his or her designated representative . . . shall, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 
2710 of the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, negotiate with such Indian tribe in 
good faith for the purpose of entering into a tribal-state compact governing . . . 
gaming as defined in the act. . . . 
(3) Such compact negotiations shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of 25 
U.S.C. 2710 of the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 
Id. 
 489. Santee Sioux Tribe, 121 F.3d at 429-30. 
 490. Judge Hansen wrote for a two-judge majority.  Judge McMillian dissented because he 
believed that Nebraska had waived its sovereign immunity.  See Santee Sioux Tribe, 121 F.3d at 
432 (McMillian, J., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying notes 504-07. 
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states’ sovereign immunity, and that section 2710(d)(7) cannot grant federal 
jurisdiction over states that do not consent to suit.”491  Furthermore, the Eighth 
Circuit explained that the Supreme Court decided that the Ex parte Young 
exception did not apply to subject Florida’s governor to suit under the 
IGRA.492 
The Eighth Circuit then noted that, although the Eleventh Amendment “has 
been interpreted ‘to extend to suits by all persons against a state in federal 
court,’”493 the state may waive its immunity by consenting to suit in federal 
court.494  To determine whether Nebraska had waived its claimed immunity, 
the Eighth Circuit asked whether the state had expressed its intention to do so 
“‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the 
text [of the relevant state statute] as will leave no room for any other 
reasonable construction.’”495  In answering this question, the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that neither the language nor the legislative history of section 9-
1,106 indicates that Nebraska intended to waive its sovereign immunity.496  
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit determined that the Nebraska assistant 
attorney general assigned to the case could not have waived the state’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity by answering the tribe’s complaint and filing 
a counterclaim because he was not authorized by state law to waive Nebraska’s 
immunity.497  For these reasons, the tribe’s declaratory suit against the state 
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.498 
The Eighth Circuit also determined that Nebraska’s governor was not 
subject to suit under the Ex parte Young exception to state sovereign 
immunity.499  The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Seminole Tribe that Congress “had prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for 
enforcing section 2710(d)(3), with significantly fewer remedies than those 
available under Ex parte Young, thus signaling Congress’s intent to limit relief 
to that available under the statute.”500  Finally, the Eighth Circuit rejected the 
tribe’s claim that Nebraska’s enactment of section 9-1,106 somehow subjected 
the state’s governor to suit under Ex parte Young.501  The court reasoned that 
 
 491. Santee Sioux Tribe, 121 F.3d at 430. 
 492. See id. 
 493. Id. (quoting Moad, 111 F.3d at 586). 
 494. See id. 
 495. Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)) (alteration 
added). 
 496. See Santee Sioux Tribe, 121 F.3d at 431. 
 497. See id. at 431-32 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 
(1945) (stating that, for the attorney general of Indiana to have waived the state’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, he must have been empowered to do so under state law)). 
 498. See id. at 432. 
 499. See id. 
 500. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75-76). 
 501. See Santee Sioux Tribe, 121 F.3d at 432. 
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the governor’s alleged failure to comply with section 9-1,106 was a violation 
of state law, while Ex parte Young allows suit to prevent violations of federal 
law only.502  Thus, the Eleventh Amendment likewise barred the tribe’s suit 
against Nebraska’s governor.503 
The decision of the Eighth Circuit panel was not unanimous.  The dissent, 
though expressing agreement with the majority’s disposition of the suit against 
Nebraska’s governor,504 would have held that the state waived its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity and consented to suit.505  The dissent reasoned that, by 
enacting the provisions of section 9-1,106 and thereby incorporating the duty 
to negotiate in good faith under the IGRA, Nebraska subjected itself to the 
remedial provisions of the IGRA creating federal jurisdiction over suits to 
enforce that duty.506  Furthermore, the dissent reasoned that Nebraska waived 
its sovereign immunity by answering the tribe’s complaint and filing a 
counterclaim for its own benefit.507 
7. United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas 
The Eighth Circuit’s next, and last, in-depth treatment508 of Seminole Tribe 
to date is United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas.509  In that case, Frankie 
 
 502. See id. 
 503. Id. 
 504. Judge McMillian’s opinion, though designated a dissent, appears to concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
 505. See Santee Sioux Tribe, 121 F.3d at 433 (McMillian, J., dissenting). 
 506. See id. 
 507. See id. at 433-34.  In United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe, a case factually and 
procedurally related to Santee Sioux Tribe v. Nebraska, the Eighth Circuit determined that the 
tribe’s operation of gambling activities without a compact with the State of Nebraska was subject 
to injunction and an order of temporary closure under the IGRA.  See 135 F.3d 558, 563-565 (8th 
Cir. 1998).  In the course of its recitation of the procedural history of the case, the Eighth Circuit 
explained the earlier dismissal of the tribe’s suit against Nebraska by reference to the Seminole 
Tribe holding that “Congress lacked the authority to enact the remedial sections of the IGRA 
allowing an Indian tribe to sue a state, and that these sections comprised an unconstitutional 
abrogation of the states’ sovereign immunity.”  Id. at 560. 
 508. Directly before and just a short time after Rodgers, the Eighth Circuit decided several 
important Eleventh Amendment cases, all of which applied the two-part abrogation test set forth 
in Seminole Tribe.  The court also relied upon the holding of Seminole Tribe that Congress may 
abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity only under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Autio v. 
AFSCME, Local 3139, 140 F.3d 802, 804-05 (8th Cir. 1998), reh’g en banc granted, opinion and 
judgment vacated, 140 F.3d at 806 (order of July 7, 1998), on reh’g en banc, 157 F.3d 1141 (8th 
Cir. 1998); Humenansky v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 824-26 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 156 F.3d 825, 829 (8th Cir. 1998), reh’g en banc granted, opinion 
and judgment vacated, 156 F.3d at 833 (order of Nov. 12, 1998), on reh’g on banc, 184 F.3d 999 
(8th Cir. 1999); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 821 (8th Cir. 1999).  Autio, 
Humenansky, Alsbrook, and Mauney, however, are better characterized as applications of City of 
Boerne.  See discussion infra Parts II.D.2, 4-6. 
 509. 154 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed, 119 S. Ct. 2387 (1999). 
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Rodgers, an Arkansas resident, brought a (qui tam)510 action against the State 
of Arkansas and the Arkansas Department of Education (collectively, the state) 
under the False Claims Act.511  Rodgers alleged that the state had falsely 
claimed compliance with federal civil rights laws and, thereby, had wrongfully 
received federal funds conditioned on such compliance.512  The United States 
did not intervene as a party to the suit.513  Asserting Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, the state moved to dismiss the suit.514 
The Eighth Circuit515 initially established that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not bar the United States from bringing suit against the states.516  
Therefore, whether Arkansas was immune from suit under the Eleventh 
Amendment turned on whether Rodgers’ suit under the qui tam provisions of 
the False Claims Act could be characterized as a suit by the United States.517  
The court determined, based on the “superior . . . role of the government in the 
prosecution of (qui tam) suits,”518 that a qui tam action under the False Claims 
Act “is a suit by the United States for Eleventh Amendment immunity 
purposes.”519 
 
 510. See supra note 150 for an explanation of qui tam actions generally and under the False 
Claims Act. 
 511. See 154 F.3d 865.  See also 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1994) and supra notes 150-55 for the 
text of various provisions of the False Claims Act. 
 512. See id. at 867. 
 513. See id.  See also generally 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B) (1994) (giving the United States 
the option of “declin[ing] to take over the [qui tam] action, in which case the person bringing the 
action shall have the right to conduct the action”). 
 514. See Rodgers, 154 F.3d at 866-67. 
 515. Judge Richard S. Arnold writing for a two-judge majority.  Judge Panner, sitting by 
designation, dissented on the basis that he believed Arkansas was entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity against the qui tam relators.  See Rodgers, 154 F.3d at 869 (Panner, J., 
dissenting); see also infra text accompanying notes 520-21. 
 516. See Rodgers, 154 F.3d at 867 (citing United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 138-41 
(1964) (stating that “nothing in [the Eleventh Amendment] or any other provision of the 
Constitution prevents or has ever been seriously supposed to prevent a State’s being sued by the 
United States”)). 
 517. See id. 
 518. Id. at 868.  The court cited to various portions of § 3730 granting the government a 
“superior role” in qui tam actions: § 3730(b)(5), (c)(3) (establishing that only the government has 
a right to intervene, and if it does not intervene within a 60-day period, allowing it to intervene 
upon a showing of good cause); § 3730(c)(1) (providing that, “[i]f the Government proceeds with 
the action, it shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not be 
bound by an act of the person bringing the action.”); § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B) (allowing the 
government to dismiss or settle the action “notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating 
the action”); § 3730(d) (establishing that, whether or not the government conducts the action, it 
will receive the bulk of the proceeds). 
 519. Rodgers, 154 F.3d at 868.  The court distinguished the present case from its holding in 
Moad.  See id. (citing Moad, 111 F.3d 585, 586).  The court characterized Moad as a 
determination that the Eleventh Amendment, in light of Seminole Tribe, bars suits against the 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] REVOLUTIONARY OR ABERRATIONAL? 595 
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s determination that the qui tam 
action against Arkansas was not “‘commenced or prosecuted’” by a private 
citizen.520  Because the United States had little control over Rodgers’ qui tam 
action, and because the Supreme Court had given the Eleventh Amendment a 
broad reading in cases like Seminole Tribe, the dissent would have held that 
Rodgers was the real party in interest and, therefore, that Arkansas was 
immune from suit.521 
 
states under the FLSA because the Interstate Commerce Clause, pursuant to which the FLSA was 
enacted, “is an impermissible basis for the abrogation of state immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment.”  Id.  Moad, said the court, was not controlling because the real party in interest 
bringing that suit was a private person, not the United States.  See id. 
 520. Rodgers, 154 F.3d at 869 (Panner, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI). 
 521. See id.  The dissent also distinguished Rodgers from Zissler, which was decided on the 
same day by the same panel of judges. See Rodgers, 154 F.3d at 870 (citing Zissler v. Regents of 
the Univ. of Minn., 154 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1998).  The court stated that the United States “has 
intervened and is prosecuting that action at the instance, and under the control, of responsible 
federal officials.”  Id.  In Zissler, the court, in addition to disposing of an argument based on New 
York that the False Claims Act impermissibly coerces the states, relied upon Rodgers in holding 
that if “a State has no Eleventh Amendment immunity against a qui tam suit filed under [the False 
Claims Act], even when the United States has chosen not to intervene,” then a fortiori a state has 
no immunity when the United States has intervened.  Zissler, 154 F.3d at 872 (citing Rodgers, 
154 F.3d 865).  The Zissler court also relied upon the Supreme Court’s statement in Seminole 
Tribe that the power of the federal government to sue a state in federal court is not hindered by 
the Eleventh Amendment.  See id. at 873 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14 (“[T]he 
Federal Government can bring suit in federal court against a State.”)). 
  Finally, after Rodgers and Zissler, the Eighth Circuit decided three cases with relatively 
minor references to Seminole Tribe.  In United States v. Weaselhead, the court cited Seminole 
Tribe, among other cases, for the proposition that Congress’ “sweeping, plenary power to regulate 
Indian affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause . . . remains subject to constitutional 
limitations.”  156 F.3d 818, 824 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73).  
In State ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, the Eighth Circuit, in the course of reciting the 
facts of the case, cited generally to Seminole Tribe, apparently in reference to the Supreme 
Court’s explanation of tribal-state compacts under the IGRA.  164 F.3d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2400 (1999).  In Rose v. United States Department of Education (In re 
Rose), the court determined that “[t]he case before this court does not present a general question 
of Eleventh Amendment immunity,” because the State of Missouri, by filing proofs of claim as a 
creditor in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, had waived its immunity.  187 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 
1999).  The court cited to Seminole Tribe, inter alia, to support its statement that “[t]he Eleventh 
Amendment can bar federal actions by private parties against a state unless it has waived its 
immunity or Congress has abrogated it in a valid exercise of power under the enforcement clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id.  See supra Part II.A.5. 
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D. City of Boerne v. Flores 
When the Roman Catholic Archbishop of the San Antonio Archdiocese, 
which encompasses the city of Boerne, Texas,522 applied to the Boerne Historic 
Landmark Commission for a permit to enlarge St. Peter Catholic Church and 
was denied, he sued the city in federal court under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA).523  The RFRA provides that the “[g]overnment shall 
not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability,”524 unless the government 
demonstrates that “application of the burden to the person . . . is in furtherance 
of a compelling governmental interest; and . . . is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”525  The archbishop argued 
that the city violated the RFRA by applying its historic districts preservation 
ordinance to deny the archdiocese a building permit.526  The city challenged 
the RFRA’s constitutionality on the basis that it was not “appropriate 
legislation” under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment527 for enforcement 
of the rights guaranteed by section 1 of the amendment.528 
As the Supreme Court529 explained, the RFRA was Congress’ reaction to 
Employment Division v. Smith.530  In that case, the Court declined to subject a 
generally applicable Oregon statute to the Sherbert v. Verner531 balancing test 
in determining whether the statute violated the Free Exercise Clause of the 
 
 522. To set the record straight at the outset, people familiar with Boerne, Texas, pronounce its 
name “Bernie.”  See Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 743, 743 (1998). 
 523. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511-12 (1997); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994). 
 524. § 2000bb-1(a). 
 525. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)-(2). 
 526. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512. 
 527. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also supra note 414 for the text of § 5. 
 528. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 and supra 
note 412 for the text of § 1. 
 529. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined, and in which Justice Scalia joined in part.  Justice 
Stevens filed a concurring opinion and joined in Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in part.  
Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion was joined in part by Justice Breyer, who also joined in a 
dissenting opinion by Justice Souter. 
 530. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (1994) (stating that “in 
Employment Division v. Smith . . ., the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that 
the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion”) 
(citation omitted); § 2000bb(b) (stating that a purpose of the RFRA is to “restore the compelling 
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner”). 
 531. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (stating that a state law substantially burdening the free exercise of 
an individual’s religion violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment unless a 
compelling state interest justifies the burden). 
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First Amendment.532  The Smith Court held that when a generally applicable 
law is challenged on free exercise grounds, the Sherbert test is inapt and the 
law in question “may be applied to religious practices even when not supported 
by a compelling governmental interest.”533 
Having explained the origins of the RFRA, the Court turned to the issue of 
the Act’s constitutionality.  The Court initially determined that Congress, in 
enacting the RFRA provisions applicable to the states and their subdivisions –
the provisions of the statute relevant to the present case – relied on its 
enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.534  Section 
5, said the Court, is “‘a positive grant of legislative power’ to Congress”535 that 
authorizes “[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations . . . 
even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional 
and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the 
states.’”536  The enforcement power is inherently limited, however, by the text 
of section 5, which allows Congress the power only “‘to enforce’” the rights 
protected by the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
including the right to free exercise of religion as incorporated into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.537  The enforcement power, said 
the Court, is “‘remedial’” and does not include the “power to decree the 
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”538  The 
Court admitted the difficulty in distinguishing permissible statutes that remedy 
or prevent Fourteenth Amendment violations from statutes that improperly 
seek to change the amendment’s substantive protections, but could not escape 
the fact that “the distinction exists and must be observed.”539  Thus, to avoid 
the enactment under section 5 of impermissible congressional statutes that are 
 
 532. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513-14; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (providing 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise there.”). 
 533. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 (explaining Smith, 494 U.S. at 885). 
 534. See id. at 516; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (1994) (defining “government” for the 
purposes of § 2000bb-1 to include “a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or 
other person acting under color of law) of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of a State”); 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (1994) (applying the RFRA to “all Federal and State law, and the 
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after 
the [RFRA’s date of enactment].”). 
 535. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 
(1966)). 
 536. Id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455). 
 537. Id. at 519 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 303 (1940) (stating that “[t]he fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment,” 
and the Free Exercise Clause therefore is incorporated into Due Process)). 
 538. Id. at 519 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)). 
 539. Id. at 519-20. 
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“substantive in operation and effect,” the Court announced the requirement, 
supported by the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and Supreme Court 
precedent,540 that there be “a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”541  The 
RFRA, held the Court, fails this test.542 
The Court first noted that the “RFRA’s legislative record lacks examples 
of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious 
bigotry.”543  Instead, Congress’ findings revealed the absence of deliberate 
religious persecution over the last forty years and only a few minor instances 
of “laws of general applicability . . . plac[ing] incidental burdens on 
religion.”544  The RFRA was “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or 
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to 
prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”545  The Court pointed out that the RFRA, 
with its universal application to all levels of government and every kind of 
government action,546 is uniquely disproportionate as compared to other 
legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’ enforcement power, such as the more 
targeted provisions of the Voting Rights Act upheld in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach.547  Lastly, the Court determined that, because the RFRA’s 
heightened scrutiny test548 invalidates laws that otherwise would be upheld 
under Smith by design, it forces states to defend legitimate exercises of their 
traditional police power that are beyond the prohibition of the Free Exercise 
Clause.549  For all of these reasons, said the Court, the RFRA is “broader than 
is appropriate if the goal is to prevent and remedy constitutional violations.”550 
Finally, the Court reminded Congress of its “duty to make its own 
informed judgment about the meaning and force of the Constitution,” and of 
 
 540. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-29. 
 541. Id. at 520. 
 542. See id. at 536. 
 543. Id. at 530. 
 544. Id. at 521 U.S. at 530-31. 
 545. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. 
 546. See supra note 534. 
 547. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33 (explaining that in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
the Court held that the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which includes termination dates, geographic 
limitations, and congressional findings of egregious and pervasive voting discrimination, is 
“appropriate legislation” under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment to effectuate 
that amendment’s prohibition of racial discrimination in voting).  See generally South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 548. The heightened scrutiny test, in addition to its requirement that a state demonstrate a 
compelling governmental interest, also includes a least-restrictive-means component not 
previously demanded by Verner or the Court’s other pre-Smith cases.  See City of Boerne, 521 
U.S. at 535. 
 549. See id. at 534. 
 550. Id. at 535. 
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the respect to be afforded to the Court’s “duty to say what the law is.”551  The 
Court concluded that because the “RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary 
to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance,” the statute is 
unconstitutional and the Court’s holding in Smith, not the RFRA, would 
control the case before the Court.552 
1. Montano v. Hedgepeth 
The Eighth Circuit’s first authoritative treatment553 of City of Boerne was 
Montano v. Hedgepeth.554  In Montano, Nicholas P. Montano, a prisoner at the 
Iowa State Penitentiary, alleged that the prison chaplain had excluded him 
from Protestant church services in violation of the RFRA.555  Montano was a 
practitioner of “Messianic Judaism,” which combines elements of Judaism and 
Protestant Christianity, and apparently had been removed from church 
gatherings for spreading his unorthodox doctrine.556 
At the outset, the Eighth Circuit557 noted the decision of the Supreme Court 
only one month earlier that “‘[b]road as the power of Congress is under the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital 
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal 
balance.’”558  In light of the holding of City of Boerne, the Eighth Circuit was 
 
 551. Id. at 535-36 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)) (“It is, 
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is.”). 
 552. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
 553. Prior to Montano, the Eighth Circuit filed two unpublished, per curiam opinions dealing 
only briefly with City of Boerne.  In Silvey v. Schriro, the Eighth Circuit declined to hear a 
Missouri inmate’s claim that a prison hair-length regulation violated the RFRA “in light of the 
Supreme Court’s . . . decision declaring the RFRA to be unconstitutional.”  117 F.3d 1423, No. 
96-2787 1997 WL 397176, at *1 n.1 (8th Cir. Jul. 7, 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished table 
decision).  Likewise, in Cooper-Bey v. Rogerson, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claim of 
Iowa inmates that prison restrictions on group worship violated the RFRA, because “[t]he 
Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores.”  117 F.3d 1422 No. 96-
2774, 1997 WL 401189, (8th Cir. Jul. 17, 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision). 
  Similarly, in two unpublished prison-litigation cases subsequent to Montano, the Eighth 
Circuit determined that an Iowa prisoner’s “claim under the [RFRA] is foreclosed by the recent 
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores.”  Armento v. Emmett, 
129 F.3d 121 No. 97-212 SI, 1997 WL 611762, (8th Cir. Sept. 30, 1997) (per curiam) 
(unpublished table decision).  Also, the RFRA claim of a South Dakota inmate properly was 
dismissed because the “RFRA has been declared unconstitutional.”  Anders v. Janklow, 163 F.3d 
601, No. 96-2718, 1998 WL 396135 (8th Cir. Jul. 8, 1998) (per curiam) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 554. 120 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 555. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).; see also supra text accompanying notes 
524-25 for the relevant language of the RFRA. 
 556. See Montano, 120 F.3d at 846-47. 
 557. Judge Floyd R. Gibson wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel. 
 558. Montano, 120 F.3d at 844 n.8 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536). 
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constrained to conclude that “Montano’s RFRA claim no longer states a viable 
cause of action.”559 
2. Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139 
In Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139,560 Jock Orville Autio sued his employer, 
the State of Minnesota, in federal court for failing to accommodate Autio’s 
physical disabilities as required under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA).561  Minnesota moved to dismiss the case on the basis that the Eleventh 
Amendment562 barred Autio’s ADA claim from being heard in federal court.563  
After the district court denied its motion, the state appealed.564 
The Eighth Circuit panel565 began by noting that, although the Eleventh 
Amendment normally immunizes a state from suit in federal court by its own 
citizens, a state’s immunity is subject to waiver by the state or abrogation by 
Congress.566  Autio conceded that Minnesota had not waived its sovereign 
immunity, and thus the court had to determine whether Congress, in enacting 
the ADA, had properly abrogated the state’s immunity.567  To answer this 
question, the Eighth Circuit applied the Seminole Tribe abrogation test 
requiring Congress to “unequivocally express[] an intent to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. . . . [and to] act[] pursuant to a valid exercise of 
 
 559. Id.  Just a few weeks after Montano, the Eighth Circuit decided Gavin v. Branstad, 
another prison-litigation case.  See 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997).  In Gavin, inmates of the Iowa 
State Prison challenged, as a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine, the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (PLRA), which threatened to terminate injunctive relief won by the inmates in a 
previous Eighth Amendment action against prison officials.  In the course of its analysis, the 
Eighth Circuit cited to City of Boerne for the proposition that the PLRA could not have amended 
the substantive constitutional law upon which the prisoners’ injunction was based because 
Congress has no power to do so.  See id. at 1086 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 
(rejecting the RFRA as an attempt to make “a substantive change in constitutional protections”)). 
 560. 140 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 1998), reh’g en banc granted, opinion and judgment vacated, 140 
F.3d at 806 (order of July 7, 1998), on reh’g en banc, 157 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 561. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination “against a 
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual”).  Autio also 
sued his union local for failing to assist him in pursuing his claims against the state, hence the 
caption of the case appears as it does.  See Autio, 140 F.3d at 803. 
 562. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also supra note 394 for the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
 563. See Autio, 140 F.3d at 803. 
 564. See id. 
 565. Judge Gerald W. Heaney, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel. 
 566. See Autio, 140 F.3d at 803 (citing Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 239-41 (holding that Congress 
did not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and that 
California did not waive its immunity or consent to suit in federal court)). 
 567. See id. at 803-04. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] REVOLUTIONARY OR ABERRATIONAL? 601 
power.”568  The Eighth Circuit determined that Congress clearly intended to 
abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity,569 and proceeded to the more difficult 
question of Congress’ authority to do so.570  The purpose of the ADA being the 
extension of equal protection to disabled individuals,571 the court determined 
that the statute was an exercise of Congress’ power under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.572 
The state’s argument, predicated on City of Boerne, was that the ADA is 
not an appropriate remedial measure to enforce the Equal Protection Clause 
“because it prohibits more than what a court might find unconstitutional.”573  
The Eighth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court struck down the RFRA in 
City of Boerne in part because the legislative record was devoid of modern 
instances of religious persecution under state action.574  Thus, the Supreme 
Court had concluded that Congress, in enacting the RFRA, was not merely 
enforcing a recognized Fourteenth Amendment right, but was attempting to 
change the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment.575  To ensure that 
legislation enacted under Congress’ enforcement power is remedial and not 
substantive, the Supreme Court required that there “‘be a congruence between 
the means used and the ends to be achieved . . . [and that] [t]he appropriateness 
of remedial measures . . . be considered in light of the evil presented.’”576 
The Eighth Circuit distinguished the ADA from the RFRA on the basis 
that “the ADA clearly chronicles and directly addresses the discrimination 
people with disabilities have experienced and the ‘evils’ those with disabilities 
continue to experience in modern day America.”577  Furthermore, “[i]n passing 
the ADA, Congress was not attempting to make a substantive constitutional 
 
 568. Id. at 804 (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55-56); see also supra note 486, briefly 
discussing the Autio court’s application of Seminole Tribe. 
 569. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994) (“A state shall not be immune under the [E]leventh 
[A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of 
competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.”). 
 570. See Autio, 140 F.3d at 804. 
 571. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994) (stating that a purpose of the ADA is “to invoke 
the . . . power to enforce the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and to regulate commerce, in order to 
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities”). 
 572. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 5, 1; see also supra notes 414 and 412 for the text of § 
5 and the Equal Protection Clause, respectively. 
 573. Autio, 140 F.3d at 804. 
 574. See id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 (“RFRA’s legislative record lacks 
examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry.  
The history of persecution in this country detailed in the hearings mentions no episodes occurring 
in the past 40 years.”)). 
 575. See Autio, 140 F.3d at 804. 
 576. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530). 
 577. Autio, 140 F.3d at 804-05; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (finding that “society has 
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and . . . such forms of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem”). 
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change.  Rather, it was attempting to enforce a recognized Fourteenth 
Amendment right: equal protection.”578  According to the Eighth Circuit, 
Congress may exercise its enforcement power to prohibit state action that has 
not been determined by a court to be a constitutional violation, as it did in the 
ADA.579  As the Supreme Court stated in City of Boerne, and the Eighth 
Circuit repeated, “‘[L]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional 
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in 
the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes 
into legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the states.’”580 
The state argued, nonetheless, that Congress overstepped the bounds of its 
section 5 power by protecting rights in the ADA that are not associated with a 
quasi-suspect or suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.581  The 
Eighth Circuit noted, however, that “other laws passed by Congress have been 
upheld as constitutionally abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity even 
though the rights protected are not grounded in quasi-suspect or suspect 
classification.”582  The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Center583 was further evidence, said the Eighth Circuit, that 
the ADA is consistent with the constitutional principle of equal protection as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court.584  For all of these reasons, the Eighth 
Circuit held that Congress did not exceed its enforcement power under section 
5 when enacting the ADA.585  Consequently, Autio was entitled to bring his 
ADA action against Minnesota in federal court.586 
The opinion handed down by the three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit in 
Autio was not the court’s final word on the case.  Three months after the 
panel’s opinion was filed, the Eighth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc 
 
 578. See Autio, 140 F.3d at 805. 
 579. Id. 
 580. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (internal quotation and citation omitted)). 
 581. See id. at 805. 
 582. Autio, 140 F.3d at 805.  The other laws to which the court referred are the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994) (prohibiting 
employment discrimination based on age), and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1491 (West Supp. 1999) (providing that all children with 
disabilities shall have access to a “free appropriate public education”).  See id. at 805 n.5.  For the 
Eighth Circuit’s subsequent treatment of the ADEA and IDEA in light of City of Boerne, see 
infra Part II.D.4-5. 
 583. See 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that, although state regulations regarding the mentally 
retarded are not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, a city ordinance 
requiring a special use permit for group homes for the mentally retarded had no rational basis and 
violates equal protection). 
 584. See Autio, 140 F.3d at 806. 
 585. See id. 
 586. See id. 
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and vacated the panel opinion and judgment.587  The court’s rehearing of the 
case did not yield another opinion, however, because the court was evenly 
divided on the issue.588  Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit summarily affirmed 
the district court’s judgment denying Minnesota’s motion to dismiss.589 
3. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church  (In re Young) 
In Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church  (In re Young),590 the 
trustee of Bruce and Nancy Young’s bankruptcy estate, Julia A. Christians, 
claimed that the RFRA591 is unconstitutional as it applies to federal bankruptcy 
law, and therefore, does not bar recovery of the Youngs’ tithes to their church 
as avoidable transfers under the Bankruptcy Code.592  On its first hearing of In 
re Young,593 the Eighth Circuit determined, based on the RFRA, that recovery 
by the bankruptcy trustee of the Youngs’ tithes “substantially burdens the 
debtors’ free exercise of their religion and is not in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest.”594  While the trustee’s subsequent petition for certiorari 
to the Supreme Court was pending, the Court struck down the RFRA “as 
applied to state law because Congress had exceeded its enforcement powers 
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”595  The Court thereafter 
granted the trustee’s petition and summarily vacated and remanded the case to 
the Eighth Circuit for further consideration in light of City of Boerne.596  On 
remand, the trustee argued that the RFRA violates the separation-of-powers 
 
 587. See id. (order of July 7, 1998, granting rehearing en banc and vacating opinion and 
judgment of April 9, 1998). 
 588. See Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139, 157 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 589. See id. at 1141. 
 590. 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 591. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4.  See also supra text accompanying notes 524-25 for 
the pertinent text of the RFRA. 
 592. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 857, 859, 861; see also 11 U.S.C. § 548(a), providing: 
  (a)(1) The [bankruptcy] trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in 
property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 
one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or 
involuntarily– 
. . . . 
  (B)(1) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer 
or obligation . . . . 
Id. 
 593. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 
1996), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997); see also Rachel A. Wilson, Note, Bankrupt 
Tithers, the Eighth Circuit & the Supreme Court: Still Praying for RFRA Relief from Bankruptcy 
Law, 62 MO. L. REV. 629 (1997), for a discussion of the Eighth Circuit’s first decision of In re 
Young and the implications of the Supreme Court’s remand of the case in light of City of Boerne. 
 594. In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1417. 
 595. In re Young, 141 F.3d at 856. 
 596. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). 
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doctrine and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and, therefore, 
is unconstitutional in its application to federal law.597 
The Eighth Circuit598 recognized the RFRA as a legislative response to 
Smith, in which the Supreme Court “effectively overruled precedent that had 
provided greater protection to individuals whose religious practices were 
burdened by the operation of neutral laws.”599  As the Eighth Circuit explained, 
the RFRA was meant to reinstate, as to both federal and state law, the 
compelling interest test rejected in Smith.600  Doubts as to whether Congress 
had the power to apply the RFRA to state law were confirmed, however, when 
the Supreme Court declared in City of Boerne that “ ‘the most far reaching and 
substantial of the RFRA’s provisions, those which impose its requirements on 
the states,’ “exceed Congress’ enforcement power under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”601  The enforcement power, explained the Eighth 
Circuit, “is remedial and only allows Congress to preserve rights already 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”602  Thus, the Supreme Court struck 
down the RFRA “[b]ecause RFRA’s protection went far beyond the protection 
offered by the Smith Court’s authoritative interpretation of the First 
Amendment, as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.”603  As the 
Eighth Circuit explained, however, the City of Boerne Court did not reach the 
issue of Congress’ authority to apply the RFRA to federal law, as opposed to 
state law.604 
Having determined that the RFRA had survived City of Boerne with 
respect to federal law, the Eighth Circuit proceeded to hear the trustee’s 
 
 597. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 857; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I, and infra text 
accompanying note 607 for the text of the Establishment Clause. 
 598. Judge Magill, writing for a two-judge majority.  Judge Andrew W. Bogue, a district 
court judge sitting by designation, dissented on the basis that the RFRA, as applied to federal law, 
is unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds.  See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 863 (Bogue, J., 
dissenting); see also infra text accompanying notes 609-12 for a summary of Judge Bogue’s 
dissent. 
 599. In re Young, 141 F.3d at 857-58 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 879) (“[T]he right of free 
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion 
prescribes (or proscribes).” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 600. See id. at 858; see also supra note 534 for the text of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-3(a), 2000bb-
2(1) (1994). 
 601. In re Young, 141 F.3d at 858 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516). 
 602. Id. at 858. 
 603. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, 523. (“Legislation which alters the meaning 
of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.  Congress does not enforce 
a constitutional right by changing what the right is. . . RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed 
remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to 
prevent, unconstitutional behavior.  It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in 
constitutional protections.”)) 
 604. See id. at 859. 
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constitutional challenges to the statute.605  The Eighth Circuit ultimately held 
that Congress had sufficient authority under the Bankruptcy Clause606 and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause607 to make the RFRA applicable to federal 
bankruptcy law, and that the RFRA does not violate the Establishment 
Clause.608 
The dissent argued that, in City of Boerne, the Supreme Court did not 
merely declare the RFRA an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ 
enforcement power vis-a-vis the states.  Rather, the Supreme Court decided 
that the RFRA “intrud[ed] upon the core function of the judicial branch, 
thereby offending ‘vital principles necessary to maintain separation of 
powers.’”609  As the City of Boerne Court had explained, “‘[W]hen the Court 
has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial 
Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is,’”610 and, therefore, 
according to the dissent, Congress’ attempt to overturn the Court’s decision in 
Smith and reimpose the compelling-interest standard of review in the RFRA 
“intruded upon, and usurped a core function of the Article III branch.”611  
Thus, the dissent would have held that the RFRA violates the separation-of-
powers doctrine and is unconstitutional as applied to federal law.612 
4.  Humenansky v. Regents of the University of Minnesota 
In Humenansky v. Regents of the University of the Minnesota,613 John 
Humenansky sued his former employer, the University of Minnesota, in 
federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).614  
 
 605. See id. 
 606. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to establish “uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). 
 607. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, (stating that Congress shall have the power to “make all 
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and 
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Office thereof”). 
 608. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 860-63. 
 609. Id. at 863 (Bogue, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536). 
 610. Id. at 864 (Bogue, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536). 
 611. Id. at 865 (Bogue, J., dissenting). 
 612. See id. at 867 (Bogue, J., dissenting). 
 613. 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 614. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994), which provides: 
It shall be unlawful for an employer– 
  (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s age; 
  (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age; or 
  (3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter. 
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Humenansky claimed that the university had violated the ADEA when it 
terminated his employment.615  The university answered that Humenansky’s 
suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment because “Congress neither 
intended to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity nor acted under section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting 1974 amendments that extended the 
ADEA to cover public employers.”616 
The Eighth Circuit617 applied the first prong of the Seminole Tribe two-part 
abrogation test and determined that “the ADEA’s text does not reflect an 
unmistakably clear intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.”618  
Furthermore, applying the second half of the Seminole Tribe test, the court 
stated that “[e]ven if the ADEA’s text contained a sufficiently clear expression 
of intent to abrogate, we conclude that Congress lacked the power to abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.”619  The court explained that, although 
Congress cannot rely on its powers under Article I of the Constitution to 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, it may abrogate pursuant to section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, “‘a positive grant of legislative power’ to 
enforce section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”620  Thus, the question for the 
court was whether the ADEA is “‘plainly adapted’” to enforcing the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.621  The court recognized that 
legislative distinctions based on age are not subject to heightened equal 
protection scrutiny.622  It surmised that the Supreme Court would not accept an 
expansive view of the section 5 enforcement power allowing Congress to 
statutorily prohibit distinctions based on age that would not violate the 
Constitution.  In particular, the court relied upon the Supreme Court’s 
determination in City of Boerne “that Congress’ section 5 powers, while broad, 
are not without limits” and quoted City of Boerne at length: 
“‘Congress’ power under section 5 . . . extends only to ‘enforcing’ the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court has described this power 
as ‘remedial.’  The design of the Amendment and the text of section 5 are 
 
Id. 
 615. Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 824. 
 616. Id. 
 617. Judge James B. Loken, writing for a two-judge majority.  Judge Jospeph F. Bataillon, a 
district court judge sitting by designation, dissented on the grounds that Congress expressed an 
unmistakably clear intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity and the ADEA was a valid 
exercise of the enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 828 
(Bataillon, J., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying notes 628-31 for details of Judge 
Bataillon’s dissent. 
 618. Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 824-25 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994) (generally 
authorizing enforcement of the ADEA “in any court of competent jurisdiction”)). 
 619. Id. at 826. 
 620. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517). 
 621. Id. (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)). 
 622. See id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] REVOLUTIONARY OR ABERRATIONAL? 607 
inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the 
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.  
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be 
said to be enforcing the Clause.  Congress does not enforce a constitutional 
right by changing what the right is.  It has been given the power ‘to enforce,’ 
not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”623 
The Eighth Circuit explained that the City of Boerne Court went on to 
strike down the RFRA because it “‘is so out of proportion to a supposed 
remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or 
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.’”624  Accordingly, the Eighth 
Circuit concluded that “the ADEA likewise exceeds Congress’s section 5 
powers as defined in City of Boerne.”625  Humenansky therefore could not 
maintain his ADEA suit against the University of Minnesota in federal court. 
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s conclusions that Congress failed 
to express an unmistakably clear intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
and that the ADEA exceeds Congress’ enforcement power.626  It argued that 
direct reference to the states in the text of the ADEA sufficiently expressed 
Congress’ intent to abrogate state immunity.627  Furthermore, regarding 
Congress’ power to enact the ADEA, the dissent distinguished the ADEA from 
the RFRA on the basis that “the ADEA [is] not ‘so out of proportion’ to the 
problems of arbitrary age discrimination identified by Congress.”628  Relying 
heavily on the Eighth Circuit panel decision in Autio, which upheld the ADA 
as a constitutional exercise of Congress’ enforcement power, the dissent would 
have held that “the ADEA is plainly adapted to the end of providing older 
workers equal protection under the law.”629 
 
 623. Humenasky, 152 F.3d at 828 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519). 
 624. Id. at 828 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519). 
 625. Id. (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 262-63 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(stating, for a four-justice minority, that the ADEA cannot be sustained as an exercise of 
Congress’ § 5 power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause)). 
 626. See id. (Bataillon, J., dissenting). 
 627. See id. at 829 (Bataillon, J., dissenting) (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57 (“[T]he 
numerous references to the ‘State’ in the text of [the RFRA] make it indubitable that Congress 
intended through the Act to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from suit.”), and citing 29 
U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1994) (defining “employer” for the purposes of the ADEA to include “a State 
or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State”) and § 630(f) 
(defining “employee” for the purposes of the ADEA to include state employees)). 
 628. Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 831 (Bataillon, J. dissenting) (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 
at 532). 
 629. Id. at 830-31 (Bataillon, J., dissenting).  The dissent stated: 
Unlike the RFRA, the ADA clearly chronicles and directly addresses the 
discrimination people with disabilities have experienced and the ‘evils’ those with 
disabilities continue to experience in modern day America . . . . Unlike the RFRA 
struck down in [City of Boerne], the ADA is ‘plainly adapted’ as a remedial measure 
even though each individual violation of the ADA may not in and of itself be 
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5. Little Rock School District v. Mauney 
Mr. and Ms. James Mauney sued the State of Arkansas and the Arkansas 
Department of Education (collectively, the state) under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),630 seeking an appropriate public education 
for their severely disabled son.631  The state argued that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars the Mauneys’ suit because Congress does not have the power 
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity in the IDEA.632 
First the Eighth Circuit633 recognized that “Congress may, when acting 
pursuant to its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity without the states’ 
consent.”634  Applying the now familiar Seminole Tribe two-part abrogation 
test, the court determined that Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to 
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in the IDEA,635 and 
 
unconstitutional . . . . [T]he ADA is plainly adapted to the end of providing those with 
disabilities equal protection under the law. 
Id. (quoting Autio, 140 F.3d at 804-05). 
  Following its decision in Humenansky, the Eighth Circuit filed several opinions with 
cursory references to City of Boerne.  In United States v. Weaselhead, the Eighth Circuit 
determined that a congressional attempt to statutorily redefine the inherent sovereignty of the 
Indian tribes exceeds Congress’ power under the Indian Commerce Clause.  See 156 F.3d 818 
(8th Cir. 1998).  It quoted City of Boerne in support of its statement that “[f]undamental, ab initio 
matters of constitutional history should not be committed to ‘[s]hifting legislative majorities’ free 
to arbitrarily interpret and reorder the organic law as public sentiment veers in one direction or 
another.”  Id. at 824 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529).  Less than one week later, in Peter 
v. Wedl, the court simply noted that “[f]ollowing the Supreme Court’s decision that RFRA is 
unconstitutional as applied to state law, the plaintiffs abandoned their RFRA claim.”  155 F.3d 
992, 996 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536) (internal citation omitted). 
 630. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (providing that all children 
with disabilities shall have access to a “free appropriate public education”). 
 631. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 632. See id. 
 633. Judge Heaney wrote for a two-judge majority.  Judge Wollman concurred in part and 
dissented in part.  Judge Wollman disagreed with the court’s conclusion that Congress properly 
abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
See id. at 832 (Wollman, J., dissenting); see also text accompanying note 652 infra for Judge 
Wollman’s opinion. 
 634. Mauney, 183 F.3d at 821 (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59).  In response to the 
state’s contention that, because the IDEA is more properly characterized as an exercise of 
Congress’ power under the Spending Clause, the statute cannot be an exercise of the enforcement 
power, the court noted that “Congress does not have to correctly surmise the source of its 
authority in order to pass legislation, and may ground its legislative authority in multiple 
sources.”  Id. at 831 (citing Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1283). 
 635. See id. at 822 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1403(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (providing that a “State 
shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from 
suit in Federal court for a violation of this chapter”)). 
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proceeded to the issue of Congress’ authority to enact the IDEA under section 
5.636  Dismissing the state’s contention that City of Boerne limited Congress’ 
ability to legislate pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the court stated that 
“[w]e read City of Boerne to stand for the unexceptional proposition that 
Congress may not subvert the judiciary’s interpretation of the substantive 
meaning of the Constitution and the judiciary may not abdicate to another 
branch its role as final arbiter of the substantive meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”637  According to the Eighth Circuit, City of Boerne turned on the 
fact that the RFRA was intended to overrule the Supreme Court’s Smith 
decision,638 and is not a severe limit on Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power, but instead a reaffirmation of the breadth of that power.639 
The Eighth Circuit next applied City of Boerne’s requirement that there 
“‘be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means adopted to that end.’”640  According to the Eighth 
Circuit, the “congruence” prong of the City of Boerne analysis,  “tests whether 
a congressional enactment is remedial in nature or whether it ‘imposes new 
substantive constitutional rights through legislation.’”641  The Eighth Circuit 
noted the legislative history of the IDEA documenting Congress’ findings 
regarding disabled children in public schools and contrasted the IDEA with the 
RFRA on that basis.642  Furthermore, the court rejected the state’s argument 
that, because disabled people are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class for the 
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause,643 Congress lacks the power under 
 
 636. See id. (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, 66-67). 
 637. Id. at 823. 
 638. See id. at 826 (“Congress’ express purpose [in passing the RFRA]–the motivation that 
the Court found fatal–was to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith and alter its 
interpretation of substantive constitutional law.” (alteration added)). 
 639. See Mauney, 183 F.3d at 824 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (“Legislation 
which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ 
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional 
and intrudes into legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.”) (internal 
quotation omitted)). 
 640. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 517 U.S. at 520). 
 641. Id. at 825 (quoting Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees, 141 F.3d 761, 769 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
 642. See id. at 825-26 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (finding that 
“there are more than eight million children with disabilities in the United States today”); § 
1400(b)(3) (finding that “more than half of the children with disabilities in the United States do 
not receive appropriate educational services which would enable them to have full equality of 
opportunity”); § 1400(b)(4) (finding that “one million of the children with disabilities in the 
United States are excluded entirely from the public school system and will not go though the 
educational process with their peers”); § 1400(b)(9) (finding that “it is in the national interest that 
the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational 
needs of children with disabilities in order to assure equal protection of the law”)). 
 643. See id. at 826 (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§ 1 and note 412 supra for the text of the Equal Protection Clause. 
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section 5 to enact legislation benefiting the disabled.644  The Eighth Circuit 
explained that “Congress is not limited to legislating on behalf of groups 
identified as suspect for purposes of judicial review.  To hold otherwise would 
be to confuse a level of judicial scrutiny with the scope of congressional 
power.”645  For these reasons, the court concluded that “the IDEA is congruent 
with the dictates of equal protection law” for the purposes of City of Boerne.646 
Proceeding to the “proportionality” prong of the City of Boerne analysis, 
the Eighth Circuit asked “whether the reach of the enactment is so out of 
proportion with the harm sought to be remedied that the Act becomes 
substantive in operation and effect.”647  The court accorded deference to 
Congress’ legislative judgment and distinguished the IDEA from the RFRA 
based on the RFRA’s “‘[s]weeping coverage . . . at every level of 
government’” and the “‘substantial costs RFRA exacts . . . in practical terms of 
imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their 
traditional regulatory power.’”648 The court noted that unlike the RFRA, the 
IDEA conditions federal funding on state compliance with the statute’s 
requirements, and therefore “functions as a contract between equals.”649  
Having determined that the IDEA does not exceed Congress’ enforcement 
power, the court held that Congress properly abrogated the states’ sovereign 
immunity.650 
In the alternative, the Eighth Circuit considered whether Arkansas 
impliedly waived its sovereign immunity under the IDEA.  The court 
determined that the IDEA “‘manifest[s] a clear intent [on the part of Congress] 
to condition participation in the programs funded under the Act on a state’s 
consent to waive its constitutional immunity.’”651 Therefore, Arkansas, by 
participating in the legislative scheme established in the IDEA, waived its 
immunity to suit under that statute. 
The dissent, although it agreed with the court’s determination that 
Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in the IDEA, would have held that such abrogation 
 
 644. See Mauney, 183 F.3d at 826. 
 645. Id. at 828. 
 646. Id. at 829. 
 647. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (“RFRA is so out of proportion to a 
supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed 
to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”)). 
 648. Id. at 830 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532, 534). 
 649. Mauney, 183 F.3d at 830 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (providing that, 
in order to qualify for federal funds under the IDEA, a state must demonstrate that it has met 
certain enumerated requirements, including that “[t]he State has in effect a policy that assures all 
children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate public education”)). 
 650. See id. at 831. 
 651. Id. at 832 (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 24 and citing § 1403). 
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exceeded Congress’ section 5 power based on “the interpretation of City of 
Boerne expressed in Humenansky.”652 
6. Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle 
Christopher Alsbrook sued his employer, the City of Maumelle, 
Arkansas,653 claiming that the city violated Title II of the ADA654 when it 
barred him from engaging in law enforcement duties because his eyesight 
could not be corrected to 20/20.655  In the Eighth Circuits’ first hearing of 
Alsbrook, a panel of the court656 determined that Congress, by enacting the 
ADA and abrogating state sovereign immunity to suits under that statute, did 
not exceed its section 5 enforcement power.  Therefore, Alsbrook’s suit was 
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment and could proceed in federal court.657 
On rehearing en banc,658 the Eighth Circuit659 began by applying the 
Seminole Tribe two-part abrogation analysis. The court had no problem 
determining that “Congress, in passing the ADA, ‘unequivocally expressed’ its 
intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity,”660 and proceeded to 
determine whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power.661 
The court first noted that, “[f]ollowing Seminole Tribe, Congress can 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity only if it is acting pursuant to its 
 
 652. Id. (Wollman, J., dissenting) (citing Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 822). 
 653. Alsbrook also sued the State of Arkansas, the Arkansas Commission on Law 
Enforcement Standards & Training (ACLEST), and the commissioners of ACLEST in their 
individual and official capacities.  For the sake of simplicity, all the defendants are referred to 
collectively as “the City.” 
 654. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) (providing that “no qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity”). 
 655. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 156 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 1998), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion and judgment vacated, 156 F.3d at 833 (order of Nov. 12, 1998), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 
184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 656. Judge McMillian wrote for a two-judge majority.  Judge C. Arlen Beam dissented on the 
basis that he would have stayed the decision of Alsbrook until the en banc court had decided the 
similar issue presented in the Autio case. 
 657. See Alsbrook, 156 F.3d at 830-31. 
 658. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
 659. Judge Beam wrote the opinion of the court.  Judge McMillian, writing for a four-judge 
minority, argued that Congress did not exceed its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
in enacting the ADA and, therefore, properly abrogated state sovereign immunity to suits under 
the ADA.  See id. at 1012 (McMillian, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 
682-88 for a summary of the dissenting opinion. 
 660. Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1006; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994) and supra note 569 for 
the text of § 12202. 
 661. See id. 
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powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”662  Although Congress 
invoked its section 5 enforcement power in enacting the ADA, the court made 
it clear that “Congress’s declaration that a statute is passed pursuant to section 
5 does not . . . end our inquiry.”663  Rather, the court looked to the operative 
provisions of the ADA to determine whether “Title II of the ADA represents a 
proper exercise of Congress’s section 5 powers ‘to enforce’ by ‘appropriate 
legislation’ the constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, in 
particular, the Equal Protection Clause.”664 
The Eighth Circuit referred to City of Boerne as “the Supreme Court’s 
most detailed pronouncement on Congress’s authority to impose legislation on 
the states pursuant to its section 5 powers,” and noted the Supreme Court’s 
determination that “‘as broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is 
not unlimited.’”665  The City of Boerne Court had determined that Congress’ 
section 5 power is remedial and that Congress, therefore, has no authority “to 
enact substantive legislation defining the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s restrictions on the states.”666  For congressional legislation to be 
a valid exercise of Congress’ remedial section 5 power, the Supreme Court 
required that there be “‘a congruence and proportionality between the injury to 
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.’”667  Based on the 
reasoning of the City of Boerne Court, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the 
application of Title II of the ADA to the states was not a proper exercise of 
Congress’ section 5 enforcement power.668 
The Eighth Circuit nevertheless acknowledged Alsbrook’s argument that, 
unlike the RFRA, the ADA contains detailed legislative findings of 
discrimination against the disabled.669  The court explained, however, that “the 
state of the legislative record, alone, cannot suffice to bring Title II within the 
ambit of Congress’s section 5 powers if Title II is not ‘adapted to the mischief 
and wrong which the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to provide 
against.’”670  Thus, the court flatly stated that “regardless of the extent of its 
findings, Congress, under section 5, only has the power to prohibit that which 
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits.”671 
 
 662. Id. 
 663. Id. 
 664. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5). 
 665. Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1006-07 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518; Humenansky, 
152 F.3d at 828 (“Congress’ § 5 powers, while broad, are not without limits.”)). 
 666. Id. at 1007 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (“Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is.”)). 
 667. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519). 
 668. See id. 
 669. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994) and supra note 577 for the pertinent text 
of that section. 
 670. Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1008 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532). 
 671. Id. 
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Likewise, the Eighth Circuit rejected Alsbrook’s argument that, because in 
Cleburne the Supreme Court concluded that arbitrary state distinctions based 
on mental retardation lack a rational basis under the Equal Protection Clause, 
the ADA, which prohibits discrimination against the disabled, is a valid 
exercise of Congress’ section 5 power.672  The Eighth Circuit determined that 
Title II of the ADA does not “enforce” the rational basis standard applied in 
Cleburne.  Rather, the ADA prohibits any state program, service, or activity 
that fails to provide “‘reasonable modifications’” for the disabled, even though 
it may be rationally related to a legitimate state interest and valid under 
Cleburne.673  Furthermore, the court was concerned that the application of the 
ADA to every state program, service, and activity “‘is a considerable 
congressional intrusion into the State’s traditional prerogatives and general 
authority to regulate the health and welfare of their citizens.’”674 
Finally, the court noted Alsbrook’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s 
statement in City of Boerne that “‘[l]egislation which deters or remedies 
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement 
power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself 
unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of autonomy previously 
reserved to the States.’”675  The Eighth Circuit determined, however, that the 
Supreme Court’s statement “is best understood as saying that Congress may 
prohibit conduct which itself is not necessarily unconstitutional, if to do so 
would rectify an existing constitutional violation.”676  As the Eighth Circuit 
noted, Title II of the ADA, rather than specifying particular state laws or 
actions that violate the Constitution, is aimed indiscriminately at every state 
law, policy, or program.677 
Thus, the court determined that “it cannot be said that in applying Title II 
of the ADA to the states, Congress has acted to enforce equal protection 
guarantees for the disabled as they have been defined by the Supreme 
Court.”678  Accordingly, the court held that the extension of Title II of the 
ADA to the states was not a proper exercise of Congress’ section 5 power and, 
 
 672. See id. at 1009 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432). 
 673. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994) (defining a “‘qualified individual with a 
disability’ for the purposes of the ADA as an individual with a disability who, with or without 
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, 
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets 
the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or 
activities provided by a public entity”)). 
 674. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534). 
 675. Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1009 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (internal quotation 
omitted)). 
 676. Id. 
 677. See id. 
 678. Id. at 1010. 
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consequently, that Congress failed properly to abrogate Arkansas’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.679 
The dissent would have held that Congress properly enacted the ADA 
pursuant to section 5 and, therefore, properly abrogated the Eleventh 
Amendment.680  The dissent argued, based on Cleburne, that “protection 
against disability-based discrimination is a well-established Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection guarantee,” and disagreed with the majority’s 
determination that Title II does more than merely enforce the rational basis 
standard applied by the Cleburne Court.681  The dissent relied in large part 
upon the Supreme Court’s statement in City of Boerne that “‘[l]egislation 
which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of 
Congress’s enforcement power . . . even if in the process its prohibits conduct 
which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of 
autonomy previously reserved to the States.’”682  The majority’s interpretation 
of this passage, according to the dissent, ignored “the Supreme Court’s 
reference to legislation which ‘deters’ constitutional violations and only takes 
into consideration legislation which ‘remedies’ constitutional violations.”683 
Citing congressional findings of persistent and pervasive discrimination 
against the disabled in public services, programs, and activities,684 the dissent 
argued that Title II of the ADA reflects the requisite “‘congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end.’”685  Thus, the dissent would have concluded that 
Congress properly exercised its section 5 enforcement powers and that the 
Eleventh Amendment did not protect the city from Alsbrook’s ADA claim.686 
E. Printz v. United States 
In Printz v. United States,687 the Supreme Court considered whether certain 
interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady 
Act)688 violate the Constitution.  The Brady Act requires the U.S. Attorney 
General to establish a nation-wide background check system for the purchase 
 
 679. See id. 
 680. Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1012 (McMillian, J. dissenting). 
 681. Id.  (McMillian, J. dissenting) (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447). 
 682. Id. at 1013 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (McMillian, J. dissenting) (internal 
quotation omitted)). 
 683. Id (McMillian, J. dissenting). 
 684. Id. at 1014 (McMillian, J. dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994)). 
 685. Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1014 (McMillian, J. dissenting) (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 
at 520). 
 686. Id. at 1016 (McMillian, J. dissenting). 
 687. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 688. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994). 
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of handguns.689  In the interim, the statute requires that handgun dealers, before 
selling guns to prospective purchasers, provide the “chief law enforcement 
officer” of the jurisdiction in which the prospective purchaser resides with a 
statement containing information relevant to a background check of the 
prospective purchaser.690  The statute then requires that the state officer “make 
a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or 
possession [of the handgun] would be in violation of the law.”691  Jay Printz, 
the chief law enforcement officer for Ravalli County, Montana, challenged the 
interim provisions of the Brady Act on the basis that they compel state officers 
to execute federal law and, therefore, violate the principle of dual sovereignty 
established in the Constitution.692 
The Supreme Court693 noted initially that “there is no constitutional text 
speaking to this precise question,” and therefore “the answer to [Printz’] 
challenge must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the 
structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.”694  
Looking first to statutes enacted by the earliest Congresses, the Court 
determined that “[t]hese early laws establish, at most, that the Constitution was 
originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to 
enforce federal prescriptions” under Article III and the Supremacy Clause.695  
The state judiciaries, said the Court, were treated differently from the other 
branches of state government under the Constitution because, “unlike 
legislatures and executives, they applied the law of other sovereigns all the 
time.”696  Thus, the Court rejected the argument that “the early statutes 
imposing obligations on state courts imply a power of Congress to impress the 
state executive into its service.”697  The Court further determined that “there is 
 
 689. See note following § 922. 
 690. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III), (IV). 
 691. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2). 
 692. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 904, 905. 
 693. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.  Justices O’Connor and Thomas filed 
concurring opinions.  Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens in his 
dissenting opinion.  Justice Souter wrote his own dissenting opinion, as did Justice Breyer, and 
Justice Stevens joined in Justice Breyer’s dissent. 
 694. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. 
 695. Id. at 907 (citing, e.g., Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (requiring that state courts 
record citizenship records); Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § 2, 1 Stat. 577-78 (requiring state courts 
to deport alien enemies during times of war)); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial 
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); U.S. CONST art. VI, cl. 2.  See supra 
note 103 for the text of the Supremacy Clause. 
 696. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. 
 697. Id.  The Court also distinguished its holding in Testa on the basis that the Constitution 
treats state judges differently than other state officers, explaining that “Testa stands for the 
proposition that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law–a conclusion mandated by the 
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not only an absence of executive-commandeering statutes in the early 
Congresses, but there is an absence of them in our later history as well.”698 
The government argued, nonetheless, that certain numbers of The 
Federalist, upon which the Court has been known to rely for the original 
understanding of the Constitution, indicate that Congress may compel 
enforcement of federal law by state executives.699  The government invoked, 
for example, the statements of Alexander Hamilton that Congress could 
“‘make use of the State officers and State regulations, for collecting’ federal 
taxes” and that the new Constitution would “‘enable the [national] government 
to employ the ordinary magistracy of each [State] in the execution of its 
laws.’”700 The Court responded, however, that “none of these statements 
necessarily implies–what is the critical point here–that Congress could impose 
these responsibilities without the consent of the States.”701 
Having determined that “constitutional practice . . . tends to negate the 
existence of the congressional power asserted here,” the Court proceeded to 
examine the structure of the Constitution itself for some indication of the 
constitutionality of the statute at bar.702  The Court first noted the principle, 
reflected throughout the text of the Constitution, that “the Constitution 
established a system of “dual sovereignty.”703 The Court explained that “the 
Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and 
through the States, and instead designed a system in which the state and federal 
 
terms of the Supremacy Clause . . . .  [T]hat says nothing about whether state executive officers 
must administer federal law.”  Id. at 928-29 (explaining Testa, 330 U.S. at 386). 
 698. Id. at 916. 
 699. See id. at 910. 
 700. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST Nos. 36, 27, at 221, 176 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 701. Printz, 521 U.S. at 910-11 (citing FERC, 456 U.S. at 796 n.35 (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part)). 
 702. Id. at 918. 
 703. Id. (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457 and citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (providing that 
“no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State 
be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 
(“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies between two or more states; between a 
State and Citizens of another State;–between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the 
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different states, and between a State, or the Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”);-U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens 
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”);-
U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring that amendments to the Constitution be “ratified by the Legislatures 
of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof”);-U.S. CONST. 
art. IV § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government.”);-U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating the powers of Congress);-U.S. CONST. 
amend. X). 
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governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people.”704  This 
federal system, said the Court, makes each state government accountable to its 
citizens705 and, by dividing power between two levels of government, reduces 
the likelihood that power will be abused at either level.706  The Court expressed 
concern that “[t]he power of the Federal Government would be augmented 
immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service–and at no cost to itself–
the police officers of the 50 States.”707 
The Court similarly noted that, just as a congressional power to compel 
state officers to enforce federal law would blur the division of power between 
the states and the federal government, it would likewise degrade the separation 
of powers between the coordinate branches of the federal government.708  The 
Court explained that the Constitution grants exclusively to the President the 
power to execute federal law,709 yet the Brady Act seeks to delegate this 
executive power to state officers.  “[I]f Congress could act as effectively 
without the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute 
its laws,” said the Court, then the “unity [of executive authority] would be 
shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction.”710 
Finally, the Court turned to its own precedent to determine how it had 
treated similar statutes whose constitutionality had been challenged before the 
 
 704. Printz, 521 U.S. at 920 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (“[T]he Framers explicitly 
chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.”); 
U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It was the genius of [the Framers’] 
idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each 
protected by incursion from the other.  The resulting Constitution created a legal system 
unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own 
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who 
sustain it and are governed by it.”). 
 705. See id. (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-77).  The Court 
rejected the government’s argument that the interim provisions of the Brady Act do not decrease 
the accountability of state or federal officers, stating that: 
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal 
regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for ‘solving’ problems without 
having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.  And 
even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of implementing a federal 
program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and 
for its defects. 
Id. at 930. 
 706. See id. at 921 (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“Just as the separation and 
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the 
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the 
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”)). 
 707. Id. at 922. 
 708. See id. 
 709. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 922 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President 
“shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”)). 
 710. Id. at 923. 
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Court.711  The Court determined that its previous opinions had “made clear that 
the Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by 
legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”712  The Court 
relied in part on its warning in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. 
Mississippi713 that “‘this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal 
command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations.’”714  
Furthermore, the Court noted its holding in New York that “‘the Federal 
Government . . . may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal 
regulatory program.’”715 
The Court rejected as irrelevant the government’s contention that the 
interim provisions of the Brady Act serve important law enforcement purposes, 
are the most efficient means of executing those purposes, and place a minimal 
burden on state officials for a short period of time.716  The Court stated that 
such factors “might be relevant if we were evaluating whether the incidental 
application to the States of a federal law of general applicability excessively 
interfered with the functioning of state governments.”717  But where, as in the 
Brady Act, the “whole object of the law [is] to direct the functioning of the 
state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual 
sovereignty, such a ‘balancing’ analysis is inappropriate.”718  The Court again 
relied on New York to support its rejection of the government’s proposed 
balancing approach719 and held that “[t]he Federal Government may neither 
issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor 
command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to 
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”720 
The Court concluded that the obligations imposed upon chief law 
enforcement officers to “‘make a reasonable effort to ascertain . . . whether 
 
 711. See id. at 925. 
 712. Id. (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264; FERC, 456 U.S. at 742). 
 713. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
 714. Printz, 521 U.S. at 926 (quoting FERC, 456 U.S. at 761-62). 
 715. Id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188). 
 716. See id. at 932. 
 717. Id. 
 718. Id. 
 719. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.  The Court stated: 
Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the form of our government, and 
the courts have traditionally invalidated measures deviating from that form.  The result 
may appear ‘formalistic’ in a given case to partisans of the measure at issue, because such 
measures are typically the product of the era’s perceived necessity.  But the Constitution 
protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among 
branches of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate 
power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day. 
Id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 187). 
 720. Id. at 935. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] REVOLUTIONARY OR ABERRATIONAL? 619 
receipt or possession [of a handgun] would be in violation of the law’” is 
unconstitutional.721  The Court declined to decide, however, whether firearms 
dealers and prospective purchasers still are bound by the relevant provisions of 
the Brady Act because the Court refused to “speculate regarding the rights and 
obligations of parties not before the Court.”722 
1. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota 
The Eighth Circuit first addressed Printz in Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa 
Indians v. Minnesota,723 in which Minnesota Chippewa Indians sought to 
enforce an 1837 treaty with the United States reserving to the Indians the rights 
to hunt, fish, and gather grains on certain land, lakes, and rivers in present-day 
Minnesota and Wisconsin.  The Indians requested a declaratory judgment that 
their rights under the treaty continued to exist in Minnesota, as well as an 
injunction to enforce those treaty rights free of regulation by the State of 
Minnesota.724  Following years of litigation in federal court, the Indians agreed 
with the state to a plan resolving some of the Indians’ claims and allowing the 
Indians to continue hunting, fishing, and gathering subject to state 
regulation.725  Regarding the Indians’ remaining claims under the 1837 treaty, 
the state argued that the Indians’ treaty rights were extinguished in 1858 when 
“Minnesota was granted statehood and acquired the sovereign trust and police 
power over its natural resources,”726 and that enforcing the Indians’ rights 
under the treaty would violate Minnesota’s sovereignty in violation of 
Printz.727 
The Eighth Circuit728 acknowledged “the Supreme Court’s recent opinion 
in Printz v. United States” and noted that “[i]n Printz, the Court struck down a 
portion of the Brady Act which required state officers to implement a federal 
regulatory program as violative of the Tenth Amendment.”729  The Eighth 
Circuit determined, however, that Printz was not relevant to the case sub judice 
because “[t]here is no federal law commanding state regulation . . . . [and] the 
State voluntarily stipulated to the [agreement] regarding regulatory issues.”730  
Furthermore, the court determined that the case before it concerned “state law 
infringing on rights guaranteed by federal law, and there is no question that 
federal courts have the power to order state officials to comply with federal 
 
 721. Id. at 933 (quoting § 922(s)(2)). 
 722. Id. at 935 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 186-87). 
 723. 124 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1997),  aff’d, 119 S. Ct. 1187 (1999). 
 724. See Mille Lacs, 124 F.3d at 910. 
 725. See id. at 912. 
 726. Id. at 926. 
 727. See id. at 928 n.44. 
 728. Judge Lay wrote for the court. 
 729. Mille Lacs, 124 F.3d at 928 n.44. 
 730. Id. at 928-29 n.44. 
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law.”731  The court went on to hold that the Indians’ 1837 treaty rights were not 
extinguished when Minnesota was admitted into the Union and that enforcing 
those rights is not inconsistent with the state’s sovereignty.732 
2. Nebraska v. Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact 
Commission 
The Eighth Circuit’s next extensive discussion733 of Printz was Nebraska 
v. Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Commission, a 
case factually related to Concerned Citizens.734  In Central Interstate, the State 
of Nebraska sought a declaratory judgment precluding the Central Interstate 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission from establishing deadlines for the 
state to consider a license application for a radioactive waste facility to be 
located within the state.  The commission was created in an interstate compact 
entered into pursuant to the LLRW Act735 and argued that it was granted 
authority under the compact to impose a deadline for Nebraska, a party to the 
compact, to process the license application.  Nebraska claimed that the 
commission had no authority to interfere with the state’s regulatory process, 
and that doing so violated the state’s sovereignty under Printz, as well as New 
York.736 
Although the Eighth Circuit737 was “cognizant that the State’s sovereign 
powers are potentially limited by the Compact,”738 it found Printz and New 
 
 731. Id. at 929 n.44 (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 931 n.16; Fond du Lac, 68 F.3d at 256 n.3). 
 732. See id. at 928-29.  The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s disposition of the 
Mille Lacs case without mention of Printz.  See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa 
Indians, 119 S. Ct. 1187 (1999). 
 733. Before deciding the Central Interstate case, the court filed two opinions with only 
peripheral mentions of Printz.  First, the dissent in In re Young, 141 F.3d at 865, referring to 
Printz, stated that “recently the [Supreme] Court reemphasized the importance of maintaining the 
constitutional structure and separation of powers, and reaffirmed its duty to call into check 
impermissible exercises of Congressional power.”  The dissent also quoted Printz as support for 
the proposition that a congressional statute that violates the separation of powers doctrine is not a 
proper exercise of the powers of Congress, and therefore is “merely an act of usurpation which 
deserves to be treated as such.” Id. at 866 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 924 (internal quotation 
omitted)).  Second, in Johnson v. Missouri, the Eighth Circuit dismissed a lawsuit brought by 
Missouri prisoners for lack of standing and, quoting Printz, rejected the prisoners’ attempt to 
assert claims on behalf of third parties.  142 F.3d 1087, 1091 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Printz, 521 
U.S. at 935 (“We decline to speculate regarding the rights and obligations of parties not before 
the Court.”)). 
 734. Nebraska v. Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm’n, 187 F.3d 982  
(8th Cir. 1999) (citing Concerned Citizens, 970 F.2d at 77). 
 735. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-(j) (amended 1986); see also supra text accompanying notes 
67-72 for the history and purpose of the LLRW Act. 
 736. See Central Interstate, 187 F.3d at 984, 985 n.3. 
 737. Judge Beam, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel. 
 738. Central Interstate, 187 F.3d at 985. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] REVOLUTIONARY OR ABERRATIONAL? 621 
York “largely irrelevant here, except that they highlight the concerns associated 
with intrusion into sovereign powers.”739  The court determined that, “[d]espite 
the State’s diligent efforts to bring the principles espoused in . . . New York v. 
United States and Printz v. United States to bear on this case, the limited 
authority delegated by the Compact does not run afoul of the State’s sovereign 
regulatory authority.”740  The court concluded that the compact was a legally 
binding agreement and that its text clearly authorized the commission to set a 
reasonable deadline for Nebraska to process the license application.741 
III. CONCLUSION 
Central to the large amount of commentary generated by the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in New York, Lopez, Seminole Tribe, City of Boerne, and 
Printz is the question whether those cases are the solution for which critics of 
congressional overreaching have been searching, or whether they are too 
narrowly tailored and fact-specific to be effectual in changing the relationship 
between the states and the federal government.  The preceding discussion of 
Eighth Circuit cases applying the quintet of recent Supreme Court federalism 
cases offers some answers, but, as might be expected, the answer varies 
depending upon the case. 
First, the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York, and 
reaffirmation and extension of New York in Printz, has been minimal, judging 
by the Eighth Circuit’s rejection of claims predicated on one or both of those 
cases.  As was made explicit by the Eighth Circuit in Concerned Citizens, the 
effect of New York on the federal balance of power is most obviously limited 
by the Court’s striking down the take-title provision of the LLRW 
Amendments and severing it from the remaining incentive provisions.  
Regarding the remaining incentive provisions, New York has had the effect 
only of reinforcing the power of Congress to attach strings to state receipt of 
federal money under the Spending Clause and to compel states to regulate 
pursuant to federal standards or face preemption under the Commerce Clause.  
Thus, Congress remains free to coerce the states to conform to its legislative 
goals, but may avoid the kind of “commandeering” prohibited by New York 
and Printz by the simple expedient of threatening to withhold federal funds.  
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit upheld both the IGRA in Cheyenne River and the 
False Claims Act in Zissler on similar bases. 
The impact of New York also is stifled by the Supreme Court’s explicit 
avoidance of the volatile Wirtz-Usery-Garcia line of cases dealing with the 
application of the FLSA to state employers.  The Court’s insistance that New 
 
 739. Id. 
 740. Id. at 987 (internal citations omitted). 
 741. See id. at 985-88. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
622 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:529 
York does not call into question the Court’s previous holding in Garcia was not 
lost on the Eighth Circuit in May. 
Finally, the Eighth Circuit’s decisions in Fond du Lac and Mille Lacs 
emphasize the important distinction made in New York and Printz between 
congressional attempts to commandeer state bureaucracies and the long-
recognized power of the federal courts to demand state compliance with 
federal law.  The Supreme Court reaffirmed the authority of the federal courts 
to order states to comply with federal law under Article III and the Supremacy 
Clause, and narrowly tailored the holdings of New York and Printz to prohibit 
only congressional attempts to compel state legislatures to enact, and state 
executive officers to enforce, federal regulatory programs. 
Thus, New York and Printz have had no impact in the Eighth Circuit 
beyond their narrow holdings striking down the take-title provision of the 
LLRW Amendments and the interim provisions of the Brady Act.  This is most 
obvious in Mille Lacs and Central States, in which the Eighth Circuit 
suggested that the general concerns about the principle of state sovereignty 
expressed in New York and Printz simply are not persuasive outside the realm 
of direct commandeering of state legislative or executive authority by 
Congress. 
More surprising, particularly considering the acclaim that accompanied the 
opinion, has been the almost complete ineffectiveness of Lopez as a basis for 
challenging federal criminal laws nominally predicated on the interstate 
commerce power.  The Eighth Circuit cases suggest that result is due in large 
part to the inherent limits of Lopez in the face of the immense commerce 
power accumulated over the past sixty years. 
The most far-reaching of those limits is the Supreme Court’s recognition in 
Lopez that virtually any congressional legislation containing a jurisdictional 
element is a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.  
The Eighth Circuit applied this rule in Mosby, Rankin, Miller, Flaherty, Baker, 
Bausch, and numerous other cases in that line, to sustain various criminal 
statutes with otherwise tenuous links to interstate commerce.  Nowhere is the 
importance of this facet of Lopez more obvious than in Danks, in which the 
Eighth Circuit upheld a revised version of the very statute struck down in 
Lopez, the singular revision being Congress’ addition of an interstate 
commerce requirement. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court determined in Lopez that legislative findings 
regarding the effect of statutorily regulated activity on interstate commerce 
may bring a statute with no otherwise apparent connection to commerce within 
the purview of the Commerce Clause.  Accordingly, in Robinson, Monteleone, 
and McMasters, the Eighth Circuit relied on Congress’ findings regarding the 
effects of carjacking, gun trafficking, and arson on interstate commerce in 
sustaining federal statutes that regulate those activities. 
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That Congress may comply with Lopez simply by drafting a jurisdictional 
element or creating favorable legislative history is exacerbated by the minimal 
showing necessary to establish the required nexus to interstate commerce.  
When considering Lopez challenges in Dinwiddie and Crawford, for example, 
the Eighth Circuit relied on the “aggregate effects” test promulgated in 
Wickard and endorsed in Lopez to find the necessary connection between 
interstate commerce and activities that, when viewed in isolation, only 
nominally impact commerce.  Similarly, in Mosby, Flaherty, Baker, 
McMasters, Bausch, and Wright, the court required only the slightest 
connection between the defendants’ conduct and interstate or foreign 
commerce.  The court further determined in Flaherty that Lopez has nothing to 
say about the quantum of evidence necessary to prove a jurisdictional element, 
and in Wright the court recognized that merely crossing state lines constitutes 
interstate commerce for the purposes of Lopez. 
What is more, that an interstate commerce element or congressional 
findings regarding interstate commerce are sufficient to bring a statute within 
the ambit of the Commerce Clause by no means suggests that Congress’ 
interstate commerce power is limited to interstate commerce.  In Brown, 
Dinwiddie, Monteleone, Baker, and Hall, for example, the Eighth Circuit 
reaffirmed that Congress’ interstate commerce power reaches purely intrastate 
activity.  Nor is Congress’ power to regulate commerce limited to the 
regulation of commercial activities.  Although in Farmer and Vong, the Eighth 
Circuit appears to have categorically determined that Lopez is inapplicable to 
statutes regulating commercial establishments, it did not suggest that Congress 
may regulate only commercial establishments under the Commerce Clause.  
Indeed, in Dinwiddie, the court squarely determined that Congress’ power to 
regulate commerce is not limited to commercial entities. 
The effectiveness of Lopez also is impaired by the Eighth Circuit’s 
apparent unwillingness to rigorously apply that case if the costs of doing so are 
the repeal of numerous criminal statutes currently on the books and turmoil in 
the system of commerce that has grown up around more established Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.  Particularly indicative of the Eighth Circuit’s apparent 
reluctance in this regard is the court’s reasoning in Wright that, if merely 
crossing state lines did not constitute interstate commerce, then too many 
existing statutes would have to be struck down for want of constitutional 
authority.  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit’s reliance on pre-Lopez cases in 
Brown, Flaherty, and McMasters suggests that Lopez has not been the 
watershed many expected when it comes to interpreting statutes already 
sustained as proper exercises of the commerce power. 
Further softening the impact of Lopez is the fact that the Commerce Clause 
is not the only authority under which Congress may prohibit conduct 
traditionally regulated by the states.  That Congress’ options are not limited to 
the commerce power was made explicit by the Eighth Circuit in Elliot, in 
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which the court determined that Lopez was inapt because, in passing the mail 
fraud statute, Congress had relied upon its postal power, not the interstate 
commerce power.  Likewise, in Emery, the court determined that 18 U.S.C. § 
1512(a)(1)(C), prohibiting the murder of federal informants, does not derive its 
authority from the Commerce Clause, but from Congress’ power to maintain 
the integrity of federal proceedings and investigations.  Finally, in Jensen and 
Hall the court concluded that Congress had acted pursuant to its taxing power, 
not its commerce power.  Hall is particularly interesting because, although the 
Eighth Circuit determined that Congress had exceeded the commerce power by 
prohibiting the possession of unregistered firearms in 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), the 
court concluded that section 5861(d) could nonetheless be sustained as a valid 
exercise of the taxing power. 
Thus, judging by Eighth Circuit jurisprudence, the effect of Lopez on the 
federal balance has been surprisingly minimal.  Lopez’s ineffectiveness can, in 
most cases, be attributed to the inherent limitations of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in that case, which bind the Eighth Circuit and its sister circuits.  
Regardless of the reasons for the almost complete lack of success of claims 
based on Lopez, the fact is Lopez simply has failed to fulfill the wildly 
optimistic prognostications of its many proponents.742   
In contrast to Lopez, the bright-line rule of Seminole Tribe that Congress 
may not employ its Article I powers to abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity has been successful in keeping defendant states out of 
federal court.  The impact of Seminole Tribe is most evident in Moad, in which 
the Eighth Circuit concluded that Congress could not abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity to suit under the overtime provisions of the FLSA 
because that statute apparently was enacted pursuant to the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.  On the heals of Moad, the court squarely determined in 
Raper that Congress did not enact the overtime provisions of the FLSA 
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby rendering those 
provisions virtually unenforceable against the states in federal court. 
Seminole Tribe’s circumscription of Congress’ power to abrogate state 
immunity is all the more important considering that the Eighth Circuit, in cases 
like Moad and Santee Sioux Tribe, has demanded an unequivocal expression of 
a state’s intent to waive its immunity.  Thus, the court has declined to 
circumvent Seminole Tribe by merely implying state waiver where it has not 
been expressed. 
 
 742. The Supreme Court again displayed the inherent limits of Lopez in its recent decision of 
Reno v. Condon, in which the Court held that the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 
regulating the states’ disclosure of information submitted to their motor vehicle divisions, is a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’ interstate commerce power.  See 120 S. Ct. 666, 671 (2000).  
The Court also held that the DPPA does not violate the principles of New York and Printz because 
the statute regulates state activity, and does not compel the states to regulate their citizens.  See id. 
at 672. 
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There are, of course, bounds to the holding of Seminole Tribe that 
constrain its effectiveness in relieving the states of the burden of defending 
themselves in federal court.  For example, to dispel criticism that its holding 
would completely foreclose the federal courts to suits against the states, the 
Court took great pains to enumerate the circumstances in which the states 
remain subject to suit.  Most importantly, the Court explained that the Ex parte 
Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity continues to apply after 
Seminole Tribe.  The continued viability of Ex parte Young was, of course, 
demonstrated by the Eighth Circuit’s disposition of In re SDDS.  The Eighth 
Circuit also demonstrated in Santee Sioux Tribe, however, that it would follow 
the Supreme Court’s lead in Seminole Tribe by declining to apply the Ex parte 
Young exception when it would provide broader relief than the statute sub 
judice would allow. 
The Seminole Tribe Court also endorsed the long-standing exception to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity that suits brought by the United States fall 
outside the purview of the Eleventh Amendment.  This already substantial 
exception to state immunity has been extended in cases like Rodgers and 
Zissler, in which the Eighth Circuit held that suits brought by qui tam relators 
against states in federal court are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment 
because the United States is the real party in interest.743 
Yet another limitation on Seminole Tribe’s capacity for sheltering states 
from suit in federal court is the exception from the Eleventh Amendment of 
attorneys’ fee awards.  As the Eighth Circuit recognized in Jensen and Weaver, 
attorneys’ fees are not subject to the constraints of the Eleventh Amendment 
and, therefore, assessing attorneys’ fees against a state does not require proper 
abrogation of the amendment by Congress. 
Finally, the Eighth Circuit somewhat moderated the effect of the Seminole 
Tribe two-part abrogation test by determining in Crawford that the second 
prong, requiring that Congress act pursuant to a valid exercise of power, is an 
objective requirement.  That is, Congress does not have to specifically intend 
to exercise its section 5 enforcement power when enacting a statute abrogating 
state immunity; the enforcement power need only be a plausible basis for the 
statute. 
Despite these various limitations and exceptions, Seminole Tribe has 
proven effective in preventing Congress from subjecting the states to suit in 
federal court.  Its continued success in this regard is virtually assured by the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in City of Boerne, which, when 
combined with Seminole Tribe, further diminishes the states’ exposure to suit 
 
 743. The Supreme Court will address this issue in the October 1999 term in Vermont Agency 
of Natural Resources v. United States, No. 98-1828, in which it will be called upon to decide 
whether a qui tam relator suing the State of Vermont is the real party in interest for the purposes 
of state sovereign immunity. 
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in federal court by narrowing the issue of congressional abrogation of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity to a question of the extent of Congress’ power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The combination of Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne is featured most 
prominently in the Eighth Circuit’s decisions in Humenansky, Mauney, and 
Alsbrook.  In Humenansky, the court subjected the ADEA to the Seminole 
Tribe abrogation test and concluded that the statute failed both parts of the 
analysis.  Congress not only failed to clearly express its intent to abrogate, it 
also exceeded its enforcement power, as construed in City of Boerne, when it 
enacted the ADEA.744 
In Mauney, the court applied the Seminole Tribe analysis to the IDEA and 
concluded that Congress properly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity 
under section 5.  The dissent, however, would have relied on the court’s 
interpretation of City of Boerne in Humenansky and therefore would have 
found that the IDEA exceeds Congress’ enforcement power.  This case in 
particular—as well as Autio, in which the court en banc was evenly split 
regarding whether Congress properly abrogated state immunity when it 
enacted the ADA—highlights the apparent difference of opinion within the 
Eighth Circuit regarding the bounds of the enforcement power following City 
of Boerne.  The disagreement turns on whether Congress has the power under 
section 5 to prohibit conduct that does not violate the substantive sections of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
The court likely settled this issue, however, in its en banc decision of 
Alsbrook.  There, the court, reversing the panel opinion, rigorously applied 
City of Boerne to strike down the provisions of the ADA that seek to enforce 
against the states rights that the Supreme Court has not found to be guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Beyond its effectiveness in constricting the second prong of the Seminole 
Tribe analysis, the narrow holding of City of Boerne striking down the RFRA 
has had the immediate effect in Eighth Circuit cases like Montano of rendering 
pending RFRA claims no longer viable.  As made explicit in In re Young, 
however, City of Boerne disposes of the RFRA only to the extent that the 
statute applies to state law.  Thus, the RFRA continues to provide private 
plaintiffs the right to sue the federal government for violations of the 
substantive provisions of the statute.  Oddly enough, this limitation of City of 
Boerne’s holding means that the federal government is held to a more rigorous 
standard regarding religious freedom than are the states. 
 
 744. Subsequent to the Eighth Circuit’s decision of Humenasky, the Supreme Court 
considered the issue of Congress’ abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in the ADEA in 
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).  The Court concluded that the ADEA 
contains a clear statement of Congress’ intent to abrogate the states’ immunity, but that the 
abrogation exceeded Congress’ § 5 enforcement power.  See id. at 642, 650. 
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The impact of City of Boerne also may have been impaired to some extent 
by the Eighth Circuit’s suggestion in Mauney, and to a lesser extent In re 
Young, that City of Boerne is a fact-intensive case standing for the 
unremarkable proposition that Congress may not overturn the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of substantive constitutional rights.  The Mauney court further 
suggested that, rather than limit Congress’ power under section 5, City of 
Boerne confirmed the broad scope of the enforcement power.  The Mauney 
court’s interpretation of City of Boerne is dubious, however, considering the 
Eighth Circuit’s en banc decision of Alsbrook, as well as the Supreme Court’s 
latest forays into this area.745  In a trilogy of cases handed down last term, the 
Court continued down the path begun with Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne, 
making it all the more likely that those cases, already clearly the most 
influential of the five Supreme Court cases, will continue to have a profound 
mediating effect on congressional attempts to subject the states to suit in 
federal court. 
 In sum, it appears from the Eighth Circuit’s application of New York, 
Lopez, Seminole Tribe, City of Boerne, and Printz that the capacity of those 
cases for shifting the federal balance of power in favor of the states is a mixed 
bag.  New York and Printz have had little effect outside the marginal realm of 
statutes directly commandeering state legislatures and executives, and Lopez 
appears very nearly to be limited to its facts.  The relatively clear rules of 
Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne, however, have greatly impaired Congress’ 
ability to subject states to private causes of action in federal court and, judging 
by the most recent Eighth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions, will continue 
to do so into the immediate future. 
 
 745. See supra note 36.  
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